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The increased complexity of the business environment, such as globalization of the
market, faster introduction of new products, more interdependencies among firms and
financial crises, has reduced the forecasting accuracy of conventional prediction methods
based on historical data or experts. How can we predict the future? Where can we find
information about the future? 
Over the past decade, some in the business world have come to believe that the best
forecasts emerge from neither past behavior patterns nor far-removed experts who ana -
lyze markets, but rather crowds; the front-line employees who are working directly with
new products and services and interacting daily with buyers, sellers and customers in the
field, as they have the most relevant and updated information and knowledge required for
forecasting. A prediction market, an elegant and well-designed method for capturing the
wisdom of crowds and predicting the outcome of a future event, has been, therefore, intro -
duced. Its promising forecasting results have inspired much enthusiasm among both
researchers and practitioners in recent years.  
This dissertation adopts the information-based view to investigate the effect of
information transparency on traders’ behavior and prediction market performance. The
research consists of three empirical studies. The case study investigates the activity of and
dynamic interactions between traders in an internal prediction market. The subsequent
laboratory experiment examines the effect of price information transparency on market
performance via traders’ behavior. The final field experiment further investigates different
levels of price information transparency in an internal prediction market in a real business
environment. The dissertation distinguishes clearly between information aggregation
efficiency and market predictive accuracy for the analysis of prediction market performance
by defining and developing a measurement of information aggregation efficiency. This
research, as a whole, contributes to the academic literature on information transparency
and prediction markets, and also demonstrates the considerable potential of prediction
markets in managerial decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Forecasting is a fundamental activity of  management within a company, because a forecast is 
often required when a decision is made (Armstrong 1985). Poor forecasting may lead to 
disastrous decisions and huge financial losses. Risk and uncertainty are central to forecasting. 
Nowadays, substantial changes to business and economic environments have increased risks 
and uncertainties for companies.  
 
Within a company, a significant proportion of  financial resources and managerial attention is 
now spent to develop and launch more and more new products every year, as new products 
can increase a company’s long-term financial performance and market value (Ho and Chen 
2007). Demand forecasts are critical to supply, production and launch date planning for each 
new product, and hence, the increased introduction of  new products leads to more frequent 
forecasting. Poor demand forecasts prevent companies from capitalizing on the successes of  a 
new product blockbuster, such as the huge shortage when the Nintendo Wii was launched and 
the delay of  the international launch date of  the iPod Mini (Ho and Chen 2007). 
 
To seek and choose the most promising new product ideas in which to invest, companies have 
become increasingly proactive in sourcing ideas from front-line employees, managers and 
other personnel beyond the boundaries of  research and development departments. Therefore, 
companies now seek agile and easily deployable means to collect and evaluate ideas for new 
products and services, addressing the challenges of  intense and timely innovation (Botho et al. 
2012). In other words, forecasting the success of  a new product idea now requires more 
opinions from a wider variety of  people.  
 
Moreover, the globalization of  markets brings higher complexity into forecasting. Companies 
need to know their home market but also understand unfamiliar overseas markets, including 
competitors, customer behavior, and culture. Particularly, the global market involves more 
complicated logistics management, and companies must be able to accurately forecast demand 
and to target resources (Page 2008).  
 
Outside a company, financial crises, economic recessions, inflation, shortages, changes to 
commercial laws or treaties, and the occurrence of natural disasters all increase the uncertainty 
of management. Accordingly, these dynamic environments have added to the difficulty of 
forecasting (Zhang et al. 1998), though they have focused renewed attention on forecasting 
and the benefits it can provide (Makridakis and Wheelwright 1977). 
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Conventional forecasting methods become less accurate in the aforementioned environments. 
For instance, when a new product is launched statistical forecasting of  demand has no sales 
data on which to base the demand estimate. Thus, statistical forecasting based on historical 
data does not perform as well for new products as it does for existing products (Berg et al. 
2003b; Armstrong 2001).  Likewise, target customers in a survey may not be able to give 
unbiased purchase intentions without learning from early adopters (Ho and Chen 2007), and 
opinion variance between experts is limited if  they are few in number or if  social pressure 
influences their appraisal (Hahn and Tetlock 2006; Ray 2006). Consequently, forecasts based 
on these methods are less accurate.  
 
Over the past decade, some in the business world have come to believe that the best forecasts 
emerge from neither past behavior patterns nor far-removed experts who analyze markets 
(Malone 2004b). Rather, the best forecasts come from crowds; the front-line employees who 
are working directly with new products and services and interacting daily with buyers, sellers 
and customers in the field, as they have the most relevant and updated information and 
knowledge required for forecasting (Hahn and Tetlock 2006; Malone 2004b; Surowiecki 2004). 
The aggregation of  information dispersed in groups is referred to as “the wisdom of  crowds” 
(Surowiecki 2004) and companies are recommended to use it (also called “collective wisdom” 
or “collective intelligence”) to make forecasts and decisions (Bonabeau 2009; Davenport and 
Harris 2009; Malone 2004a; Malone and Klein 2007; Malone et al. 2010; Surowiecki 2004).   
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION OF PREDICTION MARKETS 
A prediction market is an elegant and well-designed method for capturing collective wisdom 
and predicting the outcome of  a future event (Surowiecki 2004). They can be powerful 
information-processing mechanisms that aggregate the views of  multiple market traders to 
generate a prediction of  the future (Kambil and Van Heck 2002). The use of  prediction 
markets for aggregating information about the future is based on the efficient market 
hypothesis (e.g. Chen and Penncok 2010; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004), which asserts that 
financial markets are informationally efficient, and the rational expectations hypothesis (e.g. 
Berg et al. 2008; Bothos et al. 2012; Gruca et al. 2005; Hanson et al. 2006), which states that 
agents’ expectations equal true statistical expected values. These theories suggest that prices in 
a market reflect all available information about the future, and therefore, prices imply the 
prediction of  the future. Figure 1.1 illustrates how a prediction market works. 
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Figure 1.1 Illustration of  How a Prediction Market Works 
 
A prediction market works through a double auction mechanism, in which multiple traders are 
involved in trading contracts (Van Heck 2006). When a prediction market is used within a 
company, the traders are usually the employees of  this company. The contracts represent the 
potential outcomes of  a future event. As illustrated in Figure 1, the future event being 
predicted is a company’s sales of  televisions in the upcoming first quarter of  a new year. Each 
contract represents a possible sales figure. For instance, contract “20-30 million” indicates that 
the sales of  televisions in the first quarter will be between 20 and 30 million.  
 
Traders reflect their opinions of  the potential outcomes in the corresponding buying or selling 
prices. For instance, if  a trader believes that sales in the first quarter are likely to be between 
50 and 60 million, he or she will buy shares of  the contract “50-60 million”. Moreover, in 
order to be able to obtain this contract, he or she is willing to buy the shares of  this contract 
with a higher buying price. On the contrary, if  a trader thinks that sales in the first quarter are 
not likely to be between 50 and 60 million, he or she will sell the shares of  this contract, and 
probably at a lower price in order to execute the sell order quickly. 
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The executed trades construct a market price for the contract. This price reflects the traders’ 
consensus of  the potential outcomes of  the future event. For instance, as shown in Figure 1.1, 
the market price of  the contract “50 and 60 million” is $75 (based on the last transaction 
price), implying the likelihood of  the outcome presented by this contract is approximately 
46%, the highest among all the contracts (the detailed measurement of  the likelihood of  a 
contract is discussed in Chapter 5.) This leading position indicates the traders’ agreed opinion 
that sales of  televisions in the upcoming first quarter are most likely to be between 50 and 60 
million.  
 
The pervasiveness of  information technology (IT), particularly, the Internet, has enabled 
online prediction markets. Online prediction markets eliminate the temporal and spatial 
constraints of  participation: traders all over the world can access a market, any time, anywhere. 
In turn, today’s prediction markets are almost all online markets.  
 
1.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
This dissertation entails five underlying motivations. First, prediction markets, in general, have 
inspired much enthusiasm among both researchers and practitioners in recent years by 
producing promising forecasting results. With regard to public prediction markets that are 
open to anyone (Cowgill et al. 2008; Nocera 2006), numerous markets can be listed (see 
Chapter 2). For example, in the earliest online prediction market, Iowa Electronic Market 
(IEM), 14 out of  15 markets concerning presidential elections in the United States predicted 
the winner accurately (Rhode and Strumpf  2004).  
 
Internal prediction markets, used inside companies and only open to selected traders, who are 
usually employees (Hahn and Tetlock 2006; Plott and Chen 2002; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004), 
have shown similarly promising performance. For instance, Hewlett-Packard (HP) used 
prediction markets to forecast its sales. The markets beat official forecasts 75% of  the time 
(Plott and Chen 2002; Spann and Skiera 2003); Eli Lilly adopted a prediction market to 
forecast the success of  drugs. The market correctly forecasted the three most successful drugs 
(Hahn and Tetlock 2006; Pethokoukis 2004); and Intel used a prediction market to determine 
which factories should produce computer chips and when, which resulted in nearly 100% 
efficiency in allocating manufacturing capacity (Malone 2004b; Hopman 2007). More 
examples can be found in Chapter 2. 
 
The second motivation is the complexity of  prediction markets. Prediction markets embrace a 
number of  noticeable advantages compared to other forecasting methods, including: (1) 
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motivation for traders to reveal their true opinions without deference to or influence by the 
majority (Ho and Chen 2007; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Ray 2006); (2) incentives for traders 
to research and discover information (Bondarenko and Bossaerts 2000; Gruca et al. 2005; 
Malone 2004b; Rhode and Strumpf  2004); and (3) provision of  an algorithm for aggregating 
opinions (Ho and Chen 2007; Ray 2006). Elaboration on the advantages of  prediction markets 
can be seen in Chapter 2. 
 
However, prediction markets as a forecasting method have disadvantages as well. The 
prediction market may not perform well under certain circumstances, such as little relevant or 
accurate information in the market (Malone 2004b; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004), little variance 
of  information held by traders (Surowiecki 2004), or the possibility for traders to manipulate 
or distort the market for their own interest (Hanson et al. 2006; Sunstein 2006a). Elaboration 
on the disadvantages of  prediction markets can be seen in Chapter 2. 
 
Third, traders’ behavior in a prediction market is dynamic and has a great effect on market 
performance. The number, composition, bias and manipulations of  the traders in a prediction 
market all can have an impact on the outcome of  the market (Berg et al. 2008; Hanson et al. 
2006; Healy et al. 2010). Moreover, learning is the underlying activity of  traders in a prediction 
market (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). Traders keep learning from different information 
sources (Bondarenko and Bossaerts 2000; Gruca et al. 2005; Rhode and Strumpf  2004) and 
each other (Chen et al. 2009; Davis and Holt 1993). However, in a prediction market, not 
every trader is rational nor is every trader’s rational level equal. Nevertheless, any trader can 
lead the market.  While “marginal traders”, who are more rational, can lead a market to 
efficiency (Forsythe et al. 1992), there have also been successful attempts to manipulate prices 
(Hansen et al. 2004; Hanson 2006). Thus, this dissertation will address the impact of  the 
individual behavior of  traders on the outcome of  the market. 
 
Fourth, while internal prediction markets have been identified as an exemplar of  the future of  
work (Malone 2004b), the research on internal prediction markets is very limited compared to 
public prediction markets. Due to substantial differences between public and internal 
prediction markets, such as market focus, market size and market duration, (Cowgill et al. 2008; 
Plott and Chen 2002), the findings of  the public markets probably cannot be applied in 
internal markets.  
 
Furthermore, in the practice of  management, many companies are grappling with incentives 
for traders and the potential ramification of  prediction markets (Kiviat 2004). For instance, 
Plott, who ran the first HP prediction market, posed the contradiction between the real money 
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and play money. Real money ensures that traders trade on their best information. However, 
companies that ask employees to risk their own money must face ethical questions. Eli Lilly 
did not have a strategy in place to handle conflict between the market forecast and the official 
forecast: should it follow the results from the market and assume the market is smarter? At 
Intel, there was concern that individual workers in a prediction market may face risks as well. 
Does it mean they are not knowledgeable about something they should be, if  they lose money 
in the market? 
 
Last, our research adopts the information-based view to study prediction markets, as 
information is the key in a prediction market. Traders in a market use and process different 
information in their personal estimation about a future event, reflected in their trading 
activities. Their trading activities in a market become a source of  information for other traders; 
and the market aggregates the dispersed information from the traders through their trading 
activities. In turn, the fundamental element in a prediction market is information and the 
fundamental activity between traders is information exchange.  
 
We particularly address information transparency in our research. Information transparency 
refers to the availability and accessibility of  market information to its traders (Granados et al. 
2010; Zhu 2004). Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) contended that the success of  prediction 
markets, like any market, depends on their design and implementation. Information 
transparency is a fundamental issue in the design of  markets (Bloomfield and O’Hara 1999). 
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) explicated that transparency, the real time, public dissemination 
of  market information, plays a fundamental role in the fairness and efficiency of  markets. 
Despite increased research attention (Bloomfield et al. 2009; Flood et al. 1999; Granados et al. 
2006; 2007; 2008; Mollgaard and Overgaard 2000; Pagano and Röell 1996; Zhu 2002; 2004), 
there is little consensus as to the overall effects of  information transparency on markets. 
Especially, due to the novelty of  prediction markets, little research has studied the effect of  
information transparency on this new type of  market. Consequently, our research 
concentrates on information transparency.   
 
To summarize, the aforementioned disadvantages and potential problems of  prediction 
markets raise many uncertainties and impede the further adoption of  prediction markets, 
particularly inside a company; and information is fundamental throughout a prediction market. 
Therefore, this dissertation focuses on an information-based view of  internal prediction 
markets. 
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1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
This dissertation entails two major research objectives. First, we aim to understand traders’ 
behavior in an internal prediction market. The aforementioned uncertainty of  the human 
factor in a prediction market has been identified as a noticeable concern of  companies (Kaviat 
2004). Although traders’ behavior is one of  the major research streams of  prediction markets, 
the study of  traders in internal prediction markets is underdeveloped.  
 
According to Cowgill et al. (2008), the characteristics of  traders in public and internal 
prediction markets are different. In public markets, traders may not necessary have private 
information about the future event; while in internal prediction markets, as the participants are 
usually selected corporate employees, they have diverse specialized information about business 
events. Thus, traders in an internal prediction market are likely to be more informed than 
those in a public prediction market.  
 
Besides, the behavior of  traders in public and internal prediction markets is different. For 
instance, evidence drawn from the studies showed that traders in public prediction markets are 
likely to be less risk-neutral than traders in internal markets (Tetlock 2004; Cowgill et al. 2008). 
As less risk-neutral traders tend to show long-shot bias, the presence of  long-shot bias is more 
likely to influence a public prediction market than an internal one (Ali 1977; Manski 2006).   
 
Moreover, different conditions between public and internal prediction markets lead to 
different behavior among traders. For instance, the number of  traders in an internal prediction 
market is far smaller than in a public prediction market. In turn, traders are able to and may 
manipulate or distort the market for their own interest in internal prediction markets (Hanson 
et al. 2006; Sunstein 2006a). 
 
Therefore, it is important firstly to understand traders’ behavior in an internal prediction 
market. Accordingly, the first major research question in this dissertation is as follows: 
 
RQmain1: How do traders behave in an internal prediction market?  
 
The other fundamental objective of  this dissertation is to investigate the effect of  information 
transparency on prediction market performance. This research objective has two motivations. 
First, the effect of  transparency on the market outcomes may differ in different types of  
markets (such as auctions and dealer markets) (Pagano and Röell 1996) and existing studies 
have revealed double-edged effects: the effect of  information transparency is not always 
beneficial or equal to different stakeholders in a market. Therefore, no definitive answer to the 
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effect of  information transparency on market outcomes has emerged. Prediction markets, as a 
new type of  market, however, have not been captured in existing research.  
 
Second, Zhu (2002) contended that information transparency is one of  the key features that 
distinguish digital exchanges from traditional markets. He argued that in a physical market, 
information is typically about past transactions or activities; in online markets, information is 
real time, more transparent and more synchronized. As contemporary prediction markets are 
all based on a digital platform, information transparency is definitely relevant to the study of  
prediction markets.  
 
The second main research question is as follows: 
 
RQmain2: How does information transparency in an internal prediction market influence market 
performance? 
 
1.3 RESEARCH METHODS 
This dissertation adopts a pluralist methodology to validate the conceptual framework and 
investigate the research questions. Its major advantages are characterized by diversity and 
efficiency of  study on the full richness and complexity of  the real world, particularly within 
the context of  information systems (IS) (Mingers 2001; Robey 1996).  
 
Three different research methods based on the principles of  discipline and engaged 
scholarship are used in this dissertation to triangulate the results. These three methods 
correspond to three empirical studies and are conducted in sequence. The results drawn from 
each study were used to plan the method of  the following study.  
 
First, we used case studies to explore traders’ behavior in internal prediction markets, 
including their participation and interactions. We investigated the transaction data of  two 
internal prediction markets in an international financial company to understand how actively 
employees participate and to what extent they interact with each other in a prediction market 
in the real business practice.  
 
Second, we conducted laboratory experiments to examine the influence of  information 
transparency in a prediction market on traders’ behavior and market performance. We 
developed online prediction markets with “opaque” and “transparent” conditions and 
recruited university students as subjects for these experiments. To simulate the characteristics 
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of  internal prediction markets, we adopted the actual forecasting events and data of  an 
e-commerce company. 
 
Last, we conducted field experiments to investigate the impact of  information transparency 
strategies on market performance. We developed online prediction markets with four different 
transparency levels and conducted the experiments in an e-commerce company in China. The 
traders were the employees of  this company and the future events being predicted were actual 
management needs. These field experiments allowed us to investigate information 
transparency, traders’ activities and market performance of  internal prediction markets in a 
real business environment. The results of  the field experiments enhance the validity of  
research on prediction markets used inside companies.   
 
1.4 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
This dissertation contributes to the research on prediction markets and information 
transparency. First, this dissertation adds to the theory development of  prediction markets by 
addressing information transparency. Existing studies on prediction market design focus on 
market mechanisms, contracts, traders and incentives. Our research is among the first to add 
information transparency as a factor in prediction market design. Therefore, our studies 
contribute to the research stream of  prediction market design.  
 
With regard to information transparency, as one of  the first to theoretically develop and 
empirically test the impacts of  information transparency in the context of  prediction markets, 
this dissertation extends the previous studies on information transparency that focused only 
on business-to-business (Zhu 2004) or business-to-consumer markets (Granados et al. 2010). 
Unlike previous research, we examine not only the effect of  opaque or transparent 
information conditions but also investigate different transparency levels. Thus, our dissertation 
advances the research in transparency strategy (Granados et al. 2010). 
 
Furthermore, this dissertation defines the “information aggregation efficiency” of  a 
prediction market, which had not been done before. We define the information aggregation 
efficiency of  a prediction market as the ability of  the market to synthesize the traders’ mean 
belief. We also develop the measurement of  information aggregation efficiency. Our definition 
and measurement distinguish the information aggregation efficiency and the predictive 
accuracy of  a prediction market, which were confused and unidentified in previous studies.   
 
Besides, this research focuses on internal prediction markets, and hence, adds to the literature 
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on prediction markets used in companies and the business world. In particular, our research 
provides insights into traders’ behavior, including traders’ individual activities and interactions 
in internal prediction markets. Thus, we extend the research stream of  traders’ behavior in 
prediction markets.  
 
Moreover, we contribute to the pluralist methodology by demonstrating the feasibility of  
using multi-method research in IS. Mingers (2001) argued that only a tiny proportion of  IS 
empirical research has adopted multiple methods; the majority of  these methods are in fact 
just a narrow spectrum centered around traditional approaches with very little by way of  
cross-paradigm linkages. This dissertation adopted different research methods, including case 
studies, laboratory experiments, field experiments and follow-up surveys. As a result, we 
extend the manifestation of  a pluralist methodology in IS. 
 
This dissertation further contributes to the managerial implications of  empirical studies of  
internal prediction markets. First, empirical studies demonstrate the possibility of  using 
prediction markets to gather dispersed information from employees and accurately forecast 
the future. Second, the research proposes general principles to guide organizations to design 
and operate an internal prediction market, particularly with regard to information transparency. 
Third, field experiments conducted in a new, dynamic and highly uncertain business 
environment demonstrate the considerable potential of  prediction markets in managerial 
decision-making.    
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation consists of  seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research topic and the 
overview of  the dissertation. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on prediction markets and 
information transparency. Based on the literature review, we draw an overall conceptual 
framework. Chapter 3 justifies the overall research methodology and specific research methods. 
Subsequently, Chapters 4, 5 and 6 present the three empirical studies. Each study focuses on 
specific research questions. These studies together validate the overall conceptual framework. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the key research findings drawn from the studies, elaborates the 
scientific, methodological, and managerial contributions of  the dissertation, discusses the 
limitations of  the research, and suggests future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a survey of  the literature on prediction markets, and focuses particularly 
on empirical studies of  prediction markets. These empirical researches allow us to identify 
which areas have been investigated and what major findings have been revealed. 
 
Based on the literature, we first identify the definition of  prediction markets used in this 
dissertation. Second, we analyze the advantages and disadvantages of  prediction markets 
compared to traditional forecasting methods. Third, we summarize the applications of  
prediction markets in the field and discuss the performance of  these markets. Last, we classify 
the existing research into three main streams and discuss the major debates. 
 
Moreover, we survey the literature on information transparency, which has been identified as 
an important and influential factor of  markets (Bloomfield and O’Hara 1999; Granados et al. 
2008). We summarize the effects of  information transparency on markets drawn from the 
empirical evidence. Finally, we review the transparency strategies that have been identified and 
applied in markets. 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION OF PREDICTION MARKETS 
Research on prediction markets is of  interest to both academia and the business world. We, 
therefore, commence our literature review with a discussion of  terminology and we present 
the definition used in this dissertation. 
 
2.1.1 Terminology and Definition 
The literature survey showed that different terms have been applied to “prediction markets”. 
We identified eight commonly used terms. Table 2.1 lists these terms and examples of  the 
corresponding references. We noticed that use of  “prediction markets” is most common in 
the existing literature, accounting for approximately 50%. Recent literature, since 2007, has 
mostly adopted the term “prediction markets” (see Table 2.1). Accordingly, we use the term 
“prediction market” in this dissertation. 
 
Similar to the terminology, there are various definitions of  prediction markets. Table 2.2 
shows some of  these definitions. Essentially, there are two types of  definitions. One describes 
the purpose of  prediction markets; and the other describes the working mechanism and 
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features of  prediction markets. To explain the use of  prediction markets and its fundamental 
working principle, we define prediction markets as follows: 
 
Prediction markets are designed and conducted for the primary purpose of  aggregating 
information so that market prices forecast future events. In such markets, a group of  traders 
trade in contracts whose payoff  depends on unknown future events. 
 
2.1.2 Theoretical Foundation of  Prediction Markets 
Existing research has suggested that the use of  prediction markets is based on two major 
theoretical foundations, the rational expectations hypothesis (e.g. Berg et al. 2008; Bothos et al. 
2012; Gruca et al. 2005; Hanson et al. 2006) and the efficient market hypothesis (e.g. Chen and 
Penncok 2010; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004).  
 
The rational expectations hypothesis states that, in the aggregate, the expected price is an 
unbiased predictor of  the actual price (Muth 1961). According to this theory, all available 
information to traders in a market is revealed by prices in the process of  trading (Grossman 
1981; Lucas 1972; 1978). 
 
According to the efficient market hypothesis, in an efficient market, prices always “fully reflect” 
all available information (Fama 1970). In a prediction market, traders trade contracts 
corresponding to a future event. In accordance with the efficient market hypothesis, in a truly 
efficient prediction market, contract prices reflect all available information about the future 
event. No combination of  other information can be used to improve on the market-generated 
forecasts, and thus, the market price will be the best predictor of  the event (Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz 2004). 
 
The efficient market hypothesis and rational expectations hypothesis are neither contradictory 
nor mutually exclusive. The efficient market hypothesis is in fact the application of  the theory 
of  rational expectations to financial markets (Mishkin 2010). As the prediction market 
mechanism is similar to a financial market, the efficient market hypothesis is, therefore, 
identified as a theoretical foundation of  prediction markets.  
 
Hayek (1945) proposed the use of  markets to aggregate dispersed information from market 
traders. He pointed out that the knowledge of  the circumstances of  which we must make use 
never exists in concentrated or integrated form. The knowledge exists solely as dispersed bits 
of  incomplete and frequently contradictory information, possessed by the separate individuals. 
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As a result, the fundamental problem is the utilization of  knowledge not given to anyone in its 
totality. He further suggested that this problem should be solved by some form of  
decentralization instead of  centralization. To be specific, he explicated that the economic 
problem of  society is mainly one of  rapid adaptation to changes in the particular 
circumstances of  time and place. Therefore, the problem should be solved by the people who 
know of  the relevant changes and the resources immediately available to meet them. To 
communicate information, a mechanism must be adopted. Hayek (1945) proposed that the 
price system, which operates the economy of  knowledge, can enable the individual 
participants to take the right action even with little knowledge, because the most essential 
information is passed on, and passed on only to those concerned, by price.  
 
Hayek’s (1945) proposal on the use of  knowledge in society was in fact in line with the 
rational expectation theory and the efficient market theory. Malone (2004b) further contended 
that this decentralized form of  decision-making is the future of  work and a prediction market 
is an exemplar. 
 
2.1.3 Prediction Markets vs. Traditional Forecasting Methods 
Armstrong (2001) classified all the possible types of  forecasting methods into two major 
categories, statistical and judgmental. Statistical methods make predictions by discovering a 
pattern of  historical data. Judgmental methods make predictions by sourcing information 
from individuals. A prediction market is a judgmental method. Compared to other forecasting 
methods, a prediction market is novel. In turn, traditional forecasting methods, in this 
dissertation, refer to any other commonly used statistical or judgmental method. 
 
2.1.3.1 Disadvantages of  Traditional Forecasting Methods 
Commonly used statistical forecasting techniques include time series models (e.g. historical 
values of  the outcome to be forecasted with trends, auto-regressive and moving average 
components when needed) and structural models (e.g. regression models based on input 
variables estimated on past observations) (Berg et al. 2003b). Given a sufficient number of  
observations under essentially identical conditions and sufficient stationarity, statistical 
methods are more accurate than judgmental methods (Armstrong 2001; Berg et al. 2003b). 
 
However, the events being predicted often lack sufficient data, stationarity or both (Berg et al. 
2003b) and the environment is often too complex to model (Zhang et al. 1998). For instance, 
as companies increase the development of  the extensions to existing products and new 
products and the business environment becomes increasingly dynamic, the availability of  
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relevant historical data becomes constrained and the predictive power of  historical data is 
reduced. In turn, judgmental methods have been increasingly adopted in the contemporary 
business environment. 
  
Widely adopted judgmental forecasting methods include intentions (e.g. target customer 
survey about their purchase intentions) and expert opinions (e.g. pooling of  experts’ opinions) 
(Amstrong 2001). Both are deliberative associated methods, but with potential problems. For 
instance, as Ho and Chen (2007) argued, surveys do not motivate customers to reveal their 
true purchase intentions and do not provide customers with information that early adopters 
of  new products have learned. Hence, the link between stated purchase intention and the 
ultimate purchase behavior is weak and customers give biased responses. They further pointed 
out that under the approach of  pooling expert opinions, opinions are typically weighted 
equally, independent of  the experts’ knowledge. Moreover, experts’ opinions may not be 
independent of  each other because they rely on same information source. Consequently, the 
associated demand forecast is inaccurate. 
 
2.1.3.2 Advantages of  Prediction Markets 
The advantages of  prediction markets over the aforementioned traditional forecasting 
methods derive from the fact that they solve the problems of  traditional methods. Wolfers 
and Zitzewitz (2004) summarized three major advantages of  prediction markets. 
 
First, prediction markets provide incentives for truthful revelation. In a prediction market, the 
trading process is usually anonymous. Particularly, in an Internet-based online prediction 
market, traders do not even see each other. Thus, whether traders know each other or not in 
their social networks, in a prediction market, they are not confronted with any social pressure, 
such as following group behavior (Hahn and Tetlock 2006; Ray 2006). Thus, prediction 
markets motivate traders to reveal their true opinions without deference to or influence by the 
majority (Ho and Chen 2007; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Ray 2006). Moreover, since the 
reward (i.e. profit) and punishment (i.e. loss) are straight forward, the self-interest of  profit in 
a prediction market motivates traders to reveal their private information (Ray 2006). 
 
Second, prediction markets provide incentives for research and information discovery. Traders’ 
self-interest in a prediction market is to profitably trade, and thus, they must improve their 
personal prediction accuracy. A common approach is to take into consideration more recent 
information. Bondarenko and Bossaerts (2000), Gruca et al. (2005), Malone (2004b) and 
Rhode and Strumpf  (2004) demonstrated that traders keep updating their beliefs based on 
different information sources (e.g. news) available to them and reflect the updated 
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information in their buy and sell orders. As a result, a prediction market encourages traders to 
explore and absorb additional accurate information so as to improve the accuracy or relevance 
of  their personal information. 
 
Third, the market provides an algorithm for aggregating opinions. It is reasonably assumed 
that some traders may have incentives to distort the information they provide so as to 
influence prices to their own benefits, leading to the exercise of  monopoly. Nevertheless, 
because traders compete instead of  collaborate in a prediction market, this monopoly power 
will be eliminated (Abramowicz 2006; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). As a result, traders who 
place a larger bet in a prediction market are likely to be more confident about their 
information. As Ray (2006) argued, by their structure, prediction markets automatically allow 
traders to bet as much money as they desire, using their specialized information in the hopes 
of  profiting from it. This is how information will be given more weight in the aggregation 
process in a prediction market. The incentives derived from prediction markets in fact provide 
a natural way to weigh opinions (Ho and Chen 2007). 
 
2.1.3.3 Disadvantages of  Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets, however, are unlikely to perform well under certain conditions. First, 
prediction market performance relies on relevant and dispersed information. If  little relevant 
or accurate information exists in the market, the prediction market is not able to capture the 
entire picture of  the future event (Malone 2004b; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). Consequently, 
the prediction will not be accurate. 
 
Second, traders are motivated by disagreement and contest rather than consensus or 
compromise (Surowiecki 2004). If  traders hold similar information in a prediction market, 
they tend to carry homogeneous beliefs, leading to few trading activities. Consequently, 
information is not aggregated in the market. 
 
Third, the weights that markets give to different opinions may not be an improvement on 
alternative algorithms where the accuracy of  pundits is directly observable (Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz 2004). For instance, the public information on the probability of  weapons of  mass 
destruction in Iraq appears to have been of  dubious quality, and hence, it is unsurprising that 
markets were as susceptible to be misled as general public opinion.  
 
Furthermore, traders in a prediction market with a small group of  traders have higher 
potential to manipulate or distort the market for their own interest. Manipulation and 
distortion undermine the capacity of  the market for self-correction (Hanson et al. 2006) and 
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hence, the collective result is not likely to be wise (Sunstein 2006a). 
 
2.1.4 Field Applications of  Prediction Markets 
In this section, we first distinguish two types of  prediction markets, public and internal. 
Second, we exhibit the examples of  public and internal prediction markets. Thereafter, we 
discuss the performance of  these prediction markets.  
 
2.1.4.1 Public and Internal Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets can be applied in public or private sectors and correspondingly categorized 
into public prediction markets or internal prediction markets (Hahn and Tetlock 2006). Public 
prediction markets give free entry to anyone (Cowgill et al. 2008; Nocera, 2006) while internal 
prediction markets are used inside companies and are only open to selected traders who are 
usually employees (Hahn and Tetlock 2006; Plott and Chen 2002; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
2004). 
 
Internal prediction markets are substantially different from public prediction markets in 
various ways (see Table 2.3). For example, Plott and Chen (2002) noted that in public 
prediction markets, it is unclear if  there is any specific or specialized information that is 
unavailable for the general public. As public reports of  the event to be forecasted in a public 
prediction market are usually available, markets such as the Iowa Electronic Market (IEM), in 
fact are only effective and sophisticated systems of  polling, collections of  personal intentions, 
coordination mechanisms of  public information, or combinations of  polls. In other words, 
the information aggregated in public prediction markets is not necessarily inside information 
(beyond the personal intention to vote). 
 
Furthermore, in internal prediction markets, traders are selected specifically from different 
parts of  the business operation, as these traders are thought to have different inside 
information about the targeted events. This inside information (e.g. market intelligence, 
specific information about big clients and pricing strategies) must be aggregated. In addition, 
there are usually no public summaries of  information available to the traders during the 
operation of  the market. 
 
Moreover, Cowgill et al. (2008) pointed out that public and internal prediction markets differ 
in market liquidity and traders’ behavior as well. For instance, public prediction markets 
usually have a large number of  traders, and thus do not have problems with liquidity. However, 
as internal prediction markets do not always have many traders, they are often confronted with 
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limited trading. Additionally, evidence drawn from studies showed traders in public prediction 
markets are likely to be less risk-neutral than traders in internal markets (Tetlock 2004; Cowgill 
et al. 2008).  
 
Table 2.3 Differences between Public and Internal Prediction Markets                             
based on Plott and Chen (2002) and Cowgill et al. (2008) 
Aspects Public Prediction Markets Internal Prediction Markets 
Market focus 
Public events 
(observable by public) 
Corporate issues 
(partially observable by people who 
are close to the activity) 
Traders Every single individual Selected corporate employees 
Market size Large Small 
Aggregated information 
Personal intentions;  
public information 
Different specialized information 
about business events 
Market duration Long Short 
Market liquidity Likely to be high Likely to be constrained 
Traders behavior Less risk-neutral More risk-neutral 
 
2.1.4.2 Applications in Practice 
Public prediction markets appeared first in field applications. The IEM is perceived to be the 
first field application of  prediction markets and is widely recognized (Berg and Rietz 2006; Ho 
and Chen 2007; Ray 2006). Operated by the University of  Iowa Tippie College of  Business, 
the IEM is a real-money prediction market, though not for profit. Although the first IEM 
prediction market in 1988 allowed only University of  Iowa affiliates to participate, subsequent 
prediction markets have all been public and all the traders voluntarily invest between US$5 
and US$500. 
 
The IEM is best known for its United States and worldwide election markets. However, along 
with development and penetration, the IEM now has conducted markets on a broad range of  
events, such as political appointments, outcomes of  legislative processes, international 
relationships, economic indicators, movie box office receipts, market capitalization after an 
initial public offering (IPO), corporate earnings forecasts, corporate stock price returns, and 
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the incidence of  influenza (Berg and Rietz 2006). 
 
Another well-known but relatively new prediction market is the Hollywood Stock Exchange 
(HSX). The HSX allows people to use virtual currency to speculate on entertainment-related 
events, such as weekend and total box office returns on the upcoming movies, the success of 
the current season’s new TV series, the impact of movie stars on movie’s average gross, and 
the winners of Oscars (Ho and Chen 2007; Lamare 2007).  
 
Besides, numerous public prediction markets have been established. Table 2.4a lists some of  
them that have been frequently discussed in the literature.  
 
Nevertheless, the information of  internal prediction markets is far more limited compared to 
public prediction markets. Table 2.4b shows some companies that have conducted internal 
prediction markets and reported the results, including the events being predicted. 
 
Among these internal prediction market examples, the best-known is that of  HP. In 1996, HP 
initiated its internal prediction markets. During three years, HP conducted 12 markets to 
forecast sales of  various printer products. The traders were recruited from three HP divisions, 
including marketing, finance and HP labs. The duration of  each market was always one week. 
However, the number of  active traders and contracts varied in each market from 7 to 26 and 
from 8 to 10, respectively (Plott and Chen 2002). 
 
2.1.4.3 Prediction Market Performance 
Prediction market performance is commonly measured in two ways, accuracy and usability. 
Existing studies tend to measure accuracy rather than usability. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) 
argued that the most important issue with prediction markets and the like is their performance 
as predictive tools. The accuracy of prediction markets can essentially be categorized in 
absolute terms against the actual outcome and in relative terms against predictions derived 
from competing forecasting methods (Berg and Rietz 2003). The smaller the discrepancy 
between a prediction and the actual outcome, the more accurate the prediction. 
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In general, prediction markets have proven to be uncannily accurate in predicting all types of 
events (Ray 2006). This contention can be supported by numerous evidences. Table 2.4a 
summarizes the accuracy of some well-known public prediction markets. For instance, in the 
earliest prediction market, IEM, 14 out of  15 markets concerning presidential elections in the 
United States predicted the winner accurately (Rhode and Strumpf  2004). In the HSX, 
prediction markets concerning Oscar award winners forecasted correctly eight out of  eight 
times in 2005 and seven out of  eight times in 2006 and 2007. Concerning movie office-box 
revenues, HSX achieved twice as many hits as the expert judgments (a ‘hit’ refers to a case 
where a specific forecasting instrument has the lowest absolute percentage error of  all 
considered forecasting instruments for the same movie) (Lamare 2007; Spann and Skiera 
2003).  
 
Evidences drawn from internal prediction markets were limited compared to public prediction 
markets because fewer internal prediction markets carried out. Table 2.4b exhibits the 
accuracy of  internal prediction markets. All these markets demonstrated that prediction 
markets not only predict accurately against the actual outcomes but also outperform 
competing forecasting mechanism. For example, in HP, six out of  eight markets predicted 
more accurately than HP official forecasts (Chen and Plott 2002); Siemens’ internal markets 
correctly predicted that the firm would definitely fail to deliver on a software project on time, 
whereas traditional planning tools suggested the opposite result (Ortner 1998); and the 
internal market prediction of  the success of  six Eli Lilly drugs was exactly the same as the 
actual outcome (Pethokoukis 2004).  
 
The amazing forecasting accuracy of prediction markets may also be illustrated by an 
unexpected suspension of a market project. The United States Pentagon created the Terrorism 
Futures Market in 2003 in order to aggregate information regarding potential acts of terrorism, 
and in turn, the Pentagon would be able to preclude or at least hedge against such acts. 
However, the prices, which could inform the government about the terrorists’ attack plans, 
could also inform terrorists about the government’s security plans. Moreover, the terrorists 
might even have profited from inside information revealed in the market, which might have 
led to public outrage. Consequently, the market was terminated immediately after its inception 
(Hahn and Tetlock 2006; Ray 2006).  
 
Usability, whether or not information can be used to make decisions, is another important 
measurement of  market performance (Bocij et al. 2003). Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2006a) argued 
that prices provide useful estimates of  average beliefs about the probability an event will occur, 
and hence, prediction markets ultimately can be used for decision-making (Ledyard 2006). 
This argument can be supported by the performance of  internal prediction markets. For 
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instance, the results based on 270 internal markets during two and half  years in Google 
revealed that market prices closely approximated event probabilities (Cowgill et al. 2008).  
 
In some cases, prediction markets may not outperform the competing mechanism in terms of  
accuracy, but they can provide additional information for decision-making. For instance, 
Gadanecz (2007) argued that “Economic Derivatives”, in contrast to survey-based measures, 
produce true density forecasts, covering the whole distribution of  the “market’s view”, not 
just point estimates. This information could be used to track the uncertainty of  market traders 
about the state of  the macroeconomy and to monitor the probabilities they attach to tail 
events. Chen et al. (2009; 2010) demonstrated that a Fortune 100 company used a prediction 
market for a first-stage screening process for emerging technologies. The company has 
decided to expand investment in the use of  this prediction market. 
 
2.2 MAJOR RESEARCH STREAMS OF PREDICTION MARKETS 
Our literature survey suggested that the existing discussion of  prediction markets concentrates 
on three areas. Most studies demonstrated the market’s ability to accurately predict future 
events and aggregate information, addressing the aggregation level of  a prediction market (see 
2.2.1). Another stream of  researches investigated traders’ behavior in prediction markets, 
addressing the individual level of  a prediction market (see 2.2.2). The third stream of  literature 
focused on market design, identifying and discussing the important design aspects of  a 
prediction market (see 2.2.3). 
 
2.2.1 Accuracy and Information Aggregation 
In this research stream, studies dealt with two aspects of  prediction markets, prediction 
accuracy and information aggregation.  
 
2.2.1.1 Accuracy 
Noticeable evidences have manifested the powerful predictive ability of  prediction markets, 
not only the point estimate (Gadanecz 2007) but also the probabilities (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
2006a). In section 2.4.1.3, we have illustrated the accuracy of  prediction markets from field 
applications. Essentially, it is beyond doubt that prediction markets can make accurate 
forecasts.  
 
Additional researches further investigated under which conditions a prediction market shows 
more or less powerful predictive ability. Two major results were drawn from the empirical 
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studies. First, taking into consideration time horizons, prediction markets are viable 
forecasting tools both in the short run (e.g. forecasting one day or one week ahead) and in the 
long run (e.g. forecasting three months ahead). Their predictive accuracy outperforms 
competing methods (e.g. surveys) particularly in the long run (Berg et al. 2008). This result 
suggested that prediction markets are suitable when the events do not have a long history or a 
clear model for a statistical forecasting method. 
 
Second, the predictive power of  prediction markets reduces with the increased complexity of  
the environment. Healy et al. (2010) argued that prediction markets are likely to outperform in 
an environment a with relatively simple information structure (e.g. with one event and fewer 
contracts). In contrast, when the information structure becomes complex (e.g. with correlated 
multiple events and more contracts), other forecasting methods (e.g. Delphi) generate more 
accurate predictions. A possible reason is that traders tend to focus attention on a small subset 
of  the possible outcomes of  a future event, resulting in severe mispricing overall.  
 
2.2.1.2 Information Aggregation 
In prediction markets, some traders have a piece of  information about the future event being 
predicted, but some do not (Plott 2000). The former are referred to as informed traders; and 
the latter are referred to as uninformed traders. However, markets are efficient, because 
information can be disseminated from the informed to the uninformed. This process is 
referred to as information aggregation (Gruca et al. 2005; Plott and Sunder 1982; 1988).  
 
Information aggregation is processed through trading activities. A trader’s individual bids and 
asks on a contract represent the value he or she expects of  the contract. Similarly, a 
transaction on a contract represents the aggregate expected value of  the contract. These 
orders and transactions in turn become public information available in the market and other 
traders learn from it. Gradually, with an increased number of  trades, information about a 
future event is disseminated from the informed to the uninformed. In turn, traders’ beliefs 
regarding the potential outcomes of  a future event in a prediction market become convergent. 
Wolfers and Sitzewitz (2006a) and Gjerstad (2004) demonstrated that when the traders’ beliefs 
are convergent, the market price in stock markets will be very close to the mean of  market 
participants’ beliefs. Accordingly, we define information aggregation efficiency as follows:  
 
Information aggregation efficiency of  a prediction market is the ability of  the market to 
synthesize the traders’ mean belief. 
 
With regard to information aggregation, the central discussion point in the current literature is 
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whether or not a prediction market can aggregate dispersed information from traders. The 
results showed positive findings. Gruca et al. (2005) asserted that prediction markets can 
aggregate private information held by traders and disseminate this information in the market 
by trading, and thus the market eventually aggregates the consensus of  the traders. This result 
suggested that prediction markets facilitate decision-making by aggregating dispersed 
information. 
 
Bothos et al. (2012) further exemplified the promising use of  prediction markets in idea 
screening based on its information aggregating ability. They argued that prediction markets 
enable the acquisition of  more ideas from individuals than forum-like idea suggestion systems, 
though the quality of  ideas is similar between the two methods. 
 
2.2.2 Traders’ Behavior  
The research in this area focused on the effect of  uninformed traders and traders’ 
manipulation of  information aggregation and the predictive accuracy of  prediction markets. 
 
2.2.2.1 Presence of  Uninformed Traders 
Informed and uninformed traders are distinguished based on their possession of  private 
information of  future events. Informed traders are those who have some private information 
while uninformed traders do not (Berg et al. 2008). Empirical evidence has led to controversial 
discussions. Kyle (1985) argued that uninformed traders bring larger trades into the market 
and provide profit opportunities for informed traders, leading to the acquisition and 
integration of  information. Berg et al. (2008) and Tetlock (2007) counter argued that although 
increased trading volume positively correlates to market predictive accuracy, the presence of  
uninformed traders leads to less accurate prediction and slower information convergence.  
 
Experimental studies showed mixed results. Bloomfield et al. (2009) drew the conclusion that 
uninformed traders may increase trading volume but their trading diminishes the adjustment 
of  market prices to new information, leading to lower informational efficiency. On the 
contrary, greater information aggregation was observed when uninformed traders were 
present (Healy et al. 2010), in line with Kyle’s (1985) argument. 
2.2.2.2 Bias and Manipulations 
A trader’s actions in a prediction market may be biased due to their opinions (e.g. wishful 
thinking) (Forsythe et al. 1992; 1999). Traders may also attempt to manipulate prices in order 
to gain in the market (Hanson et al. 2004). Related research showed that neither of  these 
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factors is able to distort prediction accuracy. 
 
The fundamental argument was that the efficiency of  the market does not depend on the 
average traders but on the so-called “marginal trader” (Forsythe et al. 1992). A marginal trader 
is relatively free of  judgment bias, and thus consistently buys and sells at prices very close to 
the equilibrium price, which reflects all available information about future events (Forsythe et 
al. 1992). These traders are usually more rational and can drive the efficiency of  market prices 
in spite of  large numbers of  traders who constantly display suboptimal behavior (Oliven and 
Rietz 2004). 
 
Several reasons have been identified. First, biased traders may be driven from the market by 
losses incurred as a result of  biased trading (Oliven and Rietz 2004). Second, biased traders 
may learn from market prices (Bondarenko and Bossaerts 2000; Gruca et al. 2005; Rhode and 
Strumpf  2004) and update their expectations in a way that defeats the bias (Oliven and Rietz 
2004). Third, biased traders tend to be inactive (Forsythe et al. 1992). Highly biased traders 
generally tend to buy and hold contracts, leading to transitory effects on prices at most 
(Forsythe et al. 1992; 1999). Last, when setting at-market limit orders and setting prices, 
traders are much less mistake-prone. These traders, who “make” the market, are likely to be 
more rational (Forsythe et al. 1999). As a result, rational traders drive efficient markets. 
 
With regard to manipulators, first, similar to biased traders, they face the risk of  losses 
incurred as a result of  “irrational” trading, and thus, may be driven from the market before 
their manipulations succeed. Second, manipulators attempt to make systematically higher price 
offers than other traders. However, the reluctance of  non-manipulators to accept such high 
offers effectively cancels out the distortionary effects of  manipulations (Hansen et al. 2004; 
Hanson 2006). Third, the increased profit opportunity from manipulators increases the effort 
by other traders to obtain relevant information, possibly increasing the price accuracy 
(Hanson 2006). Finally, when traders suspect the presence of  manipulators and know in what 
directions manipulators would like to push the price, the manipulation becomes ineffective 
(Hanson et al. 2004; 2006). As a result, efforts to manipulate prices are unsuccessful (Camerer 
1998; Rhode and Strumpf  2004). 
 
Nevertheless, an exception was indeed found in empirical evidence. Hansen et al. (2004) 
reported successful attempts at manipulating prices in the IEM. Hanson (2006) argued that 
prediction markets are hard to manipulate, except for a thin market, where the number of  
traders is very limited, or during a short transition phase (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004).  
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2.2.3 Market Design 
Existing studies on prediction market design focused on four key issues, including market 
mechanisms, contracts, traders and incentives.  
 
2.2.3.1 Market Mechanisms 
A prediction market mechanism determines how buyers and sellers are matched (Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz 2004). Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) identified four major mechanisms applied in 
prediction markets. First, the most-adopted prediction market mechanism is a continuous 
double auction (CDA), in which buyers submit bids and sellers submit asking prices and the 
mechanism executes a trade whenever the two sides of  the market reach a mutually agreeable 
price. The second mechanism is a continuous double auction with a market maker 
(CDAwMM), who is willing to accept a large number of  buy and sell orders at particular 
prices. The third mechanism is a pari-mutuel market (PM), in which all of  the money that is 
bet goes into a common pot and is then divided among the winners. The last mechanism is 
market scoring rules (MSR), which can be thought of  as sequential scoring rules with many 
traders.  
 
Each mechanism has benefits and drawbacks. A CDA poses no risk for the market institution, 
as it only matches willing traders. However, a CDA may suffer from illiquidity in the form of  
huge bid-ask spreads or light trading (Hanson 2003; Pennock 2004). In turn, when the 
number of  traders is small, a CDA may face a liquidity problem. A CDAwMM has built-in 
liquidity, as the market maker is usually affiliated with the market institution. Nevertheless, the 
market maker is exposed to significant risk of  large losses. As a result, the liquidity comes at a 
cost. The advantage of  both CDA and CDAwMM is their incentives for traders to 
continuously leverage information as soon as it becomes available. As a result, prices capture 
updated information exceptionally well (Pennock 2004). 
 
A PM does not have the problem with liquidity or involve risks for loss, because traders can 
place a bet on any outcome at any time with no need of  a market maker. Prices in this 
mechanism, however, do not reflect continuously updated information, as traders do not place 
bets until either all information is revealed or the market is about to close. Consequently, this 
market mechanism is not suitable for situations where information arrives over time (Pennock 
2004). A dynamic pari-mutuel market (DPM), a hybrid between a CDA and a PM, was 
proposed by Pennock (2004) and solves the CDA problem of  illiquidity and allows for 
continuous information incorporation, which is not possible in a standard PM. Nevertheless, 
this mechanism has the drawbacks of  only one-sided liquidity of  buy orders and unfixed 
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payoff, which complicates a trader’s problem of  strategic optimization. 
 
A MSR, developed based on scoring rules, can be conceptualized as a market that provides a 
two-sided automated market maker that is always willing to accept a trade on any event at 
some price. Therefore, it avoids the problem of  illiquidity and allows for continuous 
information incorporation but implies risks (Hanson 2003; Pennock 2004). A MSR allows for 
simultaneous predictions over many combinations of  outcomes instead of  requiring separate 
markets for each combination of  possible outcomes. Hence, the sum of  traders’ errors over 
all predictions is lower (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004).     
  
2.2.3.2 Contracts 
Contracts are tied to the outcomes of  future events, and hence, contract design is pivotal to 
prediction markets (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004; 2006b). Three basic types of  contracts in 
prediction markets have been distinguished (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). The first type is 
“winner-takes-all” in which the contract costs some amount of  money and pays off  only if  a 
specific event occurs. The price in a winner-takes-all market represents the market’s 
expectation of  the probability that an event will occur based on the assumption of  neutral 
risk.  
 
The second type of  contract is “index”, in which the amount that the contract pays varies in a 
continuous way based on a number that rises or falls. This contract price represents the mean 
value that the market assigns to the outcome.  
 
The third type of  contract is “spread”, in which traders differentiate themselves by bidding on 
the cutoff  that determines whether an event occurs. For example, in a game of  football, either 
one team will win by at least a certain number of  points or not. Combined with the setting 
that winners double their money while losers receive zero, the corresponding price indicates 
the market’s expectation of  the median outcome.  
 
Clear, easily understood and easily adjudicated contracts are important for a prediction market 
to work well (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004; Ledyard 2006). The description of  the contracts 
must be able to help traders distinguish the alternatives considered. However, a challenge can 
arise if  the underlying facts tied to the contracts change unexpectedly. For instance, in 
Ortner’s (1998) study, the internal prediction market on whether a software project would be 
delivered to the client on schedule was confronted with the change of  the deadline extended 
by the client.  
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2.2.3.3 Traders 
The discussion on traders in prediction markets concentrated on the number and the 
composition of  traders. First, a large number of  traders are thought to be necessary for the 
market to function well (Kambil and Van Heck 2002; Ho and Chen 2007). Since traders 
incorporate their information into their trading activities, more traders are likely to lead to 
more trading activities in a market, and thus more information will be aggregated in the 
market. In addition, Surowiecki (2004) and Abramowicz (2006) asserted that traders in a 
prediction market do not deliberate but compete. They argued that a larger number of  traders 
may pose more intensive competition, and thus, motivate traders to actively trade on 
information available to them. Furthermore, a relatively large number of  traders make it likely 
that there is accurate information of  the future event in the prediction market (Sunstein 
2006a). 
 
With regard to the composition of  traders, it has been argued that traders with different 
information in a prediction market are desirable. As mentioned above, traders in a prediction 
market are motivated by disagreement and contest rather than consensus or comprise 
(Surowiecki 2004; Abramowicz 2006). If  they hold similar information, they tend to carry 
homogeneous beliefs, leading to few trading activities and impeding information aggregation. 
Therefore, a diversity of  opinions of  the future event should be considered in the prediction 
market design (Ray 2006).  
 
It should be clarified that the number and the composition of  traders are not mutually 
exclusive issues of  prediction market design. A larger number of  traders are, in fact, likely to 
have heterogeneous information.  
 
2.2.3.4 Incentives 
Incentives are given to motivate traders to trade and reveal information in prediction markets. 
The central research question of  this design issue was how much difference it makes whether 
prediction markets run with real money or with play money (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). 
Controversial results were drawn from the existing research. On the one hand, early studies 
revealed that prediction markets work better when “[the traders] put their money where their 
mouth is” (Hanson 1999). Since traders risk their own money, they tend to make better use of  
their information and proactively seek accurate information. In turn, the information 
aggregated in the market is more accurate. 
 
On the other hand, Servan-Schreiber (2004) and Rosenbloom and Notz (2006) demonstrated 
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that the predictions drawn from real-money markets and play-money markets did not differ 
significantly and both were accurate. Moreover, recent studies on play-money markets 
supported the conclusion that non-monetary incentives, as long as they were properly 
designed, were able to motivate traders to trade and reveal information in prediction markets 
(Chen et al. 2009; 2010; Cowgill et al. 2008).  
 
Despite the aforementioned controversial discussion on real-money and play-money markets, 
it is beyond doubt that proper incentives can encourage participation and the revelation of  
information in prediction markets (Ledyard 2006).  
 
2.3 INFORMATION TRANSPARENCY 
Information transparency is defined as the degree of  visibility and accessibility of  information 
(Zhu 2002; 2004). In markets, information transparency is referred to as market transparency 
(Granados et al. 2006; 2007; 2008; Bloomfield and O’Hara 1999; Mollgaard and Overgaard 
2000). Market transparency is defined as the level of  availability and accessibility of  
information about products and market prices (Granados et al. 2008). The impact of  
information transparency on markets has raised enthusiasm for research on this topic.  
 
2.3.1 IT Enabled Information Transparency in Markets 
Research on information transparency is motivated by the development and use of  
information technology (IT). IT refers to technological artifacts that enable electronic markets, 
such as the Internet, network technologies and communication technologies (Granados et al. 
2006). A common thread in the markets is that the Internet has caused a structural increase in 
the level of  information transparency for two major reasons (Granados et al. 2008).  
 
First, the electronic market hypothesis (EMH) posits that advanced IT reduces coordination 
costs between suppliers and buyers and motivates the dominance of  electronic market-based 
forms of  economic activity (Malone et al. 1987). The EMH predicts that biased electronic 
markets will emerge as suppliers take advantage of  IT to lock in buyers. However, unbiased 
electronic markets will gradually dominate. In unbiased electronic markets, all products and 
suppliers can be evaluated by buyers to make well-informed decisions, and information is 
complete, accurate and real time (Granados et al. 2006; 2007; 2010). In this regard, 
information is more transparent in electronic markets than traditional physical markets (Zhu 
2002). 
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Second, IT, such as the Internet, enables exchanges by providing an online platform in which 
a vast sea of  information about products, prices, transactions and competitors is available. All 
the information is gathered, compiled, displayed and transmitted among traders. Zhu (2002) 
contended that the abundance of  information that is available based on the Internet has, in 
general, made information more transparent in online markets. 
 
2.3.2 The Double-Edged Effects of  Information Transparency 
Early studies on information transparency suggested the possibility that efficiencies would 
arise from more widespread dissemination of  desired complete and accurate information 
(Kahn et al. 2002) and that all traders would prefer the full disclosure of  private information, 
even to their rivals (Li 1985; Shapiro 1986). The “information transparency hypothesis”, that 
open sharing of  information in electronic markets is beneficial to all traders, has been thus 
introduced (Zhu 2002).  
 
Recent research, however, has shown that previous studies on information transparency 
ignored many real situations, such as price competition, information confidentiality and 
information uncertainty, which may eventually influence the effect of  information 
transparency on markets (Granados et al. 2008; Zhu 2004). In contrast to the previously held 
consensus about the benefits of  information transparency, these studies have challenged the 
“information transparency hypothesis” and demonstrated that transparent information is in 
fact a double-edged sword. In other words, information transparency sometimes has a 
negative effect. 
 
To be specific, Granados et al. (2008; 2010) revealed different effects of  information 
transparency on different market positions (i.e. buyers, suppliers, and intermediaries) in a 
business-to-consumer (B2C) market. They argued that increased information transparency 
generally benefits consumers because they are able to better discern the product that best fits 
their needs at a better price. Granados et al. (2006) identified that information transparency 
benefits buyers in three ways. First, search costs decrease as more information is made 
available at no additional cost (Zhu 2002). Second, the value of  a purchase increases if  the 
buyer discerns product characteristics of  existing alternatives with higher precision, resulting 
in more accurate product valuation (Hasbrouck 1995). Third, information may become 
available that allows a buyer to transact at a lower price for a given product (Stigler 1961). 
Suppliers and intermediaries, however, are commonly confronted with the trade-off  between 
the benefits of  a more transparent market to attract buyers and the risk of  reduced profit due 
to better informed buyers and competitors (Porter 2001; Soh et al. 2006).  
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Even within the same market position (e.g. buyers or suppliers), a transparent market does not 
necessarily bring all traders the same effect. Zhu (2002) studied the traders’ incentives to join 
an electronic market in the business-to-consumer (B2B) context and found that information 
transparency benefits some traders in a market but hurts others. In an online B2B market, 
suppliers can see the rivals’ cost, as cost prices are disclosed. By making cost information 
transparent, suppliers with different costs would react accordingly. The low-cost suppliers will 
find it optimal to join the exchange due to their competitive price. On the contrary, high-cost 
suppliers will stay away from the exchange, as cost transparency exposes their uncompetitive 
costs in the market. From the buyers’ side, as their willingness-to-pay is transparent, those 
with high willingness-to-pay will have stronger incentives to join the exchange than those with 
low willingness-to-pay. As a result, low cost suppliers and high willingness-to-pay buyers have 
strong incentives to join the online B2B market. 
 
2.3.3 Transparency Strategy 
IT not only increases the potential for complete, accurate, real time and unbiased market 
information but also the potential for concealment or information distortion (Granados 2006). 
Moreover, as information transparency brings different effects on markets, with respect to 
market design, information can be strategically revealed, concealed, biased and distorted, 
depending on the goals and market position of  the information source (e.g. suppliers versus 
buyers) (Granados et al. 2010). For instance, sellers may take advantage of  IT to present 
incomplete or distorted information. Under this circumstance, buyers cannot fully evaluate the 
product and make well-informed decisions. Thus, the sellers may lock in buyers at prices that 
favor the seller (Granados et al. 2006).  
 
Granados et al. (2010) argued that information transparency, unlike information availability or 
information sharing, implies the intention to disclose or withhold information. Tapscott and 
Ticoll (2003) contended that information transparency is increasingly viewed strategically as 
firms consider the trade-off  between attracting new customers with market information and 
the risk of  losing information advantages to customers and competitors. Transparency 
strategy is therefore proposed, which is defined as the set of  policies and decisions that a firm 
makes to disclose, conceal, bias or distort market information (Granados et al. 2010). 
 
Based on existing literature, Granados et al. (2010) identified seven key components of  
transparency strategy, including the following: (1) information from (whom), the party 
considers the disclosure of  information; (2) information to (whom), the party receives the 
information; (3) information elements, the categories of  information, such as price (Granados 
et al. 2006; Soh et al. 2006), product (Bakos 1997; Mollgaard and Overgaard 2000), inventory 
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(Lyons 1996; Jain and Moinzadeh 2005; Dewan et al. 2007), cost (Sinha 2000; Gal-Or 1988; 
Zhu 2004), and process (Adomavicius et al. 2006); (4) potential actions, the possible actions 
with respect to the strategic revelation of  the information, such as transparent, distorted, 
biased and opaque (Granados et al. 2006); (5) systems and mechanism design, the direct 
implications for IT and system design in accordance with the strategic decisions to reveal or 
conceal information; (6) transparency regime, the aggregate information disclosed by 
competitors, suppliers, buyers and customers, and other third parties; and (7) complementary 
strategies, the alignment and coordination with other related managerial decisions (Ellison and 
Ellison 2009; Granados et al. 2008). 
 
The literature on transparency strategy is scarce and scattered across disciplines, as the 
Internet was not well-developed until the end of  the last millennium (Granados et al. 2010). 
Existing studies on transparency strategy can be classified into three major research areas. The 
first research category addresses B2B transparency strategy and the disclosure of  information 
from sellers to other firms in the supply chain. Related research revealed that information 
disclosure in B2B markets is an enabler of  efficiency for supply chains and a strategic 
dimension for individual firms (Patnayakuni et al. 2006; Hoffman et al. 2002; Kim et al. 2005; 
Jain and Moinzadeh 2005). In turn, firms participate in transparent Internet-based channels as 
long as the efficiency in the supply chain is enhanced. However, even in these 
efficiency-seeking partnerships, traders may use information strategically, and it may not be in 
their best interest to be transparent (e.g. due to information confidentiality) (Corbett 2001; 
Kalvenes and Basu 2006; Zhu 2004). In this case, firms will stay away from transparent 
environments. 
 
The second research area addressed information transparency and electronic market design. 
These studies identified transparency design features, which are related to information 
disclosure policies throughout the trading process (Granados et al. 2010). Online travel 
agencies (OTA), such as Hotwire and Orbitz (Granados et al. 2006, 2007), and other online 
markets (Soh et al. 2006; Smith 2002) were the primary objects of  these empirical studies. The 
results drawn from the research showed that consumers demand both product and price 
information from different suppliers, so a common strategy for online markets is to be 
unbiased in the inclusion and display of  information about supplier offerings (Granados et al. 
2010). However, some OTAs biased markets by failing to equitably include product and price 
information from all sellers (Granados et al. 2006), to favor suppliers with whom they develop 
special arrangements (Granados et al. 2010; Soh et al. 2006; Smith 2002). Moreover, 
Viswanathan et al. (2007) found that consumers with transparent product information pay 
higher prices for a product than those with transparent price information. This reminds online 
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intermediaries to carefully consider the conflicting interests of  buyers and sellers with regard 
to price transparency and the need to satisfy both buyers and sellers. 
 
The third category of  research focused on transparency regimes and their impacts on 
competition, consumer welfare and market efficiency. In general, the related research aimed to 
determine the impact of  higher transparency of  competitive offerings on competition and 
concentrates on price and product transparency (Granados et al. 2010). Research findings 
suggested that the impact of  price transparency is different according to product type. The 
effect of  price transparency on price competition of  homogeneous products is salient and will 
result in lower net prices. Even though suppliers form a tacit collusion, consumers are only 
partially offset, as they are better informed about the prices (Boone and Pottersz 2006; 
Campbell et al. 2005; Schultz 2005). On the other hand, price transparency makes collusion 
relatively more difficult for differentiated products, exacerbating price competition (Anderson 
and Renault 1999; Bakos 1997; Schultz 2004). With regard to product transparency, Bakos 
(1997) and Boone and Pottersz (2006) demonstrated that higher product transparency of  
differentiated products will likely lead to higher demand from consumers and higher prices. 
For homogeneous products, nevertheless, product transparency does not have an impact on 
consumers’ purchase decisions.  
   
2.4 SUMMARY 
An increasing body of  literature has appeared since the first field application of  prediction 
markets, IEM. However, the literature survey revealed that research on prediction markets, 
particularly internal markets used in companies, is limited and the empirical evidence is 
constrained. The common threads of  the existing studies are the description of  prediction 
markets and demonstration of  the market predictive power. Recent studies tended to 
investigate traders’ behavior and market design. Moreover, increased literature on IT-enabled 
information transparency in markets has motivated empirical studies in various online markets 
(e.g. B2B and B2C). However, prediction markets have not been addressed.    
 
The aforementioned findings imply that further empirical studies could investigate prediction 
market design from the perspective of  information transparency, particularly, in the context 
of  internal prediction markets. The analyses ought to include the individual level (i.e. traders’ 
behavior) and the aggregation level (i.e. market performance). Theorizing based on related 
empirical research is also necessary. All these are attempted in this dissertation as illustrated by 
the conceptual framework (see Figure 2-1). As the conceptual framework research model 
shows, this dissertation investigates the effect of  information transparency on prediction 
market performance through traders’ individual behavior. We particularly focus on traders’ 
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activity and the interactions of  traders’ behavior and market predictions and the information 
aggregation of  market performance. The detailed construction of  hypotheses together with 
the related theories are further elaborated in the following chapters on the case study, the 
laboratory experiment and the field experiments (see Chapter 5 and 6). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework of  the Dissertation 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the research methodology applied in this dissertation. To validate the 
conceptual model and answer the research questions, this dissertation adopted a pluralist 
methodology (Mingers 2001). The plan of  this chapter is as follows. We first justify the use of  
a pluralist methodology in IS. Subsequently, we discuss the rationale of  the chosen 
methodology based on the principles of  discipline and engaged scholarship. Guided by the 
aforementioned rationales, we present our overall method, namely triangulation, and justify 
the use of  specific research methods, including explorative case studies, laboratory 
experiments and field experiments. 
 
3.1 RATIONALE OF PLURALIST METHODOLOGY IN IS 
Methodological pluralism refers to a position that favors a diversity of  methods, theories, even 
philosophies, in scientific inquiry (Landry and Banville 1992). It lies between the extremes of  
methodological monism and the anarchy of  an “anything goes” attitude (Landry and Banville 
1992; Robey 1996). Landry and Banville (1992) argued that methodological pluralism in IS 
emerged because of  the gradual unfolding of  the human, organizational and social 
dimensions of  this discipline.   
 
Robey (1996) identified four major advantages of  the pluralist methodology characterized by 
diversity particularly within the context of  IS. The pluralist methodology: (1) expands the 
foundation upon which knowledge claims in the field are based; (2) attracts good people to 
the field of  IS where they can address applied problems that interest them; (3) fosters 
creativity; and (4) advances the valued principle of  academic freedom. 
 
Specifically, with regard to research methods, Mingers (2001) and Robey (1996) contended 
that multimethod research is desirable for IS to effectively study the full richness of  the real 
world. The real world is characterized by complexity: an event consists of  a multifaceted 
structure. Different research methods focus on different aspects of  reality and therefore a 
richer and more reliable understanding of  the research topic will be gained by combining 
several methods together in a single piece of  research or a research program (Mingers 2001).  
 
Moreover, each research method has its strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, the adoption of  
multiple research methods compensates for deficiencies in other methods. For instance, field 
studies allow researchers to gain insights into a phenomenon within its context and reveal 
important variables and their possible relationships (Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt and 
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Graebner 2007; Pettigrew 1990; Yin 2003). However, the high generalizability of  field studies 
comes at the cost of  internal validity (Scandura and Williams 2000). By contrast, laboratory 
experiments achieve higher internal validity because they are executed in a controlled 
environment (Shadish et al. 2002). Nonetheless, the generalizability of  laboratory experiments 
is low. To increase internal and external validity, the use of  multimethod research is desired. 
 
3.2 RATIONALE OF RESEARCH METHOD CHOICE 
The appropriateness of  a research method differs for each research situation. Therefore, a 
choice and design of  research methods should be made based on the premise of  the study 
(Landry and Banville 1992). Landry and Banville (1992) suggested a more disciplined 
approach to the selection of  research methods drawn upon Laudan’s (1984) triadic network of  
justification. 
 
Landry and Banville (1992) suggested a disciplined approach and asserted that the choice of  a 
specific research method in IS should be justified on pragmatic grounds as appropriate tools 
for accomplishing research aims. They cautioned against conforming to a dominant paradigm 
or the researcher’s belief  in its intrinsic value (Robey 1996). In other words, researchers must 
have clearly defined research aims that justify their choices of  particular methods.  
 
Furthermore, regarding how to decide which research aims to pursue, Robey (1996) pointed 
out that researchers, not only in IS but also in other fields, usually pursue aims of  interest only 
to themselves. In fact, a more justifiable criterion of  selecting research aims is to relate aims to 
practical interests in the IS field (Robey 1996). This argumentation is consistent with Van de 
Ven’s (2007) emphasis on engaged scholarship. 
 
Van de Ven (2007) argued that engaged scholarship implies a fundamental shift in how 
scholars define their relationships with communities. He defined this engagement as a 
relationship that involves negotiation and collaboration between researchers and practitioners 
in a learning community: such a community jointly produces knowledge that can both advance 
the scientific enterprise and enlighten a community of  practitioners. He proposed that this 
approach of  engaged scholarship can address the widening gap between research and practice 
in management.  
 
3.3 TRIANGULATION AND SPECIFIC METHODS 
Triangulation is a form of  the pluralist methodology. Denzin (1978) defined triangulation as 
the combination of  methodologies in the study of  the same phenomenon. Denzin (1978) 
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drew a distinction between within-method and between-method triangulation. Within-method 
triangulation refers to the use of  multiple techniques within a given method to collect and 
interpret data, such as a survey questionnaire with different scales measuring the same 
“empirical uniP3”. Between-method triangulation refers to the use of  multiple methods to 
examine the same dimension of  a research problem.  
 
Jick (1979) concluded that within-method triangulation essentially involves cross-checking for 
internal consistency or reliability while between-method triangulation tests the degree of  
external validity. He asserted that the latter type represents the most popular use of  
triangulation, because it is largely a vehicle for cross validation when two or more distinct 
methods are found to be congruent and yield comparable data. In this dissertation, we adopt a 
between-method triangulation, involving case studies, laboratory experiments and field 
experiments. 
 
Between-method triangulation can be further classified into simultaneous (or parallel) and 
sequential triangulation (Brewer and Hunter 1989; Mingers 2001). Simultaneous triangulation 
refers to the use of  multiple methods in the same study to measure the same phenomenon. By 
checking the consistency of  multiple evidences, the results of  the study are considered more 
convincing. For instance, a questionnaire survey and interviews are conducted independently 
to collect data for the same phenomenon, and then their results are compared to reveal 
consistency or inconsistency. Sequential triangulation requires a researcher to use the results 
of  one method as the basis for a new study of  the same concept with a different method. In 
turn, the methods are dependent. For instance, a statistically analyzed questionnaire is done 
first, followed by in-depth interviews to better understand the results (Mingers 2001). 
 
We use sequential triangulation in this dissertation. Each study adopts a specific method and 
the results drawn from it are used to plan the method of  the following study. We justify the 
choice of  research method in each study as follows. 
 
3.3.1 Study 1 – Explorative Case Studies 
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between a phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident (Yin 2003). Yin (2003) identified three fundamental conditions of  research to 
determine the appropriate use of  case studies, including the following: (1) the type of  research 
question posed; (2) the extent of  control an investigator has over actual behavioral events; and 
(3) the degree of  focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events. A case study is most 
appropriate method when (1) a research question focuses on how or why, (2) an investigator 
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does not require any control over actual behavioral events, and (3) the research examines 
contemporary events and the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated. 
 
The first study in this dissertation aims to provide us with an understanding of  a trader’s 
behavior in an internal prediction market (see Figure 2.1) and answer the first major research 
question of  this dissertation “how do traders behave in an internal prediction market?” 
Consequently, we do not intend to interfere or control traders’ actual behavior in a market. 
Additionally, this dissertation addresses internal prediction markets, a contemporary 
management topic in real business world. Therefore, the use of  a case study is appropriate. 
 
3.3.2 Study 2 – Laboratory Experiments 
The objective of  the second study is to examine the effects of  information transparency in a 
prediction market on trader’s behavior and market prediction. Accordingly, this study aims to 
answer the second key research question of  this dissertation - how does information transparency in 
an internal prediction market influence market performance? (see Figure 2.1).  
 
To test such a casual model in the social sciences, experiments are usually adopted (Campbell 
and Stanley 1963; Cook and Campbell 1979; Shadish et al. 2002). An experiment refers to a 
study in which an intervention is deliberately introduced to observe its effects (Shadish et al. 
2002). Particularly, in contrast to case studies, laboratory experiments allow researchers to 
deliberately divorces a phenomenon from its context, and thus, focus on only a few variables 
in a controlled environment (Yin 2003). Shadish et al. 2002 argued that this highly controlled 
environment of  laboratory experiments assists researchers to determine and strengthen the 
causality. Therefore, we adopted laboratory experiments in this second study to test the casual 
effects of  information transparency. 
 
3.3.3 Study 3 - Field Experiments 
The objective of  the third study is to investigate the effects of  different information 
transparency levels in a prediction market on trader’s behavior and market performance (see 
Figure 2.1). Similar to the aforementioned laboratory study, this study answers the key 
research question – how does information transparency in an internal prediction market influence market 
performance? The results drawn from this study ought to complement the answers to the 
aforementioned research questions based on the laboratory experiments.  
 
In contrast to the second study, this study aims to examine the phenomenon in a real business 
environment. As Harrison and List (2004) argued, laboratory experiments in isolation are 
57_Erim ShenYun Yang BW_Stand.job
41 
 
necessarily limited in relevance for predicting field behavior, as unexpected behaviors may 
occur when control in the field is loosened. These unexpected behaviors in fact often indicate 
the key features of  the research phenomenon that have been neglected in the lab. Therefore, 
we adopt field experiments in this third study. 
 
Harrison and List (2004) defined a field experiment as one employs a nonstandard subject 
pool with field context in the commodity, task, or information set that the subjects can use in 
the environment where the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and do not know that they 
are in an experiment. They contended that field experiments have a methodological role, as 
they are substantively complementary to traditional laboratory experiments. 
 
When laboratory experiments are combined with field experiments, they permit sharper and 
more convincing inferences generated from a broader context. From the perspective of  
engaged scholarship, Van de Ven (2007) also encouraged researchers to spend time doing field 
research, as field research brings researchers closer to the phenomenon they are studying and 
permits deeper learning and understanding of  a research question or topic. Moreover, insight 
into the phenomenon drawn from the field work is likely to increase the chances that the 
research results will be eventually implemented by organizational practitioners (Rynes et al. 
1999).  
 
Consequently, we adopt field experiments in this dissertation to enhance the generalizability 
of  the research findings as a whole. 
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CHAPTER 4 UNDERSTANDING TRADER’S BEHAVIOR:  
AN EXPLORATIVE CASE STUDY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Traders are a fundamental element of  a prediction market (Ho and Chen 2007). They have 
information about a future event and reflect their information in the trading of  contracts in 
the market (Fama 1970; Muth 1961). A prediction market, thus, aggregates information from 
traders based on the market mechanism (Hayek 1945). Traders’ behavior in the prediction 
market is, in turn, pivotal to the market, because trading activities entail the transmission and 
aggregation of  information and eventually influence market performance. Consequently, 
traders’ behavior has become a major research stream of  prediction markets. 
 
This dissertation focuses on internal prediction markets within a firm. The research on traders’ 
behavior in internal prediction markets is underdeveloped. In Chapter 2, we reviewed current 
literature on internal prediction markets. Prior studies focused on market performance and 
most of  them addressed the accuracy of  the market prediction (e.g. Pethokoukis 2004; Plott 
and Chen 2002; Ortner 1998). The behavior of  individual traders, however, has rarely been 
captured. Accordingly, we have constructed our first major research question about trader’s 
behavior and this chapter aims to answer the following question: 
 
RQmain1: How do traders behave in an internal prediction market?  
 
Internal prediction markets are characterized by such factors as small market size and low 
liquidity (Plott and Chen 2002; Cowgill et al. 2008; see Chapter 2). In terms of  these specific 
characteristics, most existing studies on traders’ behavior in internal prediction markets or 
small size prediction markets concentrate on traders’ manipulation. These studies are 
particularly interested in the likelihood and effect of  traders’ manipulation and bias on 
information aggregation and the predictive accuracy of  prediction markets (see Chapter 2).  
 
Nevertheless, little research addresses the fundamental behavior of  traders in the market, 
namely learning. In a prediction market, some traders have information about a future event, 
but some do not (Plott 2000). The former are referred to as informed traders; and the latter 
are referred to as uninformed traders. Markets are efficient, because information can be 
disseminated from the informed to the uninformed. This process is referred to as information 
aggregation (Gruca et al. 2005; Plott and Sunder 1982; 1988).  
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Information aggregation is processed through traders’ trading activities. A trader’s individual 
bids and asks on a contract represent the value he or she expects of  it. Similarly, a transaction 
on a contract represents the aggregate expected value of  the contract. These orders and 
transactions in turn become public information available in the market and other traders learn 
from it. Gradually, with an increased number of  trades, information about a future event is 
disseminated from the informed to the uninformed. As a result, learning is an underlying 
behavior of  traders in a prediction market. Consequently, this first study focuses on learning 
among traders in internal prediction markets. 
 
Furthermore, most existing studies on traders’ behavior are conducted in laboratory 
environments (e.g. Forsythe and Lundholm 1990; Hanson et al. 2006; Plott and Sunder 1982). 
Harrison and List (2004) have identified the constraints of  laboratory experiment relative to 
predicting field behavior (see Chapter 3). In turn, it is crucial to investigate traders’ behavior in 
a prediction market within a real business environment. Therefore, we conducted an 
explorative case study to examine the behavior of  individual traders in internal prediction 
markets.  
 
Several major findings are drawn from the case study. First, traders are generally not active in 
an internal prediction market. Employees of  companies usually regard participation in internal 
prediction markets as additional work, and therefore, they may have limited time to participate. 
Second, traders learn from different information sources and incorporate what they learn into 
their trading activities, though the activities are limited. In turn, they keep updating their 
opinions of  future events. However, the influence of  one trader on others seems to be small. 
Third, employees’ trading decisions are influenced most by the latest private information 
about a future event. Additionally, marginal traders and information cascades may be 
concurrent in an internal prediction market. 
 
This study makes several theoretical and practical contributions to the body of  research on 
prediction markets. First, our study extends the research on traders’ behavior by investigating 
learning in the market. Second, we contribute to the adaptive learning theory by applying it in 
the context of  prediction markets. Third, our research adds to the literature on prediction 
markets used in companies and the real business world. We particularly contribute to the 
exploration of  traders’ behavior in internal prediction markets. Finally, from the perspective 
of  managerial implications, this multiple case study documents the reasons why traders do not 
actively participate in internal prediction markets, allowing practitioners to improve their 
market design and operation by taking practical issues into consideration. 
 
The remainder of  this chapter is organized as follows. First, we review the related literature on 
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traders’ learning in a prediction market. Second, we elaborate the research method adopted in 
this chapter. Third, we present and discuss the results drawn from this case study. Finally, we 
conclude this chapter by answering the corresponding research question. 
 
4.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, we introduce the theory of  traders’ behavior in a prediction market. We focus 
on traders’ fundamental learning, which is reflected in their trading and interactive activities. 
 
4.2.1 Adaptive Learning in Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets are similar to financial markets. Traders in a prediction market are 
equivalent to investors in a financial market. Their decisions are almost always made under 
uncertainty. Learning, therefore, occurs as the flow of  information on the costs and benefits 
of  an investment decision reduce its uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). 
 
Rational expectations theory is the primary theoretical foundation of  prediction markets (see 
Chapter 2). Rational expectations theory assumes that economic agents have full knowledge 
about the entire system in which they are operating (Muth 1961). This assumption leads to an 
asymmetry between the agents in the model and the econometrician who is estimating it, as 
the economist or econometrician knows less about the system than the agents (Sargent 1993). 
To eliminate this asymmetry, bounded rationality was proposed by Simon (1957) based on the 
assumption that agents behave like working economists or econometricians, who do not have 
complete information about an object (Sargent 1993). In addition, when taking time into 
consideration, the model of  expectations is no longer static, but dynamic, in which things 
change with the passage of  time and expectations adapt; hence, the name adaptive 
expectations (Cagan 1956; Sargent 1993). In other words, agents iteratively adjust their 
estimations of  an object in order to diminish the discrepancy between the estimation and 
perceived reality from one period of  time to the next (Sargent 1993).  
 
Based on the idea of  bounded rationality and adaptive expectations, Sargent (1993) suggested 
adaptive learning, which assumes that economic agents initially may not know the exact 
information they need to predict relevant outcomes. Nevertheless, the agents are willing and 
able to learn over time. As a result, the agents are able to keep updating their expectations 
based on the newly-received information. As Oliven and Rietz (2004) asserted, even biased 
traders may learn from market prices, and accordingly, they may update their expectations in 
ways that defeat the bias. 
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The learning that occurs in prediction markets is in fact adaptive learning. Traders are deemed 
to learn and keep updating their beliefs based on the latest information and reflect the 
updated information in their bids and asks (Bondarenko and Bossaerts 2000; Gruca et al. 2005; 
Rhode and Strumpf  2004). Notwithstanding non-market information, such as media news of  
a future event, traders learned from other individual expected values and the aggregate 
expected values of  contracts inside a market (Davis and Holt 1993). 
 
Empirical studies have demonstrated the occurrence of  traders’ learning in a prediction 
market. For instance, Lee and Moretti (2009) investigated the 2008 presidential election in the 
United States and found that market price appeared to react to the release of  relevant 
information. This reaction indicated that traders in the presidential election market learned 
and incorporated the learned information into their predictions.  
 
As information is disseminated through trades and learning is reflected in trades, active 
trading of  contracts is desired. Therefore, we first examine the activity of  traders in internal 
prediction markets. The first sub-research question is then as follows: 
 
RQ 1-1:  How actively do traders take part in an internal prediction market? 
 
4.2.2 Dynamic Interactions between Traders in Prediction Markets 
Chen et al. (2009) argued that learning in prediction markets is dynamic not only because of  
the adaptive mechanism but also the involvement of  dynamic interactions between traders. 
First, traders may revise their own expectations on contracts based on learning from other 
traders in the market and adjust the bids or asks of  the contracts accordingly.  
 
Second, adjustments of  bids and asks become new information for other traders to learn in 
the same market, and therefore lead other traders to revise their expectations on contracts. 
Hence, one trader’s revision of  bids or asks is not only the consequence of  learning but also 
the cause of  another trader’s revision.  
 
Moreover, the influence of  one trader’s revision can be extended when a succession of  
subsequent traders revise their bid or ask orders of  the contract. In turn, dynamic interactions 
refer to a trader’s revision of  buy or sell orders on contracts as a consequence of  learning and 
the cause of  another trader’s revision. In short, the presence of  traders’ dynamic interactions 
indicates that learning occurred in the market. Accordingly, we construct the second 
sub-research question as follows: 
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RQ 1-2: To what extent do traders dynamically interact with each other in an internal prediction market? 
4.3 RESEARCH METHODS 
In this section, we delineate the design of  this explorative case study and describe the details 
of  the prediction markets developed in this study. 
 
4.3.1 Case Study Design 
As stated in Chapter 3, this study aims to answer the first key research question of  this 
dissertation, namely, “How do traders behave in an internal prediction market?” In line with Yin’s 
(2003) guideline of  case study designs, we first identified the aforementioned specific 
sub-research questions to be answered in this study based on the related literature review.  
 
Subsequently, to apply replication logic (Hersen and Barlow 1976), we adopted multiple-case 
studies, examining traders in two different internal prediction markets According to Yin 
(2003), a multiple-case design, even a two-case design is preferred over a single-case design, as 
researchers have the possibility of  direct replication. Conclusions independently drawn from 
these two cases will be more powerful than those coming from a single case alone.  
 
We collected the data from a partnering company, in which two internal prediction markets 
were conducted in sequence. We partnered with an international financial company 
headquartered in the Netherlands and ranked in the Fortune Global 500. The two markets 
predicted domestic sales of  a particular financial product during two different time periods. 
The primary motivation for the company to use internal prediction markets was its 
dissatisfaction with its conventional prediction mechanism.  
 
This company used a “top-down” forecasting method to predict sales. According to the 
company, the forecasting method was complex and time consuming, and worked as follows: 
 
The top management team proposed an initial prediction of  sales, and then forwarded it to 
the lower level managers along the organizational hierarchy until it reached the regional sales 
managers. Some calibration of  the initial prediction was expected in response to any objection 
raised during the forwarding procedure.  
 
However, calibration rarely happened: lower level managers often just accepted the initial 
prediction. The company believes that its regional sales managers would make the most 
accurate predictions, as these managers have the most relevant and updated information about 
the products. Consequently, the company expected that involving those regional sales 
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managers in internal prediction markets would reveal the best predictions. In turn, they 
conducted the aforementioned two internal prediction markets as their pilot study. 
 
We chose this company because it thoroughly documented every action of  each trader, such 
as a trader’s log-in, buy orders, sell orders and transactions of  a contract. Moreover, this 
company allowed us to conduct a follow-up questionnaire study to obtain supplementary 
information about the traders’ behavior, for instance, why a trader did or did not take part in 
an internal prediction market. We expected that this follow-up study could help us gain a 
deeper understanding about the participation of  employees in internal prediction markets.  
 
The following sections describe the details of  the two cases, including the market mechanism, 
contracts, traders, incentives and operations. 
 
4.3.2 Market Mechanism 
The partnering company established a web-based continuous double auction market to 
support both internal prediction markets. On a single web page, all the contracts in a market 
were available (see Figure 4.1). The web page was divided into four parts as follows:  
 
In Part A, the highest buying price and the lowest selling price of  each contract were displayed 
and traders could place buy or sell orders for each contract; in Part B, the historic transaction 
prices of  each contract since the first transaction were exhibited in a line chart; in Part C, the 
last five transactions in the market were displayed, including contracts, shares transacted, 
prices and transaction time; and in Part D, an overview of  the trader’s buy and sell orders was 
provided, showing the status of  an order, i.e. “executed” or “not executed” - “executed” 
means that the order had been successfully transacted; and “not executed” means that the 
order was pending. 
 
This web-based prediction market platform was tested before the launch to ensure that traders 
would not experience any technical difficulties, which may have impeded motivation to 
participate. 
 
4.3.3 Predicting Events and Contracts 
The two markets were conducted in March and June 2007, and we refer to them in this study 
as the “March Market” and the “June Market”. 
 
The March Market predicted the annual sales of  a particular financial product in 2007. The 
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June Market predicted the periodical sales of  the same financial product during a particular 
campaign in 2007.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Screen Shot of  a Prediction Market Web Page 
 
The contracts represented the potential outcomes of  the event being predicted in the market. 
To illustrate, we take an example of  the contract “191-200” in the March Market. This 
contract represented that annual sales of  the financial product in 2007 would lie in the range 
of  191 and 200 million euro. Tables 4.1a and 4.1b list the events being predicted, the contracts, 
and the corresponding representations in the March Market and the June Market, respectively.  
 
The aforementioned potential sales outcomes were determined by the company’s top 
management team based on their initial prediction. This initial prediction was usually used in 
the conventional “top-down” forecasting method.  
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Table 4.1a Contracts of  the March Market 
Events Predicted Contract Representation of  Contract 
Annual sales of  a financial 
product in 2007 
110-120 Sales will be between 110 and 120 million euro 
121-130 Sales will be between 121 and 130 million euro 
131-140 Sales will be between 131 and 140 million euro 
141-150 Sales will be between 141 and 150 million euro 
151-160 Sales will be between 110 and 120 million euro 
161-170 Sales will be between 161 and 170 million euro 
171-180 Sales will be between 171 and 180 million euro 
181-190 Sales will be between 181 and 190 million euro 
191-200 Sales will be between 191 and 200 million euro 
201-210 Sales will be between 201 and 210 million euro 
 
Table 4.1b Contracts of  the June Market 
Event Predicted Contract Representation of  Contract 
Periodical sales of  a 
financial product during a 
particular campaign in 2007 
19-22 Sales will be between 19 and 22 million euro 
22-25 Sales will be between 22 and 25 million euro 
25-28 Sales will be between 25 and 28 million euro 
28-31 Sales will be between 28 and 31 million euro 
31-34 Sales will be between 31 and 34 million euro 
34-37 Sales will be between 34 and 37 million euro 
37-40 Sales will be between 37 and 40 million euro 
40-43 Sales will be between 40 and 43 million euro 
43-46 Sales will be between 43 and 46 million euro 
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4.3.4 Traders 
Thirty-four regional sales managers were invited to trade in the internal prediction markets. 
The company believed that they possessed the most relevant sales information about the 
product. These participants were located in 13 different regions within the Netherlands. In 
turn, they were thought to bring their own information regarding sales in their regions to the 
prediction markets. In other words, heterogeneity of  information held by traders presumably 
existed in these two prediction markets. 
 
4.3.5 Incentives 
The company decided to offer monetary incentives. The amount of  cash reward per market 
was €10 multiplied by the number of  invited traders. As 34 regional sales managers were 
invited to take part in the internal prediction markets, the eventual award was €340 per market. 
When the actual sales results were unveiled, the trader who had the most shares of  the 
contract that corresponded to the actual sales would receive the bonus of  €340.  
 
4.3.6 Operations 
Each market was executed during a period of  12 calendar days, starting from 09:00 on the first 
day till 18:00 on the last day. To increase participation, the traders were allowed to access the 
markets 24 hours a day, including weekends. 
 
A plenary introduction session, with full attendance, was given before the first prediction 
market. In the introduction session, the structure of  the market mechanism, the event being 
predicted in the market, and the incentives were explained in detail; the operation of  the 
web-based trading platform interface was demonstrated; and a special question and answer 
session was arranged in which traders were allowed to ask or clarify any issues regarding the 
internal prediction markets. 
 
Although participation was anonymous, each trader was assigned a subject identification 
number and a log-in account. In the prediction markets, a trader’s subject identification 
number was never revealed. Therefore, a trader was not able to trace the behavior of  others 
within the same prediction market. 
 
When the prediction market started, all the traders received an endowment that contained 
1,000 points play money and 20 shares per contract to initiate trades. 
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4.3.7 Follow-up Questionnaire Survey 
After the two markets closed, we conducted a questionnaire survey together with the 
partnering company. The questionnaire (see Appendix I) was sent to all the traders, namely, 
the 34 regional sales managers, by email.  
 
The questionnaire entailed two major objectives. One objective was to examine the 
participation activity of  a trader. For instance, how often a trader took part in the prediction 
markets. The other objective was to investigate the trader’s use of  various information sources. 
Using a five-point Likert scale (1= never, 5= always), the trader was asked to rate the extent to 
which an information source contributed to their trading decisions.  
 
4.4 MEASURES 
In this section, we focus on traders’ behavior in an internal prediction market. The 
measurement of  traders’ behavior concentrates on traders’ participation activity and dynamic 
interactions. This section elaborates the measurement of  these two variables. 
 
4.4.1 Traders’ Participation Activity 
We first identified the number of  active traders in a market. Active traders refer to the traders 
who place at least one buy or sell order in a prediction market (Berg et al. 2008; Cowgill et al. 
2008). As traders contribute their information to the market when and only when they 
incorporate their information into their trading activities, the number of  active traders should 
be identified when measuring the traders’ activity. 
 
Subsequently, we examined the traders’ participation activity at the contract level. We 
measured the number of  active traders, the number of  transactions, and the number of  shares 
traded. According to existing research on prediction markets, these are the key indicators 
measuring the traders’ activity, particularly in an internal prediction market (Berg et al. 2008; 
Chen et al. 2009; 2010; Forsythe et al. 1992).  
 
Finally, we investigated activity at the individual trader level. We measured several key 
indicators, including the average number of  buy orders/sell orders, the average number of  
shares in buy orders/sell orders, the average number of  transactions and the average number 
of  shares traded (e.g. Chen et al. 2009; 2010; Forsythe et al. 1992; Oliven and Rietz 2004). 
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4.4.2 Traders’ Dynamic Interactions 
The measurement of  traders’ dynamic interaction adapts from Chen et al. (2009), consisting 
of  two dimensions, namely trader’s self-revision and trader’s influence on others. Trader’s 
self-revision is measured at the individual trader level and trader’s influence on others is 
measured at the contract level. 
 
The details of  the measurement of  trader’s self-revision are as follows. Let 𝑉𝑖𝑗 = [𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑙 , 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑢] 
denote a range containing trader i’s estimation for contract j, where 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑙  is the lower bound 
and 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑢 is the upper bound. 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑙  and 𝑉𝑖𝑗
𝑢 can be captured when trader i places his or her first 
buy order and sell order of  contract j. As traders can observe individual bids, asks and 
aggregate behavior of  other traders in a prediction market, traders may revise their estimation 
accordingly. If  in the following order, trader i buys or sells contract j at a different price from 
the previous one, we term this “revision behavior” for trader i and refer to this new buy or sell 
order as a “self-revision”.  
 
Furthermore, we operationalize two measures of  “self-revision”, i.e. Type I and Type II. Type 
I self-revision is identified as long as trader i’s following order price is different from the 
previous one on the same contract; and Type II self-revision occurs when there is at least a 5% 
difference in the price of  trader i’s order compared to his or her previous order for the same 
contract. 
 
With regard to the trader’s influence on others, we consider all four alterative measures of  
“influential orders” developed by Chen et al. (2009). Table 4.2 presents these four alternative 
operational definitions. 
 
4.5 RESULTS 
This section delineates the results of  traders’ participation activity and traders’ dynamic 
interactions. The results drawn from the follow-up questionnaire survey are presented 
throughout the discussion of  the aforementioned traders’ behavior to provide supplementary 
evidence. We received 17 valid responses to the questionnaire for the March Market and 16 to 
the June Market, representing 11 sales regions. In the end of  this section, we discuss the 
additional finding of  information cascades in this case study. 
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Table 4.2 Alternative Operational Definitions of  Influential Orders 
(Adapted from Chen et al. 2010, p. 59) 
Operational Definition Definition 
1-influential 
A buy or sell order is 1-infuential if  the next buy or sell order of  the 
same contract is from a different trader and is also a “self-revision” 
orders in the same direction. 
2-influential 
A buy or sell order is 2-influential if  the next two consecutive buy or sell 
orders of  the same contract are from two different traders and are also 
“self-revision” orders in the same direction. 
3-influential 
A buy or sell order is 3-influential if  the next three consecutive buy or 
sell orders of  the same contract are from three different traders and are 
also “self-revision” orders in the same direction. 
2Out3-influential 
A buy or sell order is 2Out3-influential if  the next three consecutive buy 
or sell orders of  the same contract are from three different traders and 
two of  the three are also “self-revisions” orders in the same direction. 
 
4.5.1 Traders’ Participation Activity 
Active traders numbered 30 in the March Market and 18 in the June Market. More than half  
of  the invited regional sales managers participated in the internal prediction markets. 
Particularly, in the March Market, 30 out of  34 regional sales managers became active traders. 
The percentage reached 88%, considered high in internal prediction markets. In the June 
Market, the percentage of  active traders dropped to 52% (18 out of  34). 
 
In light of  the statement that traders in a prediction market sometime appear to be motivated 
by curiosity (Borison and Hamm 2009), this drop was probably due to the change of  the 
traders’ interest and curiosity about the prediction markets. According to the top management 
team of  the company, prediction markets were new to the traders. They had no experience 
with participation in prediction markets. Therefore, the March Market, as the first experience, 
motivated the traders’ to take part. However, those regional sales managers were no longer 
motivated by curiosity to trade in the second market. In Google’s prediction markets, there 
was also a gradual decline in interest among existing traders (Dye 2008).  
 
Table 4.3 exhibits the statistics for traders’ activity at the contract level in the two internal 
prediction markets. “Number of  active traders” revealed that a trader did not trade on all 
contracts in an internal prediction market. For instance, there were 30 active traders in the 
March Market. However, none of  the contracts in the March Market received buy orders or 
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sell orders from all 30 traders. The average “percentage of  active traders” further illustrated 
that a single contract received buy or sell orders from approximately 60% active traders in a 
market. Chen et al. (2009) obtained similar results from their study. They conducted two 
internal prediction markets to evaluate early stage technology and each market had 17 
contracts. According to their analyses, no contract received the full participation from all the 
active traders. The average percentage of  active trader per contract was approximately 60% as 
well.    
 
“Number of  transactions” showed that the traders in the two markets were not active. The 
average “number of  transactions” for the March Market indicated that less than two 
transactions occurred per trade day on each contract (Meannr_transaction = 18, trade day = 12). 
The same measure for the June Market showed that participation was even lower 
(Meannr_transaction = 9), implying that on some trade days (trade day = 12), there were no 
transactions of  a contract at all. The low occurrence of  transactions was due to few buy and 
sell orders from the traders (see Tables 4.4a and 4.4b). 
 
Tables 4.4a and 4.4b summarize the statistics for traders’ activity at the individual level in the 
March Market and the June Market. The average “number of  buy orders” (March Market: 
Meannr_buy_orders = 16, June Market: Meannr_buy_orders = 9) and “number of  sell orders” (March 
Market: Meannr_sell_orders = 16, June Market: Meannr_sell_orders = 9) showed that an active trader 
on average placed no more than two buy or sell orders per trade day in both markets (trade 
day = 12). 
 
The maximum number of  these measures illustrated that even the most active trader in the 
March Market placed no more than eight buy or sell orders in total per trade day 
(Maxnr_buy_orders = 51, Maxnr_sell_orders = 43); and in the June Market, the most active trader 
placed less than six buy or sell orders in total per trade day (Maxnr_buy_orders = 41, Maxnr_sell_orders 
= 31).  
 
To summarize, the results drawn from the analyses of  trader’s activity at the contract and the 
individual trader level showed that traders did not actively participate in the internal prediction 
markets. 
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As introduced in section 4.3.6, the company allowed trading in the market 24 hours a day, 7 
days a week in order to increase activity, assuming that traders would take part in the internal 
prediction markets after work. The results, however, revealed that no one traded after work 
(namely, between 18:00 and 09:00 per trade day) or during weekends. The evidence can be 
drawn from Table 4.3. According to this table, the last trade day of  the March Market was Day 
11, and yet, this market ran for 12 days. However, no trade occurred on Day 12, which, 
coincidently, fell on the weekend. Usually the last trade day is busy, as the most updated 
information is available and traders would like to take the last trading opportunity to make 
profit in the market. A number of  prior studies have asserted that the most relevant 
information comes in the last trade days, and therefore, researchers usually calculate the 
market prediction based on the last trade price or the last several trade prices (Berg et al. 
2003a; 2003b; 2008; Servan-Schreiber 2004). The situation in the June Market supported this 
argument, as quite a few transactions occurred on the last trade day, i.e. Day 12, which was a 
weekday (see Table 4.3).  
 
A possible explanation is that the regional sales managers regarded participation in the internal 
prediction markets as a part of  their job, though participation was not obligatory. In turn, they 
did not spend their private time taking part in the markets. Hanson (2006) emphasized that 
participation in an internal prediction market requires that employees allocate time and effort 
away from their regular work duties. When a proper incentive is missing, employees do not 
bother to trade. The evidence drawn from the questionnaire further supported this 
explanation. 
 
According to the data collected from the questionnaire, the traders identified lack of  time as 
the major reason that they did not actively participate in the internal prediction markets. 
Although only eight traders responded to the question “Why would you not participate in the 
markets?” (this is the translation of  question No. 7 in the questionnaire, see Appendix I), 
seven of  them gave a similar reason of  limited time for participation. These answers have 
been translated from Dutch into English and are briefly quoted in Table 4.5. 
  
These quotations from the traders’ responses supported the aforementioned explanations that 
the sales managers considered participating in the prediction markets only during their work 
time; participation was a part of  the company “policy”; and taking part in the prediction 
markets was not the priority in their work. 
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Table 4.5 Traders’ Responses to the Question about the Major Reason for 
Not Participating in the Internal Prediction Markets 
Traders Quotations of  Traders’ Answers 
1 
“I do not see the positive effects on my sales by participating in the markets. 
Participation in fact cost my time.” 
2 
“It [participation] cost me too much time. I participated because the policy 
required me do so.” 
3 “I am not attached with this game.” 
4 “The idea is good. But I do not have time to explore it further.” 
5 
“Frankly speaking, it was too hectic recently. I didn’t have time to participate. My 
contribution is probably not very important.” 
6 
“To be honest, I am very busy with visiting customers, explaining products, and 
troubleshooting. There are 20 to 25 outstanding emails in front of  me. This 
[participation in the prediction markets] is not my priority.” 
7 “I don’t feel like participating, as it takes too much time.” 
 
We noticed that one trader gave a unique reason for not participating in the internal prediction 
markets. He said that “…other traders in the markets were not active. Many of  my orders cannot be 
matched in the markets. I logged in very often. However, I found that my orders were always pending….” 
This sales manager’s answer in fact brought the problem of  low activity to light. Kambil and 
Van Heck (2002) contended that a market must have liquidity to function, which requires a 
certain minimum level of  traders’ activity. Therefore, this result actually emphasized the 
importance of  traders’ activity in an internal prediction market. When only a few traders 
behave actively, they may finally become inactive due to unavailability of  trading with others.  
 
4.5.2 Traders’ Dynamic Interactions 
Table 4.6 summarizes the statistics for traders’ self-revisions, measured at the individual trader 
level. “Number of  self-revision (Type I)” showed the number of  buy or sell orders with a 
different price compared to the previous order placed by the same trader for the same 
contract. According to this table, in the March Market, on average, each trader placed 15 buy 
or sell orders with a different price compared to his or her previous order for the same 
contract; and in the June Market, each trader, on average, made 7 self-revisions for the same 
contract.  
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“Number of  self-revisions (Type II)” showed the number of  buy or sell orders with at least 5% 
difference in price compared to the previous order placed by the same trader for the same 
contract. Table 4.6 shows that on average, a trader placed 14 Type II buy or sell orders in the 
March Market and made 6 Type II self-revisions in the June Market. 
 
The comparison between the number of  Type I and Type II self-revisions disclosed the tiny 
difference between these two types in both markets: the average number of  Type II 
self-revisions was just one smaller than Type I in both the March Market and the June Market 
(March Market: Meanself_rev_I = 15, Meanself_rev_II = 14; June Market: Meanself_rev_I = 7, 
Meanself_rev_II = 6).  
 
This tiny difference indicated that almost all self-revision from a trader for a contract entailed 
at least 5% difference of  price compared to his or her previous buy or sell order. In this case, 
5% is considered statistically significant. Moreover, the comparison to the average total 
number of  buy or sell orders at the trader level (March Market: Meanbuy_sell_orders = 32, June 
Market: Meanbuy_sell_orders = 18) demonstrated that self-revisions accounted for approximately 
50% of  the orders placed by the traders (see Figure 4.2). In other words, half  of  the buy or 
sell orders entailed an update of  traders’ opinions of  future events. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the traders in these internal prediction markets learned and incorporated their 
learning into their personal predictions, confirming our predecessors’ findings (Bondarenko 
and Bossaerts 2000; Gruca et al. 2005; Rhode and Strumpf  2004).  
 
 
With regard to a trader’s influence on others, measured at the contract level, Table 4.7 displays 
the statistics for four alternative influential orders. In accordance with this table, the mean 
values of  different types of  influential orders show that there were more 1-influential orders 
than any other influential orders in both markets (March Market: Mean1-influential = 4 > 
Mean2-influential = 1 > Mean3-influential/2out3-influential = 0; June Market: Mean1-influential = 1 > 
Mean2-influential = 0). In turn, it can be concluded that one trader’s influence on another 
concentrated on the one degree influence. 
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Figure 4.2 Measurement at Trader Level in the March Market and the June Market 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Measurement at Contract Level in the March Market and the June Market 
  
32 
18 
15 
7 
14 
6 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
March Market June Market
Measurement at Participant Level 
Average number of orders
Average number of Type I
self-revisions orders
Average number of Type
II self-revisions orders
96 
36 
4 1 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
March Market June Market
Measurement at Contract Level 
Average number of orders
Average number of 1-
influential orders
78_Erim ShenYun Yang BW_Stand.job
62 
 
However, the influence of  a trader on another did not seem to be large. Even though one 
degree influential orders occurred most, the occurrence was limited. To be specific, the 
average number of  1-influential orders in the March Market (Mean1-influential = 4) indicated that 
there were on average four buy or sell orders followed by another order of  the same contract, 
which was from a different trader and was also a self-revision for that trader in the same 
direction in this market; and in the June Market, there was only one 1-influential order per 
contract (Mean1-influential = 1). Comparing to the average number of  buy or sell orders at 
contract level (March Market: Meanbuy_sell_orders = 96; June Market: Meanbuy_sell_order = 36), these 
1-influential orders accounted for only 4% of  all the orders in the March Market and less than 
3% the June Market (see Figure 4.3). 
 
Other influential orders became extremely scarce. Although there were two degree influences 
of  an order captured in both markets, the average and the maximum “number of  2-influtneial 
orders” in the March Market and the June Market (March Market: Mean2-influential = 1, June 
Market: Max2-influential = 1), demonstrated that while there was on average one 2-influential 
order per contract in the March Market, there was only a single 2-influential order of  some 
contracts in the June Market. This result revealed that few orders were followed by two 
consecutive orders of  the same contract from two different traders, which were also 
self-revisions in the same direction. 
 
Moreover, Table 4.7 illustrated that in the March Market, there was only one 3-influential 
order and two 2Out3-influential orders of  some contracts (Max3-influential = 1, Max2Out3-influential 
= 2). In the June Market, there was not even a single 3-influential or 2Out3-influential order 
(the value for each measure remained zero). The scarcity of  these influential orders disclosed 
that an order was rarely followed by more than two consecutive orders of  the same contract 
from different traders that were also self-revisions in the same direction. 
 
The aforementioned analyses of  a trader’s self-revisions implied low influence of  a trader’s 
order on others. A possible reason is that the traders kept learning about the future event and 
incorporating the new information into their estimation (Bondarenko and Bossaerts 2000; 
Gruca et al. 2005; Guo et al. 2006; Ho and Chen 2007; Rhode and Strumpf  2004). Therefore, 
there were always changes in the direction of  one trader’s self-revision orders, and hence, one 
order’s influence on others did not remain to a large extent. 
 
The empirical evidence to support this explanation was drawn from the questionnaire survey. 
In the survey, we asked the traders to rate the importance of  different information sources for 
their trading decisions. Figures 4.4a and 4.4b exhibit the average importance of  these 
information sources.  
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According to the figures, “recent regional sales” and “recent overall sales” were considered 
more important than other information sources by the traders. In the March Market, “recent 
regional sales” was rated 4.18; and in the June Market, this information source was rated 4.19. 
In both markets, the traders identified the recent regional sales of  the financial products being 
predicted most important information source in their trading decisions. Similarly, in the March 
Market and the June Market, the rates of  importance given to the “recent overall sales” were 
considerably high, reaching 4 and 3.75, respectively. These high rates manifested that the 
traders took the recent sales of  the financial products in the Netherlands into consideration to 
a large extent.  
 
4.5.3 Additional Findings of  Information Cascades 
An additional finding of  information cascades drew our attention in this case study. An 
information cascade refers to a process by which people influence one another, so much so 
that traders ignore their private knowledge and rely instead on the publicly stated judgments 
of  others (Sunstein 2006b). Information cascades arise when individuals rationally choose 
identical actions despite having different private information (Alevy et al. 2007). This 
phenomenon is associated with traders’ learning. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. 
(1992) argued that repeated learning may lead individuals to forego their private information 
and duplicate their predecessors’ choices. Anderson and Holt (1997) and Çelen and Kariv 
(2004) showed evidence of  information cascades in laboratory environments, where 
researchers can observe when decision-makers abandon their private information.  
 
Nonetheless, in a real business environment, we can only suspect the phenomenon of  
information cascades, as we cannot observe whether a trader in a prediction market has 
chosen to ignore his or her private information to follow the actions of  those ahead of  them. 
 
In the June Market, when the transaction price of  contract “19-22” suddenly turned to 99 
points (see Table 4.3, Maximum transaction price of  this contract), it became the most striking 
information signal to other traders. It may have stimulated others to believe that some people 
in the same market must have special inside information. Especially, during the time when the 
June Market was running, there was much negative news in media about the financial product 
being predicted. Contract “19-22” corresponded with the lowest sales of  that financial 
product. It is presumed that the combined effect of  the media and market information 
encouraged information cascades in this market. Therefore, there were quite a few prompt 
responses (i.e. buying at 99 points) to this signal.  
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Figure 4.4a Average Importance of  Different Information Sources in the  
March Market 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4b Average Importance of  Different Information Sources in the June Market 
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of  the market price probably convinced the traders that other traders had information they 
lacked, and therefore, they acted alike. Therefore, we suspected that information cascade 
occurred in the June Market. 
 
Information cascades are not necessarily negative. However, when individuals focus on the 
wrong kinds of  information from the market place, they are led to make mistakes with how 
they update their information (Kauffman et al. 2010). In the June Market, the suspected 
information cascade eventually undermined market performance, because contract “19-22” 
did not correspond to the actual sales outcome and its high transaction price became a 
misleading signal. 
 
The aforementioned evidence regarding traders’ responses to the transaction price of  a 
contract in fact indicated that traders were sensitive to the prices of  contracts, confirming that 
traders in a market learn from signals and constantly update their beliefs (Bondarenko and 
Bossaerts 2000; Gruca et al. 2005; Rhode and Strumpf  2004). Unfortunately, as discussed 
above, traders sometimes refer to the wrong signal, and thus the market and the traders will be 
misled.  
 
Nevertheless, having investigated all buy and sell orders of  contract “19-22”, we found, 
surprisingly, that one trader placed two sell orders of  this contract at a much lower price (i.e. 
26 points) and another two traders placed buy orders of  this contract at prices lower than 99 
points. These orders can be considered as a correction from the market.  
 
Unfortunately, these correction orders were placed on the last trade day and the new buy 
orders were not shown on the market platform due to lower than the highest outstanding bid 
at 99 points. As a result, the transaction price of  contract “19-22” ended at 99 points and was 
not corrected. Since the market prediction was based on the transaction prices of  the 
contracts, the eventual forecasting accuracy of  the June Market was influenced. The traders 
who attempted to correct the market were likely to be more rational, and therefore, they could 
have acted as “marginal traders” (Forsythe et al. 1992; Oliven and Rietz 2004) in the June 
Market. Given enough time, they could have driven the market to be more efficient (Forsythe 
et al. 1999). 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
While there is an increased interest in use of  prediction markets inside companies, many 
companies are grappling with the practice of  management due to various uncertainties, such 
as incentives for traders and the potential ramification of  prediction markets (Kiviat 2004). 
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Particularly, the understanding of  traders’ behavior in internal prediction markets remains 
limited. This case study, therefore, aims to explore this area and answer the major research 
question “How do traders behave in an internal prediction market?” We address two specific aspects 
to answer this question. One aspect is the traders’ activity level, and the other aspect is the 
interactions between the traders.  
 
The results, drawn from two internal prediction markets about the sales of  a financial product 
in an international financial company in the Netherlands, are consistent. This case study 
reveals several key findings.  
 
First, the traders’ activity level is generally low. In reality, the number of  active traders in an 
internal prediction markets is difficult to control, though a company may have developed 
various incentive mechanism to encourage its employees to actively participate. Employees, as 
the traders of  internal prediction markets, are usually confronted with limited time in trading. 
Participation in the markets requires employees to allocate time and effort from their regular 
work. The entertainment value, which drives traders to actively participate in public prediction 
markets (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004), does not work in internal prediction markets. There 
could even be a quick decline in interest among existing traders (Dye 2008), particularly when 
the market size is small (less than 30 traders) and the markets run in parallel or continuously.  
 
Second, traders actively learn from different information sources and incorporate new 
information into their trading. Employees may not trade actively, but they seem to update their 
opinions whenever they trade. Particularly, employees consider the newly acquired private 
information most important in their trading. This supports the salient ability of  prediction 
markets to aggregate inside information from dispersed individuals (Plott 2000).  
 
Third, one trader’s order may impact another trader’s order, leading to an identical change of  a 
different trader’s opinion. However, the extent of  this influence is not likely to be large. It 
rarely happens that one employee’s order may influence more than two subsequent orders 
from different employees, as employees are more inclined to revise their opinions based on 
private information. 
 
Nevertheless, when a trader selects an unusual price of  an order, it could lead to an 
information cascade in an internal prediction market. Traders learn from signals, such as 
prices of  contracts (Bondarenko and Bossaerts 2000; Gruca et al. 2005; Rhode and Strumpf  
2004). An unusual price of  a bid, ask or transaction may lead employees to believe that 
someone has special private information about the future event, and therefore, quickly 
respond to this action, leading to an information cascade. When the information is in fact 
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inaccurate, the effect of  this information cascade becomes negative on the market prediction. 
Marginal traders, however, are able to discern the quality of  the unusual signal. Their trading 
turns to correct the market, though its effect may not immediately emerge.        
 
Moreover, as illustrated by the prior experiences of  prediction markets inside companies such 
as HP and Siemens, motivating employees to trade is a major challenge (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
2004). This study discloses that although employees show interest and willingness to 
participate, they are not likely to do so during their private time. As a result, 24/7 access to the 
market does not increase the participants’ trading activities in an internal prediction market. 
The underlying reason is that employees regard participation as a part of  their work, and 
therefore, they are only willing to join during the work hours and when there are no other 
job-related tasks with priority. Therefore, companies may consider allocating time for 
employees to trade in the markets. This approach was adopted in our following field 
experiment (see Chapter 6) with satisfying effect. 
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CHAPTER 5 INFORMATION TRANSPARENCY AND 
MARKET PERFORMANCE: A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The increased use of  prediction markets is attributed to the pervasiveness of  IT. Malone et al. 
(1987) foretold that there would be a shift to proportionately more use of  markets due to 
information technologies. Web-based prediction markets eliminate the temporal and spatial 
constraints of  participation: traders all over the world can access a web-based prediction 
market anytime, anywhere.  
 
Advanced technologies have not only enabled web-based prediction markets but also 
enhanced information transparency in markets, such as the distribution of  various types and 
amounts of  market information (Granados et al. 2010). In turn, in most current prediction 
markets, different types of  information, such as outstanding bids and asks and transactions, 
are usually made available to traders. Like the public or internal prediction markets mentioned 
in Chapter 2, the two internal prediction markets in our previous case study demonstrated the 
adoption of  transparent information in the market.  
 
Information transparency refers to the level of  availability and accessibility of  market 
information to traders (Zhu 2004). The effect of  information transparency on different 
markets, such as B2B and B2C, varies (Granados et al. 2008; 2010; Zhu 2002). However, to 
date, little work has been done on the effects of  information transparency on prediction 
markets. Since the possibility and use of  information transparency could be extensive in the 
prediction market, in this dissertation, we examine the effects of  information transparency on 
prediction market performance. As discussed in Chapter 1, the second major research 
question of  this dissertation is as follows: 
 
RQmain2: How does information transparency in an internal prediction market influence market 
performance? 
 
Based on information elements, price transparency is identified as a specific type of  
information transparency (Granados et al. 2010). Price transparency refers to the revelation of  
information about prices, such as current market prices, quotes and historical transaction 
prices (Granados et al. 2006; 2010; Soh et al. 2006). In prediction markets, prices indicate 
information and encompass information aggregation and dissemination (Ho and Chen 2007) 
and information aggregation is the fundamental function of  a prediction market. Therefore, 
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in this dissertation, we focus on price transparency. 
 
In the previous explorative case study, we observed that internal prediction markets are 
confronted with limited participation. Particularly, the number of  participants actively trading 
in the market may be constrained and very limited. Constrained traders’ participation has been 
identified as a serious disadvantage of  prediction markets (Hanson et al. 2006; Sunstein 2006a). 
Unfortunately, internal prediction markets are usually characterized by this issue (Plott and 
Chen 2002; Cowgill et al. 2008). Therefore, our research focus and designs in this chapter are 
based on this common situation of  internal prediction markets.  
 
Furthermore, the literature review in Chapter 2 discussed two aspects of  market performance; 
information aggregation and market prediction. In this laboratory experimental study, we 
examine these two aspects in terms of  information aggregation efficiency and predictive 
accuracy. Information aggregation efficiency reflects the traders’ agreed opinion, and 
forecasting accuracy is critical for decisions. The laboratory experiments allow us to assess 
both aspects of  market performance.  
 
The objective of  this chapter, in turn, is to investigate the effect of  price transparency on the 
information aggregation efficiency and the predictive accuracy of  internal prediction markets 
through trader’s behavior. The following two sub-research questions are as follows: 
 
RQ 2-1: How does price information transparency in an internal prediction market with a limited number 
of  actively trading traders influence the traders’ behavior and further influence market information 
aggregation efficiency? 
 
RQ 2-2: How does price information transparency in an internal prediction market with a limited number 
of  actively trading traders influence the traders’ behavior and further influence market predictive 
accuracy?  
 
This chapter adds to the growing literature on prediction markets, particularly internal 
prediction markets within companies that include a limited number of  actively trading 
participants. The laboratory experiments empirically test our hypotheses. The evidence 
resulting from the experiments shows that the revelation of  price information undermines 
traders’ participation and learning activity, when only a few traders are actively participating in 
an internal prediction market. This further leads to a negative effect on market information 
aggregation efficiency as well as market predictive accuracy, as higher information aggregation 
efficiency and increased predictive accuracy require higher levels of  trader participation and 
adaptive learning. We therefore suggest concealing certain price information, such as quotes, 
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in small-scale internal prediction markets. 
 
One key contribution of  this research is to extend current studies on information 
transparency by investigating its effect in new types of  markets. Moreover, this paper adds 
information transparency, particularly price transparency, to prediction market design. The 
examination of  traders’ behavior in this research enhances the understanding of  why and how 
their specific activities influence market predictive accuracy. Furthermore, we develop a 
method to measure information aggregation efficiency. This indicator allows practitioners to 
assess prediction market performance prior to the revelation of  the actual results of  the future 
event. Consequently, they can determine whether or to what extent they can make a decision 
based on the market forecast. Moreover, our study provides practitioners with an alternative 
market design in terms of  information transparency to tackle limited participation in an 
internal prediction market. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. We first discuss the relevant theoretical foundations and 
construct the hypotheses based on this theoretical background. Subsequently, we elaborate on 
the research design of  the laboratory experiments. Thereafter, we present the results from our 
empirical studies and validate the hypotheses. Finally, we conclude our research findings and 
answer the research questions. 
 
5.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section, we introduce the theoretical foundations of  this laboratory experiment and 
develop our hypotheses. 
 
5.2.1 Information Transparency and Trader’s Behavior 
Research on financial markets explored the extent to which greater price transparency leads to 
higher market efficiency and liquidity (Granados et al. 2008). Multiple price information 
includes transaction price, price quotes and so on (i.e. bids or asks) (Bloomfield and O’Hara 
1999; Granados et al. 2006; Soh et al. 2006). The effect of  price information transparency is 
debatable based on the extant research. Theoretical research suggests that market transparency 
should matter, whereas the empirical evidence shows mixed findings (Bloomfield and O’Hara 
1999). For instance, Flood et al. (1999) demonstrated that price transparency reduces opening 
spreads and increases trading volume based on their experimental markets, whereas 
Bloomfield and O’Hara’s (1999) experiment drew contrary results. In addition, restricting the 
transparency debate to a certain type of  price information, such as trade or quote, Pagano and 
Röell (1996) explored its different effects on different types of  markets, such as auctions and 
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dealer markets. The introduction of  quote transparency in particular is considered to enhance 
the complexity of  information transparency research. As Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) 
indicated, the contrasting conjectures surrounding the benefits of  quote transparency 
emphasize the general lack of  knowledge of  the effects of  transparency on market behavior.  
 
In prediction markets, there are informed and uninformed traders (Plott 2000). Markets are 
efficient, because information can be disseminated from the informed to the uninformed. 
This process is referred to as information aggregation (Gruca et al. 2005; Plott and Sunder 
1982; 1988).  
 
Information aggregation is processed through traders’ trading activities. Quote information, 
one type of  pre-trade information, shows a trader’s individual bids and asks on a contract and 
represents the trader’s expected value of  the contract. Similarly, a transaction on a contract 
represents the aggregate expected value of  the contract. These orders and transactions, in turn, 
become public information available in the market and other traders learn from it. Gradually, 
with an increased number of  trades, information about a future event is disseminated from 
the informed to the uninformed.  
 
Prior research on information transparency has suggested that information transparency in a 
market does not benefit everyone equally. Zhu (2002) argued that participants with different 
positions in the market have different incentives when they can see each other’s bid or ask 
information. In a B2B market, transparent information about buy and sell orders benefits 
low-cost suppliers and high willingness-to-pay buyers due to the exposure of  their competitive 
costs and purchase prices, respectively. Conversely, high-cost suppliers and low 
willingness-to-pay buyers will not be motivated to participate in a market that exposes their 
unfavorable orders. 
 
In a prediction market, incentives to participate differ according to each trader’s private 
information, particularly when the total number of  traders is very constrained. Informed 
traders are not likely to actively place buy or sell orders, as these orders will reveal their private 
information to other traders. When traders’ participation activity is high, informed traders 
would be willing to participate, as they expect to observe different private information from 
other informed traders. However, when traders’ participation activity is low, informed traders 
will anticipate a smaller possibility that private information exists in the market. In turn, 
informed traders are inclined to withhold their buy or sell orders. Uninformed traders, 
contrarily, are willing to place buy or sell orders. Their orders can help them discover if  any 
informed traders and private information exists in the market. For example, an uninformed 
trader places a buy order arbitrarily. If  a transaction is successfully made, it probably means 
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that someone else in the market does not expect a higher value of  this contract. Alternatively, 
if  no transaction occurs or the subsequent sell order is at a higher price, the uniformed trader 
will learn that other traders expect a higher value of  this contract. Nevertheless, uninformed 
traders may not participate actively in a thin internal prediction market. Our explorative case 
study suggests that employees participate in an internal prediction market whenever they have 
relevant or updated information about future events. 
 
As a result, in a thin internal prediction market, the revelation of  price information will hinder 
the trader’s participation activity. In turn, we construct the following hypothesis (H1a): 
 
H1a: When an internal prediction market has only a few actively participating traders, 
disclosure of  price information leads to a lower level of  traders’ activity. 
 
Traders are sensitive to the prices of  contracts, as prices are the signals they learn from to 
constantly update their beliefs (Gruca et al. 2005; Rhode and Strumpf  2004). Prices 
persistently carry information from those with more to those with less information in a 
market (Spence 2002). In a prediction market, quote information can be referred to as market 
signals, because they are the activities of  individuals in a market, which by design or accident 
alter the beliefs of, or convey information to other individuals in the market (Spence 1974).  
 
Traders in a prediction market are motivated to deal with signals, as information is initially 
asymmetric and is transmitted via signals. In order to observe the information that other 
traders have, a trader, as a signal receiver would refer to the signal (such as other traders’ bids 
and asks) and respond accordingly. The response is embodied by the receiver’s adjustment of  
his or her expected value of  a contract in the same direction with the signaler. Additionally, 
the adjustments of  quotes yields updated information by which other traders learn, and 
therefore, leads to further revisions on the expectations of  contracts. Hence, one trader’s 
revision of  buy or sell orders on contracts is not only the consequence of  learning, but also 
the cause of  another trader’s revision. Chen et al. (2009) referred to this as trader’s dynamic 
interactions. 
 
In an internal prediction market with constrained traders, informed traders are not likely to 
actively update their opinion of  future events, as their adjustment of  an order on a contract 
implies the improvement of  their estimation. Other traders may realize this improvement and 
learn from it, forming a similar opinion. Traders in a market in fact trade on difference rather 
than similarity. Surowiecki (2004) argued that traders are motivated to act from disagreement 
and contest rather than consensus or compromise. If  everyone holds a similar opinion, it is 
impossible to make profit from a trade, and thus, trades would no longer exist. When 
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individual adjustment is limited, the influence of  one trader’s information update on another 
trader’s opinion becomes even more constrained. Accordingly, we establish hypothesis (H2a) as 
follows: 
 
H2a: When an internal prediction market has only a few actively participating traders, 
disclosure of  price information leads to a decrease in traders’ dynamic interactions. 
 
5.2.2 Traders’ Behavior and Market Information Aggregation Efficiency 
Information aggregation is the process of  information dissemination from “insiders” to 
“outsiders” (Plott and Sunder 1982; 1988; Gruca et al. 2005). In turn, traders’ beliefs regarding 
the potential outcomes of  a future event in a prediction market become convergent. Wolfers 
and Sitzewitz (2006a) and Gjerstad (2004) demonstrated that when traders’ beliefs are 
convergent, the market price in stock markets will be very close to the mean of  market 
participants’ beliefs. In turn, information aggregation efficiency of  a prediction market refers 
to the ability of  the market to synthesize the traders’ mean belief. The deviation of  transaction 
prices from this mean belief  indicates information aggregation efficiency: the smaller the 
deviation, the more efficiently the market aggregates the traders’ consensus.  
 
The mean of  traders’ beliefs can be represented by an equilibrium price. From a 
microeconomic point of  view, the equilibrium price can be identified as the price at which the 
quantity of  a demanded contract equals the quantity supplied. The prices of  bids and asks 
correspond to the trader’s perceived value of  the contract, representing the possible outcome 
of  a future event. Hence, this value is determined by the trader’s estimation of  the possibility 
of  the event. Thus, the resulting equilibrium price represents a mean of  individuals’ 
probability estimations, and the resulting market price in prediction markets could predict the 
possibility of  future events when it is strongly correlated with the equilibrium price. 
 
However, in an information asymmetric market, transaction prices of  a contract are often 
above or below the average of  reservation prices depending on the elasticity of  the demand or 
supply curve. It then becomes extremely difficult to achieve the equilibrium price. However 
the price formation mechanism of  a double auction allows traders to observe other 
individuals’ beliefs based on the quote or transaction prices, and then to incorporate that 
information into their own expectations. With these new expectations come new demand 
functions and, therefore, new prices (Hahn and Tetlock 2006). Each trading activity in fact 
aggregates information into the market. If  all the information is revealed in the price and 
information aggregation is efficient, eventually the equilibrium price can be achieved. 
Accordingly, it is important to stimulate traders to actively participate in a prediction market. 
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The following hypothesis (H3) is suggested:  
 
H3: An increased level of  traders’ participation activity in a prediction market leads to higher 
information aggregation efficiency.  
 
In a prediction market, payoffs are tied to the individual trader’s predictive accuracy of  the 
future event and thus trading profit or loss is straightforward. Traders are, therefore, 
motivated not only to truthfully incorporate their private information and any other relevant 
information into trading decisions, but also to seek information about the future event (Berg 
and Rietz 2003; Oliven and Rietz 2004; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). Consequently, prediction 
markets have the ability to aggregate information from individuals, who filter both public and 
private information, and weigh this information through the price formation process (Berg 
and Rietz 2003). 
 
Traders learn and keep updating their beliefs based on different newly-acquired information. 
This learning process is reflected in their ever-changing buy and sell orders (Gruca et al. 2005; 
Rhode and Strumpf  2004). Besides non-market information, such as media news of  a future 
event, traders learn from others’ expected values of  contracts inside a market. Traders 
iteratively learn and adjust their individual expectations. As a result, their expectations will 
eventually converge and trade will cease in the market (Davis and Holt 1993). Until then, the 
convergent expectation should have captured all of  the information for the estimation of  the 
future event. In other words, the traders’ mean belief  should have been captured and reflected 
in the transaction price of  a contract in a prediction market. Thus, the deviation between the 
transaction price and the equilibrium price of  a contract, which represents the traders’ mean 
belief, is reduced. Consequently, traders’ dynamic interactions, in addition to traders’ 
participation activity, affect the process of  information aggregation. Therefore, we propose 
hypothesis (H4) as follows: 
 
H4: An increase in traders’ dynamic interactions in a prediction market leads to higher 
information aggregation efficiency. 
 
5.2.3 Information Aggregation Efficiency and Market Predictive Accuracy 
The theoretical foundation of  prediction markets, the rational expectations hypothesis (Muth 
1961) and the efficient market hypothesis (Fama 1970) suggested that higher information 
aggregation efficiency leads to more accurate market prediction. Previous studies on 
prediction markets also demonstrated that the market can accurately predict future events by 
efficiently aggregating dispersed information (such as Gadanecz 2007; Gruca et al. 2005; Plott 
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2000). Essentially, these theories proposed that a prediction market can forecast accurately due 
to its robust ability to aggregate information. In accordance with these arguments, we 
construct the hypothesis (H5) as follows:  
 
H5: Higher information aggregation efficiency of  a prediction market leads to higher market 
predictive accuracy. 
 
5.3 RESEARCH METHODS 
In this section, we describe the details of  the laboratory experiment, including the experiment 
design, the market design, contracts, subjects, incentives and experiment procedures. 
 
5.3.1 Laboratory Experimental Design 
With regard to information transparency, this dissertation focuses on price transparency, 
particularly quote information in prediction markets, as this pre-trade information is likely to 
influence traders’ behavior. We identified two conditions of  price information in this study. 
One is “opaque”, in which traders do not see others’ buy or sell orders, neither the price nor 
the number of  shares. The other condition is “transparent”, in which traders see the highest 
outstanding buy order and the lowest outstanding sell order, including the price and the total 
number of  shares. 
 
In these laboratory experiments, we adopted a within-subjects design. Every subject took part 
in two markets and each market corresponded to a specific transparency condition of  price 
information. The major advantage of  a within-subjects design is the control for differences 
across cohorts (Bloomfield and O’Hara 1999). Subjects may differ according to characteristics, 
such as intelligence, personality, motivation or familiarity with the experimental environment 
(Davis and Holt 1993; Kagel and Roth 1995). Such variations between subjects can make it 
difficult to draw inferences about the effect of  price information transparency levels if  one 
cohort of  subjects participate in one setting and another cohort participates in another, 
because the effect of  the treatment might actually reflect differences in the cohorts’ 
characteristics (Bloomfield and O’Hara 1999). Therefore, to avoid this potential confounding 
issue, we let each cohort of  subjects trade in both transparency settings. 
 
However, a within-subjects design also entails the disadvantage of  order effects, such as 
learning and fatigue. Due to the complexity of  laboratory markets, even the same subjects may 
behave differently in the later repetitions of  tasks than in early repetitions (Forsythe and 
Lundholm 1990). Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) emphasized the importance of  not running 
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different settings in a fixed sequence, as any apparent differences may actually be due to 
subject’s learning or fatigue rather than to the different treatments. Consequently, we followed 
the principle of  a balanced Latin square design (Field and Hole 2003) to order the 
experimental market sequences: one cohort of  the subjects participated in the opaque market 
first and then the transparent market, and the subsequent cohort participated in the 
transparent market first and then the opaque market. 
 
Furthermore, according to our pilot studies of  four cohorts (including a total of  20 subjects), 
training was crucial to familiarize subjects with the trading tasks, as almost none of  the 
subjects had experiences with prediction markets. Consequently, each cohort of  subjects was 
required to participate in three markets, including the first trial market for training. The 
transparency condition used in this first market was identical to the condition in the last 
market. Table 5.1 illustrates the order of  the experimental market sequences for each cohort 
of  subjects. 
 
To engage with practitioners in our research and design the prediction markets to mirror the 
implementations in real business contexts, we conducted the laboratory experiments in 
collaboration with TaoBao (www.taobao.com), a leading online B2B2C market with 
approximately 500 million registered users in China (by 2011). TaoBao provided us with its 
actual business events for prediction and the data for contract design. 
 
Table 5.1 Order of  Experimental Market Sequences 
Cohort Number Training Market First Market Second Market 
1 Transparent Opaque Transparent 
2 Opaque Transparent Opaque 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
21 Transparent Opaque Transparent 
22 Opaque Transparent Opaque 
  
5.3.2 Market Mechanism Design 
A web-based continuous double auction mechanism was used in the laboratory experiments.  
On a single web page, all of  the contracts for a market were available. Due to the different 
price information conditions, the web pages for each setting were slightly different. However, 
the fundamental design was similar and developed based on the one used in the previous 
explorative case study.  
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Figure 5.1a and 5.2a illustrate the market of  opaque and transparent price information 
conditions. At the top of  the web page, the future event being predicted was displayed. 
Beneath it was the trading part, in which all the contracts were listed in the column “stocks”. 
Historic prices of  contracts were exhibited as a line chart. An overview of  the trader’s buy and 
sell orders was provided in the bottom, showing the status of  an order, namely executed or 
not. In the opaque market, the columns including lowest sell and highest buy were not 
presented, although they were displayed in the transparent market. 
 
At the beginning of  each market, every trader received an endowment, including 1,000 points 
of  play money and 10 shares per contract. 
 
5.3.3 Contracts Design 
All of  the markets in the laboratory experiments predicted the annual sales of  a certain 
category of  products or services sold on www.taobao.com in 2008. In total, there were 43 
categories, such as computer and networking, women’s clothing, and gift cards. The prediction 
events were randomly assigned to each market, with no repetition within a single session, in 
which a cohort of  subjects participated in three different markets. Every market had five 
contracts, representing the five possible ranges of  sales of  a certain product or service 
category up for prediction. The contracts were co-designed with TaoBao, and one of  the five 
contracts corresponded to the actual sales result. Table 5.2 summarizes the 43 product or 
service categories being predicted and their corresponding contracts. 
  
To illustrate a market, we take the product category “Flowers and Cakes” as an example. In 
this market, the event to be predicted was the annual sales of  flowers and cakes on 
www.taobao.com in 2008 in RMB. Contract “238-240” represented that the sales of  this 
product category on www.taobao.com in 2008 fell between 238 million RMB and 240 million 
RMB. 
 
In the experiments, every subject received a piece of  private information in each market, 
indicating which specific contract was definitely not the actual sales outcome. However, none 
of  the subjects were informed about which contract represented the actual sales.  
 
According to Taobao, the data they provided to us were never revealed to the public or used 
in any other research activities outside Taobao. This situation ensured that none of  the 
subjects in the experimental markets were informed traders, avoiding information asymmetry 
among the traders. Additionally, Taobao masked the original data before they delivered it to 
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us. 
 
5.3.4 Subjects 
The subjects in these laboratory experiments were students of  Erasmus University. Student 
subjects are viewed as the standard subject pool used by experimenters (Harrison and List 
2004). We advertised our laboratory study to the subject pool of  the university behavioral lab 
via its official website. A total of  132 university students were recruited and randomly assigned 
to 22 cohorts, thus, 6 subjects per cohort. Each cohort was invited to a computer lab in 
sequence. A session encompassed all of  the tasks that a cohort must complete in the 
experiment. Every subject was informed about his or her session time and was required to 
confirm in advance. Three days and one day prior to the scheduled time, a reminder was sent 
to the subjects by email in order to reduce the no-show rate. 
 
5.3.5 Incentives 
Three different types of  cash rewards were offered to the subjects. The first type was an 
“attendance reward”. A subject who participated and completed the entire session received 
this basic reward of  10 euros. The other two additional rewards were offered based on the 
subject’s individual performance. In each market, a subject received an additional 0.50 euros 
per share of  the contract owned which represented actual sales. (This included only shares 
that were in addition to the 10 shares in the endowment.) This type of  reward was termed a 
“prediction reward” and was developed to motivate subjects to learn in the market. The last 
type of  reward was a “trading reward”. In each market, the subject who had the most play 
money in their account at the end of  the experiment earned an additional 2.00 euros. The 
trading reward was designed to motivate subjects to trade actively in the prediction market. 
Subjects were informed that they would not be eligible for the market rewards if  they did not 
place buy or sell orders in that market. 
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Figure 5.1a Screenshot of  an Opaque Market with No Quote Information in 
Laboratory Experiments 
 
Figure 5.1b Screenshot of  a Transparent Market with Quote Information in 
Laboratory Experiments 
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Table 5.2 Product Categories and Contracts 
Product Category 
Contract 1 
(¥1 million) 
Contract 2 
(¥ million) 
Contract 3 
(¥ million) 
Contract 4 
(¥ million) 
Contract 5 
(¥ million) 
Adult Supplies 313-315 315-317 317-319 319-321 321-323 
Antiques 1,359-1,362 1,362-1,365 1,365-1,368 1,368-1,371 1,371-1,374 
Baby 2,507-2,510 2,510-2,513 2,513-2,516 2,516-2,519 2,519-2,522 
Beauty & Massage 1,125-1,128 1,128-1,131 1,131-1,134 1,134-1,137 1,137-1,140 
Beds 894-896 896-898 898-900 900-902 902-904 
Books 1,177-1,180 1,180-1,183 1,183-1,186 1,186-1,189 1,189-1,192 
Cameras & Photo 2,469-2,472 2,472-2,475 2,475-2,478 2,478-2,481 2,481-2,484 
Cars 1,896-1,899 1,899-1,902 1,902-1,903 1,903-1,906 1,906-1,909 
Children's Clothing 1,079-1,082 1,082-1,085 1,085-1,088 1,088-1,091 1,091-1,094 
Computers & 
Networking 
3,516-3,519 3,519-3,522 3,522-3,525 3,525-3,528 3,528-3,531 
Cosmetics/Perfumes 5,690-5,693 5,693-5,696 5,696-5,699 5,699-5,702 5,702-5,705 
Dolls & Bears 1,220-1,223 1,223-1,226 1,226-1,229 1,229-1,232 1,232-1,235 
Electrics 2,123-2,126 2,126-2,129 2,129-2,132 2,132-2,135 2,135-2,138 
Fashionable 
Accessories 
1,423-1,426 1,426-1,429 1,429-1,432 1,432-1,435 1,435-1,438 
Female Clothing 7,911-7,914 7,914-7,917 7,917-7,920 7,920-7,923 7,923-7,926 
Female Shoes 1,726-1,729 1,729-1,732 1,732-1,735 1,735-1,738 1,738-1,741 
Flowers & Cakes 238-240 240-242 242-244 244-246 246-248 
Food 2,036-2,039 2,039-2,042 2,042-2,045 2,045-2,048 2,048-2,051 
Furniture 898-900 900-902 902-904 904-906 906-908 
Gift Cards 646-648 648-650 650-652 652-654 654-656 
Health 1,711-1,714 1,714-1,717 1,717-1,720 1,720-1,723 1,723-1,726 
Home 1,876-1,879 1,879-1,882 1,882-1,885 1,885-1,888 1,888-1,891 
Household 
Appliances 
2,954-2,957 2,957-2,960 2,960-2,963 2,963-2,966 2,966-2,969 
Internet Phones 1,595-1,598 1,598-1,601 1,601-1,604 1,604-1,607 1,607-1,610 
Lamps & Hardware 1,444-1,447 1,447-1,450 1,450-1,453 1,453-1,456 1,456-1,459 
Laptops 3,441-3,444 3,444-3,447 3,447-3,450 3,450-3,453 3,453-3,456 
Logistical Service 383-385 385-387 387-389 389-391 391-393 
Male Clothing 2,885-2,888 2,888-2,891 2,891-2,894 2,894-2,897 2,897-2,900 
                                                        
1
 “¥” is the symbol of RMB, Chinese currency. In 2008, 1.00 euro equals approximately to 10.00 RMB. 
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Memory Cards & 
USB 
512-514 514-516 516-518 518-520 520-522 
Mobile Phones 7,823-7,826 7,826-7,829 7,829-7,832 7,832-7,835 7,835-7,838 
Mobile Phone 
Prepaid Cards 
1,358-1,361 1,361-1,364 1,364-1,367 1,367-1,370 1,370-1,373 
MP3/iPod 982-984 984-986 986-988 988-990 990-992 
Music 562-564 564-566 566-568 568-570 570-572 
Office Supplies 1,360-1,363 1,363-1,366 1,366-1,369 1,369-1,372 1,372-1,375 
Online Games 9,732-9,735 9,735-9,738 9,738-9,741 9,741-9,744 9,744-9,747 
Outdoor Sports 785-787 787-789 789-791 791-793 793-795 
Pet Supplies 591-593 593-595 595-597 597-599 599-601 
Software 1,232-1,235 1,235-1,238 1,238-1,241 1,241-1,244 1,244-1,247 
Travel 513-517 515-517 517-519 519-521 521-523 
Underware 1,201-1,204 1,204-1,207 1,207-1,210 1,210-1,213 1,213-1,216 
Video Games 75-77 77-79 79-81 81-83 83-85 
Watches 1,314-1,317 1,317-1,320 1,320-1,323 1,323-1,326 1,326-1,329 
ZIPPO & Swiss 
Army Knife 
5,942-5,945 5,945-5,948 5,948-5,951 5,951-5,954 5,954-5,957 
 
5.3.6 Experimental Procedures 
The duration of  a complete session with a cohort was approximately 90 minutes and 
consisted of  three parts. Subjects in a session first gathered in a waiting room in the lab. 
Instructions, printed on one A4 paper (see Appendix II), were offered and the experiment 
administrator gave supplementary instructions orally. The instructions briefly introduced the 
major tasks the subjects would do, the reward scheme, and other important details that 
subjects should pay attention to. At the end of  the instruction period, the subjects were 
allowed to raise any questions or ask for clarification. This part usually took no longer than 10 
minutes.  
 
Subsequently, subjects were led to a lab with individual computer cubical rooms and the 
second part of  the session commenced. Each cubical room was furnished with headphones 
connected to the lab’s internal communication system, a pen, writing paper and the necessary 
documents for the ensuing prediction markets. The experiment administrator used the lab’s 
internal communication system to transmitted instructions to the subjects. Subjects were 
required to participate in three sequential prediction markets. Before the beginning of  each 
market, subjects were given three minutes to read the information given to them about that 
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market (see Appendix III). The information included private information and general 
historical sales information about the specific category of  products or services. The duration 
of  each market was exactly 10 minutes. After each market, subjects were asked to complete a 
small survey regarding their use of  information in the preceding market (see Appendix IV). 
During this part, the administrator instructed the subjects when to read the information and 
fill in the questionnaire and announced the opening and closing of  each market through the 
internal communication system.  
 
Finally, after trading in the three markets was complete, subjects were required to leave 
everything inside their cubicles and return to the waiting room, where a debriefing was held. 
In the debriefing, the administrator first announced if  all the subjects were eligible for the 
reward and then announced the winners of  the prediction reward and the trading reward in 
each market, including the total amount of  cash each subject would obtain. Afterwards, the 
cash rewards were distributed to every subject. 
 
5.4 MEASURES 
As the research model of  the laboratory experiments shows, the measures involve three 
variables, namely traders’ participation activity, traders’ dynamic interactions and market 
predictive accuracy. The measures of  the former two variables are identical to the measures of  
the same variables in Chapter 4 (see 4.4 Measures). To recap, the measure of  traders’ 
participation activity includes the contract level (i.e. number of  transactions and number of  
shares traded) and the individual trader level (i.e. number of  buy orders/sell orders and 
number of  shares in buy orders/sell orders). Similarly, the measure of  traders’ dynamic 
interaction entails the contract level (i.e. 1-influential, 2-influential, 3-influential, and 
2out3-influential orders) and the individual trader level (i.e. Type I and Type II self-revisions). 
 
5.4.1 Measure of  Information Aggregation Efficiency 
According to current research, there are two ways of  measuring information aggregation 
efficiency, nevertheless, neither fulfilled the needs of  this study. One measurement compares 
the transaction prices with the competitive equilibrium price of  a contract; the competitive 
equilibrium price corresponds to the reward, given that all private information is aggregated 
and reflected in the market. Therefore, the smaller the difference between the transaction 
price and the competitive equilibrium price of  a contract, the higher the information 
aggregation efficiency (See Plott 2000). However, this measurement is used in laboratory 
experiments, where the certainty of  private information is ensured and the actual result is 
known. While the measurement shows the robust ability of  prediction markets to aggregate 
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information, it cannot be used in a real business environment, where the certainty and the 
availability of  private information are not ensured and the outcome of  the future event is 
unknown. 
 
The other measurement compares traders’ average estimation of  a future event prior to 
market opening with the actual result. The closer the two results, the more efficient the 
information aggregation (see Gruca et al. 2005). A prediction market forecast reflects the 
market consensus and traders’ average estimation represents consensus. The comparison 
between these two measurements, therefore, indicates to what extent the market captures the 
traders’ consensus. However, this method neglects the fact that information aggregation is a 
process, in which traders keep learning while trading and bring new information into the 
market (Bondarenko and Bossaerts 2000; Gruca et al. 2005; Ho and Chen 2007; Rhode and 
Strumpf  2004). In turn, traders’ average estimation of  the future event prior to the market 
opening does not actually imply their consensus after learning. Alternatively, we can collect the 
traders’ average estimation of  the future event in the end of  the market, after learning in the 
market. Nonetheless, in reality, it is not ensured that all traders, or at least most of  the traders, 
will submit their personal estimate. Additionally, existing traders may leave and new traders 
may come to a market. Furthermore, it is impossible to measure the information aggregation 
efficiency until the end of  the market. 
 
The measurement we develop in this study is based on the comparison between the 
transaction price and the dynamic equilibrium price of  a contract. A trader’s buy and sell order 
of  a contract corresponds to his or her perception of  the possibility of  an outcome of  a 
future event. When there is no difference between traders’ perceived value of  a contract, no 
shares are traded further. A demand curve of  a contract can be extracted based on all the buy 
orders of  this contract, and a supply curve can be drawn based on all the sell orders of  the 
contract. An equilibrium price is identified as the price at which the quantity of  a demanded 
contract equals the quantity supplied and in the absence of  external influences the equilibrium 
value will not change. The equilibrium price of  a contract, based on the demand and supply 
curve of  the contract, thus, represents the market consensus on the probability estimation of  
the corresponding outcome. This equilibrium price of  the contract evolves along with each 
trader’s learning and the development of  the market. This is referred to as the dynamic 
equilibrium price. This measurement is illuminated by the study of  Martin (2006). 
 
To be specific, our measurement entails the following four steps: 
 
Step 1: Estimate the general equation for a linear demand curve  
With regard to a contract in a prediction market, we plot the buy orders on two coordinate 
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axes with reservation price on the vertical axis and quantity demanded on the horizontal axis. 
Reservation price refers to the price submitted in a buy order, and quantity refers to the total 
number of  shares submitted in the buy orders with the same reservation price. A linear 
demand curve can be drawn and represented by the following equation: 
 
𝑃𝑑𝑖 = 𝑎 − 𝑏 × 𝑄𝑑𝑖……………………….(4) 
 
where i represents a contract in a prediction market, 𝑃𝑑𝑖  denotes the price demanded of  the 
contract i and 𝑄𝑑𝑖  denotes the quantity demanded. Mathematically, 𝑎 is the vertical axis 
intercept and −𝑏 is the slope. Economically, if  price goes as high as 𝑎 TB, traders will 
demand zero shares of  contract i; 𝑏 is the rate at which the price must fall for the quantity 
demanded to increase by one share. In turn, 𝑎 must be positive, and the minus sign on b 
indicates that quantity demanded and price are inversely related. 
 
Step 2: Estimate the general equation for a linear supply curve  
Similar to Step 1, we plot the sell orders on two coordinate axes with reservation price on the 
vertical axis and quantity supplied on the horizontal axis. Reservation price refers to the price 
submitted in a sell order; and quantity refers to the total number of  shares submitted in sell 
orders with the same reservation price. A linear supply curve can be drawn and represented by 
the following equation: 
 
𝑃𝑠𝑖 = 𝑐 − 𝑑 × 𝑄𝑠𝑖……………………….(5) 
 
where i represents a contract in a prediction market, 𝑃𝑠𝑖  denotes the price supplied of  the 
contract i and 𝑄𝑠𝑖  denotes the quantity supplied. Mathematically, 𝑐 is the vertical axis 
intercept of  the supply curve and 𝑑 is its slope. Economically, traders will offer zero shares 
for sale if  the price drops as low as 𝑐 TB, and 𝑑 is the rate at which the price must rise for 
traders to offer one more share for sale. Thus, the intercept 𝑐 is positive, and the positive 
sign on 𝑑 indicates a direct relationship between price and quantity supplied. 
 
Step 3: Calculate the dynamic equilibrium price of  a contract 
To find the equilibrium price, we apply the condition that quantity demanded equals quantity 
supplied: 𝑄𝑑𝑖 = 𝑄𝑠𝑖 = 𝑄𝑒𝑖 , where 𝑄𝑒𝑖  denotes the equilibrium quantity of  contract i. 
Substituting 𝑄𝑒𝑖 into the demand and supply equations and noting that there is just one 
equilibrium price, we can set the two equations equal to each other: 𝑎 − 𝑏 × 𝑄𝑑𝑖  = 𝑐 − 𝑑 ×
𝑄𝑠𝑖 . Accordingly, we obtain the result: 𝑄𝑒𝑖 =
𝑎−𝑐
𝑏+𝑑
.  By inserting this value for the 
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equilibrium quantity into either the demand or supply equation of  contract i, we can 
determine that the equilibrium price is as follows: 
𝑃𝑒𝑖 =
𝑎𝑑+𝑏𝑐
𝑏+𝑑
……………………….(6) 
 
where 𝑃𝑒𝑖 denotes the dynamic equilibrium price of  contract i. Since a, b, c and d are all 
positive, 𝑃𝑒𝑖 is also positive.  
 
Step 4: Calculate the average percentage deviation of  the transaction price from the dynamic equilibrium price 
of  contracts in a market 
To compare information aggregation efficiency between different prediction markets, we 
finally calculate the average percentage deviation of  the transaction price from the dynamic 
equilibrium price of  contracts in a market as follows: 
 
∑ |(𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑒𝑖)/𝑃𝑒𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖
𝑛
× 100% 
 
where 𝑃𝑖  is the transaction price of  contract i and 𝑛 is the number of  contracts in a 
prediction market. The smaller the average percentage deviation of  the transaction price from 
the dynamic equilibrium price, the higher the information aggregation efficiency in a 
prediction market. 
 
5.4.2 Measure of  Market Predictive Accuracy 
With regard to market predictive accuracy, we examine how accurately a market predicts 
future events. Market predictive accuracy is usually assessed against two benchmarks, including 
the actual sales results and the estimation generated from the competing forecasting 
mechanism. The accuracy assessed against the former criterion is referred to as the absolute 
accuracy; the accuracy assessed against the latter criterion is referred to as relative accuracy 
(Berg and Rietz 2003). Given that it is generally more difficult to achieve absolute accuracy, 
more emphasis is put on relative accuracy. This decision fulfills the need of  most companies, 
which aim to find an improved forecasting mechanism compared to existing mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, as the actual results of  sales of  the product or service categories in 2008 on 
www.taobao.com are available to us, the experiments assess absolute accuracy. In other words, 
we measure the market predictive accuracy based on the comparison of  market prediction and 
actual sales. The smaller the difference between these two figures, the more accurate the 
market prediction. 
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The measure of  market predictive accuracy in laboratory experiments follows prior research 
on internal prediction markets in HP (Plott and Chen 2002), which were among the first 
internal prediction markets. We follow the measurement of  this prior research for four 
primary reasons. First, the future events being predicted in HP markets were sales of  HP 
products, similar to the experimental markets in this study. Second, the contract design in HP 
markets was similar to our study. In both studies, each contract represents a possible range of  
sales. Third, Plott and Chen (2002) identified the measurement of  the point estimation of  the 
market prediction. This point estimation allows researchers to calculate the absolute difference 
between the market prediction and actual sales, precisely comparing the two figures. Last, 
Plott and Chen (2002) further illustrated the particular measurement of  market predictive 
accuracy, namely, the percentage error, based on the aforementioned comparison. To be 
specific, this measure entails the following three steps. 
 
Step 1: Use price to measure the likelihood of  a contract 
In a prediction market, the transaction price of  a contract indicates trader’s agreed opinion of  
the contract. The higher the price, the more likely the outcome presented by the contact (in 
the estimation of  the traders). However, a price is not a probability; it is a positive real number. 
To use a price to measure the likelihood of  the outcome presented by a contract, we construct 
the following measurement: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖 =
𝑃𝑖
∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑖
…………………..(1) 
where i represents a contract in a prediction market and 𝑃𝑟𝑖 denotes the probability that the 
contract i would happen. The construction of  𝑃𝑟𝑖 determines that its value is between [0, 1]. 
This construct also ensures that the higher the price 𝑃𝑖, the higher the corresponding 
probability. The summation of  𝑃𝑟𝑖  is ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 1. 
 
Different prices can be taken into consideration, such as the last transaction price of  a 
contract, the average price, or the weighted average price of  a contract during a certain time 
period. In this study, we consider the last transaction price and the weighted average price of  a 
contract. Usually, the last transaction price is expected to reflect the most accurate information 
about future events. However, due to the very limited operation time (10 minutes) of  each 
market in our laboratory experiments, the weighted average transaction price of  contracts 
could be more representative of  the information. As there are few existing studies, we do not 
know which price may generate a more accurate market prediction in this case. Thereby, we 
take both prices into our calculation.  
 
Step 2: Estimate a market prediction 
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Suppose the outcome represented by contract i will definitely happen, the market prediction 
would be  
 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖 ∙ 1 = 𝑀𝑖…………………..(2) 
 
where Mi denotes the mid-point of  the numerical range represented by contract i. For instance, 
“238-240” is one of  the contracts of  the market that predicts the annual sales of  product 
category “Flowers and Cakes” on www.taobao.com in 2008. The mid-point of  this contract is 
thus “239”. Following the rationale of  Plott and Chen (2002), since there is no specific 
information within a range of  numbers represented by the contract and all the ranges are 
finite, a uniform distribution is adopted. The mid-point of  a range is regarded as the 
expectation of  a uniform distribution.  
 
In reality, we are uncertain of  the probability of  a contract. Nonetheless, we know the 
probability of  each contract in a market, and therefore, the market prediction becomes a 
weighted average of  all the contracts and the weight is the probability of  occurrence. In turn, 
we construct the formula for the point estimation of  market prediction, namely, the sales 
result forecasted by the market in the experiments, as follows: 
 
Salemarket = ∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑖 ∙ 𝑀𝑖𝑖 …………………..(3) 
 
 
Step 3: Calculate the percentage error 
We finally calculate the percentage error of  a market prediction against the actual result of  the 
event being predicted as follows: 
 
% Error =  
|Saleactual − Salemarket|
Saleactual
× 100% 
 
where Saleactual denotes the actual annual sales of  a product or service category on 
www.taobao.com in 2008. Salemarket denotes the market point estimation of  the sales. The 
difference between the market prediction and the actual result specifically means the absolute 
value of  the difference. The smaller the percentage error, the higher the predictive accuracy of  
the market. 
 
5.5 RESULTS 
This section discusses the results of  the laboratory experiment and validates the hypotheses 
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based on these results. We first present the overview of  the subjects’ participation in the 
experiments. Thereafter, we delineate the results according to the sequence of  the hypotheses.  
 
5.5.1 Overview of  Subjects’ Participation 
As mentioned in the research design of  this chapter, we invited 132 subjects to participate in 
the laboratory experiments based on 6 subjects per session and 22 sessions in total. However, 
23 subjects were absent on short notice and replacements could not be arranged in time. 
Consequently, 109 subjects participated in the experiments. Table 5.3 exhibits the participation 
of  subjects in the experimental markets. As this table shows, not every session had 6 subjects 
as 23 subjects were absent. Thus, the market size varied: three sessions had only three subjects; 
three sessions had four subjects; eight sessions had five subjects; and eight sessions had six 
subjects.  
 
Table 5.3 Overview of  Subjects’ Participation in the Experimental Markets 
Market size Number of  opaque markets Number of  transparent markets 
3 subjects 3 3 
4 subjects 3 3 
5 subjects 8 8 
6 subjects 8 8 
 
As described in the experimental procedures, every subject participated in three markets. Since 
the first market was designed to familiarize subjects with the experimental tasks and system 
operations, the data generated from this training market was not included in the following data 
analyses. Therefore, a total of  88 markets were counted for the statistical analyses. 
 
Furthermore, it should be clarified that due to the different number of  subjects in each 
market, we adopted the weighted number of  each indicator, whenever the analysis is on a 
contract level. To be specific, we adjusted the measurement by weighting numerical values by 
the ratio of  traders, 3/6 = 0.5, for markets with three subjects; 4/6 =0.667, for markets with 
four subjects; 5/6=0.833, for markets with five subjects. 
 
Moreover, all 109 subjects completed a full session, including one training market, one opaque 
market, one transparent market, and the follow-up questionnaire for each market, and were 
active traders in every market. Therefore, all of  them were included in the analyses. 
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5.5.2 Effects of Information Transparency on Trader’s Participation Activity 
Table 5.4 summarizes the statistics for the average trader’s participation activity at the contract 
level in the opaque and transparent markets. We use the Roman numerals to indicate the 
markets: upper-case numbers represent opaque markets and lower-case numbers represent 
transparent markets.  
 
A Mann-Whitney test based on the 110 contracts in each type of  market further manifested 
that the difference between the number of  transactions per contract in opaque and 
transparent markets was significant (U(110) =5103, z = -2.01, p < 0.045). As Table 5.4 exhibits, 
approximately 20% more transactions occurred in opaque markets than in transparent markets 
(Meanopaque = 16, Meantansparent = 13). 
 
However, the number of  shares traded per contract in the two types of  markets did not differ 
(U(110) = 5941, z = -0.23, p > 0.81). According to Table 5.4, the average number of  shares 
traded per contract was similar in both types of  markets (Meanopaque = 67, Meantansparent = 68); 
the difference is as small as 1.5%. The possible reason is that traders do not determine the 
number of  shares in their buy and sell orders based on the revelation of  price information. 
Transactions are traders’ matched buy and sell orders. Therefore, the shares traded do not 
differ significantly according to the disclosure of  price information. In fact, the following 
analyses at the trader level support this explanation. 
 
Table 5.5 shows the statistics for the average trader’s participation activity at the trader level in 
each market. A Wilcoxon test was performed to further compare the corresponding measures 
across the two markets with different information transparency. The results showed that there 
was a significant effect of  price transparency on trader’s participation activity based on the 
measure of  number of  buy orders (W(109) = 1633, z = -3.20, p < 0.01) and number of  sell 
orders (W(109) = 1706, z = -2.95, p < 0.01). Table 5.5 further illustrates that there were 27% 
more buy orders (Meanopaque = 14, Meantansparent = 11) and 30% more sell orders (Meanopaque = 
17, Meantansparent = 13) per trader in opaque markets than transparent markets. 
 
The measures of  the number of  shares in buy orders (W(109) = 2601, z = -1.20, p > 0.23) 
and the number of  shares in sell orders (W(109) = 2434, z = -1.56, p > 0.11) did not exhibit 
this significant effect, even though the difference of  the number of  shares in buy orders 
(Meanopaque = 135, Meantansparent = 98) and the number of  shares in sell orders (Meanopaque = 
126, Meantansparent = 104) between the two types of  markets seemed to be large. As discussed 
above, a possible reason is that traders do not determine the number of  shares in their buy 
and sell orders based on the revelation of  price information but their estimation of  the 
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corresponding probability of  the contracts. When a trader is more certain about the 
probability of  the outcome represented by the contract, the trader is likely to buy or sell the 
contract in a large quantity at a certain price, and vice versa. In this experimental study, every 
trader was informed about a piece of  accurate information about future events. Therefore, the 
numbers of  shares in buy and sell orders were not significantly different. 
 
Table 5.4 Summary Statistics for Traders’ Participation Activity at the Contract Level 
Opaque 
market 
Transparent 
market 
Weighted number 
of  transactions 
Weighted number 
of  shares traded 
I i 8 (7) 33 (36) 
II ii 19 (13) 45 (32) 
III iii 24 (21) 92 (115) 
IV iv 8 (6) 12 (20) 
V v 15 (14) 45 (92) 
VI vi 27 (14) 59 (42) 
VII vii 5 (5) 48 (48) 
VIII viii 9 (7) 83 (49) 
IX ix 15 (16) 88 (91) 
X x 29 (39) 153 (112) 
XI xi 2 (7) 7 (54) 
XII xii 16 (2) 28 (2) 
XIII xiii 18 (8) 112 (65) 
XIV xiv 12 (15) 119 (138) 
XV xv 17 (17) 53 (67) 
XVI xvi 7 (8) 51 (58) 
XVII xvii 25 (10) 89 (77) 
XVIII xviii 13 (14) 86 (102) 
XIX xix 25 (18) 65 (121) 
XX xx 16 (9) 74 (44) 
XXI xxi 25 (20) 87 (69) 
XXII xxii 8 (12) 48 (62) 
Average  16 (13) 67 (68) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are from transparent markets. 
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Table 5.5 Summary Statistics for Traders’ Participation Activity at the Trader Level 
Opaque 
market 
Transparent 
market 
Number of  buy 
orders 
Number of  shares 
in buy orders 
Number of  sell 
orders 
Number of  
shares in sell 
orders 
I i 6 (7) 25 (44) 11 (11) 67 (87) 
II ii 11 (13) 128 (133) 10 (5) 105 (62) 
III iii 11 (7) 27 (189) 13 (4) 40 (9) 
IV iv 15 (9) 145 (94) 22 (13) 199 (140) 
V v 3 (5) 52 (84) 4 (7) 21 (73) 
VI vi 12 (14) 210 (298) 14 (12) 159 (131) 
VII vii 13 (9) 37 (24) 18 (12) 79 (46) 
VIII viii 11 (5) 13 (27) 11 (7) 47 (25) 
IX ix 11 (9) 82 (55) 13 (13) 84 (88) 
X x 17 (22) 276 (83) 35 (40) 478 (143) 
XI xi 13 (6) 72 (141) 23 (10) 132 (114) 
XII xii 21 (12) 94 (99) 27 (17) 137 (176) 
XIII xiii 17 (13) 93 (57) 22 (15) 115 (86) 
XIV xiv 12 (9) 59 (48) 18 (12) 140 (79) 
XV xv 21 (18) 147 (157) 26 (35) 157 (332) 
XVI xvi 8 (9) 29 (99) 21 (15) 121 (127) 
XVII xvii 21 (11) 59 (34) 20 (14) 63 (55) 
XVIII xviii 26 (11 564 (110) 12 (11) 88 (94) 
XIX xix 9 (11 62 (46) 18 (12) 102 (52) 
XX xx 9 (8) 128 (94) 5 (8) 75 (95) 
XXI xxi 13 (13) 397 (159) 16 (16) 287 (242) 
XXII xxii 17 (11) 279 (81) 11 (7) 81 (39) 
Average  14 (11) 135 (98) 17 (13) 126 (104) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are from transparent markets. 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that when there are only a few actively participating traders in a 
prediction market, these traders tend to be less active in a transparent market than in an 
opaque market. In turn, the following hypothesis (H1a) is supported. 
 
H1a: When an internal prediction market has only a few actively participating traders, 
disclosure of  price information leads to a lower level of  traders’ activity. 
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5.5.3 Effects of  Information Transparency on Trader’s Dynamic Interaction 
With regard to the trader’s dynamic interactions, a Wilcoxon test was performed to analyze 
trader-level activity. The results indicated that there was a significant effect of  information 
transparency on both Type I self-revisions (W(109) = 1489, z = -4.03, p < 0.01) and Type II 
self-revisions (W(109) = 1688, z = -3.85, p < 0.01).  
 
Table 5.6 Summary Statistics for Traders’ Dynamic Interactions at the Trader Level 
Opaque market Transparent market Number of  Type I self-revisions Number of  Type II self-revisions 
I i 10 (10) 10 (10) 
II ii 10 (10) 10 (9) 
III iii 14 (5) 13 (4) 
IV iv 21 (13) 21 (13) 
V v 2 (4) 2 (4) 
VI vi 12 (12) 12 (12) 
VII vii 81 (56) 18 (9) 
VIII viii 12 (5) 12 (5) 
IX ix 10 (8) 10 (8) 
X x 25 (23) 25 (23) 
XI xi 18 (7) 17 (6) 
XII xii 30 (14) 30 (14) 
XIII xiii 21 (14) 21 (14) 
XIV xiv 20 (12) 16 (11) 
XV xv 28 (30) 28 (30) 
XVI xvi 14 (14) 14 (14) 
XVII xvii 22 (12) 20 (12) 
XVIII xviii 23 (13) 22 (10) 
XIX xix 13 (11) 12 (11) 
XX xx 4 (5) 4 (5) 
XXI xxi 14 (15) 14 (14) 
XXII xxii 15 (8) 14 (8) 
Average  19 (14) 16 (11) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are from the “transparent” markets. 
 
The average number of  self-revisions made by traders in each market (see Table 5.6) further 
revealed that there were approximately 36% more Type I self-revisions (Meanopaque = 19, 
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Meantansparent = 14) and 45% more Type II self-revisions (Meanopaque = 16, Meantansparent = 11) 
in an opaque market than in a transparent market. This implied that in opaque markets, 
traders are inclined to make more significant revision of  their orders. 
 
At the contract level, the analyses focused on the weighted number of  four different types of  
influential orders. A Mann-Whitney test revealed a significant impact of  price transparency on 
traders’ dynamic interactions based on 1-influential orders (U(110) = 4271, z = -2.868, p 
<0.01). Table 5.7 further illustrates that the number of  1-influential orders per contract in an 
opaque market was doubled compared to a transparent market (Meanopaque = 4, Meantansparent = 
2).  
 
A Mann-Whitney test based on the measures of  2-influential orders (U(110) = 5669, z = -1.40, 
p > 0.16), 3-infltuial orders (U(110) = 6048, z = -0.18, p > 0.98), and 2Out3-influetinal orders 
(U(110) = 5756, z = -1.00, p > 0.31), however, did not demonstrate the significant difference 
across the market with the two different price transparency conditions. According to Table 5.7, 
the average numbers of  these influential orders per contract in both types of  markets were 
almost zero. The possible reason is the limited number of  buy and sell orders at the trader 
level. Table 5.5 shows that the average number of  buy and sell orders per subject in a market 
was limited to approximately 15 and the number of  subjects in a market did not exceeded 6. 
The limited numbers of  subjects and buy and sell orders in the experimental prediction 
markets meant that they were unlikely to generate a high degree of  influential orders. Thus, 
there was an insignificant difference between these measures across the two markets. 
 
In line with the aforementioned results, we argue that when there are only a few actively 
participating traders in a prediction market, these traders update their opinions less frequently 
and the influence of  one buy or sell order from a trader on a subsequent trader’s trading 
decision is lower in a transparent market than in an opaque market. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis (H2) is supported. 
 
H2: When an internal prediction market has only a few actively participating traders, 
disclosure of  price information leads to a decrease in traders’ dynamic interactions. 
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Table 5.7 Summary Statistics for Traders’ Dynamic Interactions at the Contract Level 
Opaque 
market 
Transparent 
market 
Number of  
1-influential 
orders 
Number of  
2-influential orders 
Number of  
3-influential 
orders 
Number of  
2Out3-influential 
orders 
I i 2 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
II ii 5 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
III iii 7 (6) 0 (1) 0 (0) 0 (1) 
IV iv 4 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
V v 2 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
VI vi 7 (1) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
VII vii 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
VIII viii 2 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
IX ix 2 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
X x 7 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
XI xi 0 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
XII xii 3 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
XIII xiii 10 (4) 1 (0) 0 (0) 1 (1) 
XIV xiv 1 (3) 0 (1) 0 (0) 0 (1) 
XV xv 3 (3) 0 (1) 0 (0) 0 (1) 
XVI xvi 1 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
XVII xvii 4 (1) 1 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 
XVIII xviii 3 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
XIX xix 9 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
XX xx 5 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
XXI xxi 5 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
XXII xxii 4 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Average  4 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are from transparent markets. 
 
5.5.4 Effects of  Traders’ Behavior on Market Information Aggregation Efficiency 
We first calculated information aggregation efficiency, a percentage deviation of  the 
transaction price from the equilibrium price in a prediction market. This percentage deviation 
measures to what extent the transaction price reflects the market consensus. Thus, it indicates 
how efficiently a market aggregates information from individual traders. 
 
As discussed above, we considered two different contract prices, namely the last transaction 
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price and the weighted average transaction price, to measure information aggregation 
efficiency. Table 5.8 exhibits the percentage deviation of  each type of  transaction price from 
the equilibrium price per market. A Wilcoxon test was performed on the 44 markets, including 
22 opaque markets and 22 transparent markets. The result revealed that the choice of  the 
contract prices did not differ significantly (W(44) = 405, z = -0.59, p > 0.55). 
 
Table 5.8 Market Information Aggregation Efficiency 
Opaque 
market 
Transparent 
market 
Based on the last transaction 
price of  a contract (%) 
Based on the weighted average 
transaction price of  a contract (%)  
I i 19.87 (2.11) 19.21 (2.80) 
II ii 10.56 (28.05) 11.25 (27.77) 
III Iii 6.27 (2.51) 5.11 (2.49) 
IV iv 7.70 (12.56) 8.20 (12.69) 
V v 1.56 (4.32) 1.04 (4.67) 
VI vi 7.33 (15.87) 7.01 (14.78) 
VII vii 8.54 (3.65) 9.19 (2.99) 
VIII viii 7.66 (19.36) 7.04 (18.28) 
IX ix 11.76 (4.80) 12.04 (4.81) 
X x 5.38 (9.89) 5.17 (9.55) 
XI xi 7.42 (9.00) 7.15 (7.86) 
XII xii 8.91 (12.85) 8.38 (14.87) 
XIII xiii 5.72 (4.15) 6.24 (4.15) 
XIV xiv 3.01 (5.34) 3.17 (7.72) 
XV xv 12.19 (8.46) 13.57 (15.48) 
XVI xvi 4.26 (3.98) 3.96 (4.19) 
XVII xvii 5.22 (6.02) 4.70 (5.46) 
XVIII xviii 7.01 (11.54) 7.31 (6.28) 
XIX xix 11.87 (7.99) 11.54 (8.39) 
XX xx 10.78 (4.18) 11.61 (4.94) 
XXI xxi 14.49 (5.33) 14.26 (4.10) 
XXII xxii 10.02 (11.82) 9.42 (7.23) 
Average  8.52 (8.81) 8.48 (8.70) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are from transparent markets. 
 
According to Table 5.8, market information aggregation efficiency based on the weighted 
average transaction price of  a contract was slightly higher (opaque markets: Meanlast = 8.52%, 
Meanaverage = 8.48%; transparent markets: Meanlast = 8.81%, Meanaverage = 8.70%). Higher 
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market information aggregation efficiency is desired in a prediction market. Therefore, we 
measure information aggregation efficiency based on weighted average transaction prices to 
validate the third and the fourth hypotheses. 
 
We performed Spearman’s tests to examine the effect of  traders’ participation activity and 
traders’ dynamic interactions on market information aggregation efficiency. The results 
showed that traders’ participation activity had a significant effect on market information 
aggregation efficiency, particularly, the number of  shares in buy orders (ρ(44) = -0.46, p < 
0.01) and the number of  shares in sell orders (ρ(44) = -0.41, p < 0.01). The negative 
correlation implied that an increase in the number of  shares in buy or sell orders lead to a 
decrease in the average percentage deviation of  the transaction price from the dynamic 
equilibrium price of  contracts in the market.  
 
Although at the contract level, the results did not reveal a significant effect of  number of  
transactions (ρ(44) = -0.13, p > 0.41) and number of  shares traded (ρ(44) = -0.18, p > 0.24), 
overall, the aforementioned results manifested the positive effect of  traders’ participation 
activity on the reduction of  market prediction error. Accordingly, the following hypothesis (H3) 
is supported. 
 
H3: An increased level of  traders’ participation activity in a prediction market leads to higher 
information aggregation efficiency. 
  
With regard to the traders’ dynamic interactions, the contract-level results revealed that the 
effect of  the number of  1-influential orders on market information aggregation efficiency was 
significant (ρ(44) = -0.39, p < 0.01). The number of  2-influential (ρ(44) = -0.11, p > 0.49) and 
2Out3-influential orders (ρ(44) = -0.15, p > 0.33), however, did not seem to be correlated with 
market predictive accuracy. The reason is due to the rare occurrence of  these two indicators. 
In the 44 markets, both opaque and transparent, the occurrence of  the 2-influential and 
2Out3-influential orders was very limited (see Table 5.7) and there were zero 3-influential 
orders in the markets. This finding is in fact consistent with our previous case study, in which 
we concluded that one trader’s influence on another based on the buy or sell orders 
concentrates on one degree influence. 
  
Furthermore, at the trader level, the results showed that neither the number of  Type I 
self-revisions (ρ(44) = -0.04, p > 0.79) nor the number of  Type II self-revisions (ρ(44) = -0.05, 
p > 0.75) had a significant impact on information aggregation efficiency. Together with the 
analyses above, we argue that the number of  self-revisions does not necessarily lead the 
transaction prices of  contracts closer to the traders’ agreed opinion, as a self-revision does not 
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necessarily entail learning from other traders. However, the influential orders indeed reflect 
learning between traders in a market. Therefore, contract level indicators show the impact of  
dynamic interactions between traders on information aggregation efficiency. 
 
The overall results discussed above manifested that traders’ dynamic interactions significantly 
affects information aggregation efficiency. The negative correlation further illustrated that the 
enhanced interaction between traders reduces the deviation of  transaction price from the 
dynamic equilibrium price of  contracts in a market. Consequently, the following hypothesis 
(H4) is supported. 
 
H4: An increase in traders’ dynamic interactions in a prediction market leads to higher 
information aggregation efficiency. 
 
5.5.5 Effects of  Information Aggregation Efficiency on Market Predictive Accuracy 
We first calculated the point prediction of  each market and subsequently measured a market 
forecasting percentage error based on this market prediction and the corresponding actual 
result. The percentage error indicates the market predictive accuracy. The smaller this number, 
the greater the market predictive accuracy.  
 
Similar to the measurement of  information aggregation efficiency, we considered the last 
transaction price and the weighted average transaction price, to measure market predictive 
accuracy. Table 5.9 displays the prediction percentage error of  each market based on these 
different prices. A Wilcoxon test was performed on the 44 markets. The result revealed that 
the choice of  contract prices did not differ significantly (W(44) = 301, z = -0.77, p > 0.43).  
 
This result is consistent with the findings of  Plott and Chen (2002) drawn from their 16 
internal prediction markets in HP. Another reason for this extreme similarity could be due to 
the short trading time of  each market (10 minutes), which limited the number of  transactions 
on each contract. Therefore, the weighted average transaction price and the last transaction 
price of  a contract were quite close.  
 
Table 5.9 further illustrates that the average market prediction calculated based on the 
weighted average transaction price of  a contract was slightly more accurate (opaque markets: 
Meanlast = 0.23%, Meanaverage = 0.22; transparent markets: Meanlast = 0.31%, Meanaverage = 
0.30%). In turn, we adopted the market prediction percentage error based on weighted 
average transaction prices to validate our fifth hypothesis (H5). 
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Table 5.9 Market Predictive Accuracy 
Opaque 
market 
Transparent 
market 
Based on the last transaction 
price of  a contract (%) 
Based on the weighted 
average transaction price of  
a contract (%)  
I i 0.48 (0.04) 0.48 (0.05) 
II ii 0.14 (0.76) 0.00 (0.45) 
III iii 0.53 (0.30) 0.55 (0.28) 
IV iv 0.08 (0.18) 0.08 (0.15) 
V v 0.73 (0.08) 0.72 (0.07) 
VI vi 0.13 (0.44) 0.12 (0.50) 
VII vii 0.13 (0.64) 0.12 (0.64) 
VIII viii 0.10 (0.39) 0.11 (0.23) 
IX ix 0.54 (0.10) 0.53 (0.12) 
X x 0.00 (0.50) 0.01 (0.51) 
XI xi 0.40 (0.05) 0.36 (0.06) 
XII xii 0.12 (0.05) 0.15 (0.05) 
XIII xiii 0.56 (0.23) 0.54 (0.19) 
XIV xiv 0.12 (0.44) 0.12 (0.53) 
XV xv 0.13 (0.03) 0.11 (0.01) 
XVI xvi 0.03 (0.41) 0.02 (0.40) 
XVII xvii 0.05 (0.06) 0.04 (0.08) 
XVIII xviii 0.52 (0.01) 0.60 (0.01) 
XIX xix 0.01 (0.39) 0.01 (0.53) 
XX xx 0.10 (0.99) 0.09 (0.93) 
XXI xxi 0.10 (0.08) 0.10 (0.25) 
XXII xxii 0.04 (0.61) 0.06 (0.60) 
Average  0.23 (0.31) 0.22 (0.30) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are from transparent markets. 
 
We performed a Spearman’s test to examine the effect of  information aggregation efficiency 
on market predictive accuracy. The results revealed that information aggregation efficiency is 
highly correlated with market predictive accuracy (ρ(44) = 0.47, p < 0.01). The positive 
relationship further demonstrated that information aggregation efficiency had a positive effect 
on market predictive accuracy. 
 
In this laboratory experiment, information certainty was high among participants. If  all the 
participants bring information to the market and the market aggregates the participants’ mean 
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beliefs, the transaction prices of  contracts should not deviate from the dynamic equilibrium 
prices of  contracts. Moreover, with the higher certainty of  the information, the transaction 
prices should reflect the actual results of  the events to be predicted. Consequently, higher 
information aggregation efficiency leads to more accurate prediction. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis (H5) is supported: 
 
H5: Higher information aggregation efficiency of  a prediction market leads to higher market 
predictive accuracy. 
 
5.6 DISCUSSION 
In the following sections, we further discuss the results of  the laboratory experiments. 
Additional evidence drawn from the follow-up survey study is also incorporated.  
 
The results showed that traders in opaque markets are more actively trading and learning than 
in transparent markets, particularly when the market was extremely thin. This finding can be 
explained from two major perspectives. First, this result is in line with the study of  Flood et al. 
(1999). Flood et al. (1999) conducted an experiment to examine the effect of  quote 
transparency, in which trade information was never revealed. Their study is similar to our 
experimental setting in which very limited trade information was presented to the subjects.  
 
Their study revealed that when quote information is absent, traders must spend time searching 
for counterparties with whom to trade and traders show more aggressive pricing strategies. In 
our laboratory experiment, searching is indicated by a large number of  buy and sell orders. 
Participants keep placing new buy and sell orders with different prices so as to find the 
possible matching orders for successful transactions. By contrast, the presence of  quote 
information makes it easier for traders to trade with each other, and therefore, the trader’s 
participation level is reduced. The same reason also explains why the opaque setting leads to 
higher self-revision behavior of  participants in the laboratory experimental markets. 
 
Searching entails the traders’ learning based on other information sources, particularly, trade 
information in these markets. The results drawn from the questionnaire manifested that in an 
opaque market, the transaction prices of  a contract were considered important to the 
participants. The following analyses support this finding and are based on the questionnaire 
that the subjects completed after each market. 
 
As introduced in the research methods (see 5.3), after each market, subjects were required to 
fill in a questionnaire with regard to their use of  different information sources. They were 
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asked to give a score to each information source in a market. The scores indicated how 
important a specific information source was for the subjects to make their trading decisions. A 
Wilcoxon test was performed. The follow-up survey results revealed that the two different 
price information transparency conditions did not significantly affect subjects’ perceived 
importance of  various information sources for their trading decisions, except for the line 
chart (W(96) = 586, z = -3.31, p < 0.01) and the last transaction price (W(96) = 780, z = -2.31, 
p < 0.05) provided in the markets.  
 
As Table 5.10 exhibits that in an opaque market, subjects considered the line chart (Meanopaque 
= 3.94, Meantransparent = 3.57) and the last transaction price (Meanopaque = 4.00, Meantransparent = 
3.63) of  contracts more important than in a transparent market. The line chart showed all the 
transaction prices of  a contract during the entire trading time period and the last transaction 
price of  a contract presented the most updated agreed opinion of  that contract between 
different subjects in the market. Therefore, the aforementioned research finding implied that 
trade information becomes the most important information source for participants to extract 
other trader’s opinions in opaque markets, when quote information is not available. 
 
Table 5.10 Subjects’ Perceived Importance of  Different Information Sources 
Information sources Transparent market Opaque market 
Historical sales 2.79 3.12 
Private information 4.25 4.17 
Line chart of  transaction prices 3.57 3.94 
Last transaction price 3.63 4.00 
Lowest sell/highest buy  4.30 -- 
 
It is noted that in transparent markets, the average score given to quote information exceeded 
even private information (Meanquote = 4.30, Meanprivate = 4.25). This highest score among all 
the information sources indicated that when quote information is available, participants in the 
market consider it most important in their trading decisions. The weight of  trade information 
in their trading decisions reduces accordingly. 
 
The second perspective to further explain the findings is based on the argument of  Zhu (2002; 
2004) and Granados et al. (2006). They argued that the effect of  information transparency is 
not equivalent to all the participants in a market. The impact depends on the position of  the 
participants. In other words, while some participants may benefit from the transparent market, 
others may not. For instance, buyers in general prefer a transparent market due to decreased 
search costs, increased possibility to discern products, and lower transaction price (Granados 
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et al. 2006). Conversely, sellers, particularly, high-cost suppliers (Zhu 2002) or large market 
participants (Granados et al. 2006), often avoid trading in a transparent market, as it provides 
signals about their cost structure or their motivation to trade (Clemons and Weber 1990; 
Madhavan 2000).  
 
In an internal prediction market, participants are the employees of  the company. They are 
essentially all informed traders, as they have more or less inside information about the 
business practice being predicted. In turn, their buy or sell orders entail their private 
information. When the market is thin, which is often the situation of  an internal prediction 
market, there is a very limited number of  buy or sell orders. Thus, as soon as a participant 
places a buy or sell order, it will probably become quote information listed in the market. As a 
result, other participants can immediately learn and benefit from this information. 
Consequently, the participant who reveals this information loses the advantage of  having 
private information. Therefore, when the market is considerably thin, an opaque setting in fact 
motivates traders to participate and learn more actively than a transparent condition.  
 
Furthermore, this laboratory experiment study revealed the positive effect of  traders’ 
participation and dynamic learning in a prediction market on information aggregation 
efficiency and market predictive accuracy. The result is in accordance with the primary 
theories that information is aggregated through trader’s trading activities (Plott 2000) and 
traders keep learning while trading (Gruca et al. 2005; Rhode and Strumpf  2004), and 
therefore, the market eventually reflects the sum of  all available information about the future 
in the contract prices (Davis and Holt 1993; Fama 1965, 1970).  
 
However, this finding is different from the findings of  the empirical study conducted by Chen 
et al. (2010). They examined traders’ participation activity and traders’ dynamic interactions in 
prediction markets to evaluate early stage technologies. Their empirical field study did not 
reveal that an increase in traders’ participation activity and dynamic interactions leads to an 
improvement in market performance. Our study, on the contrary, manifested that an increase 
in traders’ participation level and in interactions leads to better market performance. Two 
possible reasons for those differences can be identified.  
 
First, the measure of  market performance is different between the two studies. In our 
laboratory experiments, we assessed prediction market performance based on absolute 
accuracy, against the actual outcome of  the event being predicted. In their study, Chen et al. 
(2010) constructed internal prediction markets to predict the preference ranking of  early stage 
technologies. This preference ranking corresponded to the evaluation of  the technologies. The 
higher a technology was ranked, the greater its potential. The researchers assessed prediction 
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market performance against the views of  an expert panel. The closer the market prediction to 
the expert panel, the better the market had performed. This assessment of  market 
performance in fact assumed that the expert panel generated a more accurate evaluation of  
early stage technologies than prediction markets. This assessment fulfilled the needs of  the 
company in their study, which was seeking a more economic evaluation method to replace the 
costly expert panel. Nevertheless, in reality, it is unknown whether or not the aforementioned 
assumption holds.  
 
The differences between the environments of  the laboratory and field study are likely to be 
another reason. As discussed in Chapter 3, the differences between laboratory and field 
studies are noticeable. The study of  Chen et al. (2010) was carried out in a real business 
environment, in which traders were employees and the environment could not be controlled 
by the researchers, while ours was conducted in a controlled laboratorial environment, in 
which subjects were university students. To further test the research model and understand 
information transparency on prediction markets, we will continue with the field experiments 
in the real business environment in the following chapter. 
 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Advanced IT has enabled web-based prediction markets and the manipulation of  information 
transparency in market design. However, little has been know about the effect of  information 
transparency on prediction market performance. This chapter, therefore, aimed to investigate 
this research area. We particularly addressed two different conditions of  price transparency, 
namely opaque and transparent, and focused on internal prediction markets where there are 
only a few actively participating traders. The objective of  this chapter was to answer the 
following specific research questions:  
 
RQ 2-1: How does price information transparency in an internal prediction market with a limited number 
of  actively trading traders influence the traders’ behavior and further influence market information 
aggregation efficiency?  
 
RQ 2-2: How does price information transparency in an internal prediction market with a limited number 
of  actively trading traders influence the traders’ behavior and further influence market predictive 
accuracy?   
 
The laboratory experiments showed that price transparency has an indirect effect on market 
performance through traders’ behavior. In a thin prediction market, particularly in the context 
of  an internal prediction market, the concealment of  price information of  buy and sell orders 
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motivates traders to actively participate and learn compared to the revelation of  the same 
information. Traders’ active participation and interaction lead to a positive effect on market 
information aggregation efficiency and predictive accuracy.  
 
The underlying reason is that the disclosure of  a trader’s buy or sell orders in fact exposes 
informed traders’ private information and their improvement in estimation about the future 
event. When the number of  traders is limited, these informed traders do not expect to obtain 
much from observing other’s private information and updated estimation in the market. In 
turn, they are inclined to withhold their private information or their improved adjustment of  
their prediction based on learning. Consequently, price transparency in such a market is 
actually not desirable. 
 
Moreover, in an opaque market, active participation and learning are necessary for traders to 
explore others’ opinions about future events and make successful transactions. Accordingly, 
when the number of  actively trading participants is very limited and all the traders are 
informed in a prediction market, price information, such as quotes, can be concealed for 
higher levels of  trader participation and dynamic interactions, and eventually, higher 
information aggregation efficiency and more accurate market prediction, particularly when 
information about the future event in the market is highly certain. 
 
This study makes an especially significant contribution to the research stream of  information 
transparency. It extends current studies on information transparency from three different 
aspects. First, this study investigates the effect of  information transparency on a new type of  
market. The existing literature and empirical studies on information transparency focus on 
B2B (Zhu 2002; 2004) and B2C (Granados et al. 2006; 2010) markets. Our research introduces 
the study of  prediction markets. Second, our study follows the predecessor’s call to examine 
the effect of  different types of  information in a market (Bloomfield and O’Hara 1999; Flood 
et al. 1999; Granados et al. 2008) by stressing quote price information. Third, we extend the 
generalizability of  previous research on information transparency (Clemons and Weber 1990; 
Flood et al. 1999; Granados et al. 2006; 2010; Madhavan 2000; Zhu 2002; 2004) by comparing, 
linking and adding the research findings on the effect of  price transparency on prediction 
market performance to this literature stream. 
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CHAPTER 6 INFORMATION TRANSPARENCY AND 
MARKET PERFORMANCE: A FIELD EXPERIMENT 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Current research focuses on numerous influential factors of  prediction market performance, 
such as market size (Ho and Chen 2007; Ledyard 2006), market liquidity (Abramowicz 2006), 
composition of  traders (Ledyard 2006; Surowiecki 2004), incentives (real money vs. play 
money) offered to traders (Luckner et al. 2008; Sauer 1998; Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004; 
Spann and Skiera 2003), and contract design (Ledyard 2006; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). 
Information transparency, however, has seldom been taken into consideration. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, advanced IT has enabled the notable possibility of  manipulating information 
access and revelation in a market, and therefore, the effect of  information transparency on 
market performance is addressed in this dissertation. 
 
This chapter focuses on a field study, which allows us to investigate price information 
transparency in an internal prediction market in a real business environment. As discussed in 
Chapter 3 (Research Methodology), the restricted control environment of  laboratory 
experiments may conceal effects that can in fact appear in the real environment. Therefore, to 
further explore how price information transparency actually affects internal prediction market 
performance, we conducted field experiments. Similar to the laboratory experiments, this 
chapter aims to answer the second major research question of  this dissertation: 
 
RQmain2: How does information transparency in an internal prediction market influence market 
performance? 
 
Granados (2006) emphasized that IT not only increases potential for complete, accurate, real 
time and unbiased market information, but also gives the possibility to conceal or distort 
information. In turn, information can be strategically revealed, concealed, biased and distorted, 
depending on the goals or the positions of  the participants in a market (Granados et al. 2010). 
Accordingly, information transparency may entail different levels. In other words, the type, 
amount and content of  the information displayed in a market can vary. Therefore, we address 
different levels of  price transparency in this field research. 
 
The objective of  this chapter is to examine the effect of  different price transparency levels on 
information aggregation efficiency and predictive accuracy of  internal prediction markets 
through traders’ behavior. In turn, we construct the following two sub-research questions in 
this chapter.  
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RQ2-3: How does a different level of  price information transparency in an internal prediction market 
influence traders’ behavior and further influence market information aggregation efficiency? 
 
RQ2-4: How does a different level of  price information transparency in an internal prediction market 
influence traders’ behavior and further influence market predictive accuracy? 
 
This chapter extends our research to the effect of  different price transparency levels on 
prediction market performance. The field experiments empirically test our hypotheses in a 
real business environment, enhancing the validity of  our research findings. The results of  this 
study show that the revelation of  different traders’ expectations rather than the highest or the 
lowest outstanding expectation on contracts leads traders to actively learn in an internal 
prediction market. However, in a fully transparent market, traders’ learning activity level does 
not rise, but actually declines. The results of  these field experiments further reveal that traders’ 
learning in a prediction market leads to more efficient information aggregation. Information 
aggregation efficiency, as a market performance indicator, is especially useful when managers 
are interested in the consensus of  their employees with regard to a future event. Last, 
although prediction markets in general have a robust forecasting ability, under highly 
uncertain circumstances market predictive accuracy is severely reduced. 
 
Similar to the laboratory experiments, this field study makes several key contributions to 
extend current studies on information transparency and prediction market design (see 
Chapter 5). Particularly, the use of  different information transparency levels in this research 
adds insights into the role of  information transparency in the performance of  internal 
prediction markets. Moreover, our development of  the measurement of  information 
aggregation efficiency not only fills a gap in the research on prediction markets but also gives 
the opportunity to assess market performance prior to the moment when the actual result is 
revealed. Given the fact that managers need and use prediction to manage the uncertain 
future, this measurement allows and enables them to use internal prediction markets in actual 
management. Last but not least, this field study demonstrates the importance of  a company’s 
commitment to the use of  internal prediction markets to foster employees’ active 
participation in the market.    
 
The plan of  the chapter is as follows. We first review the relevant theoretical foundation and 
construct the hypotheses accordingly. Thereafter, we present the overview of  the subjects’ 
participation in the experiments. Subsequently, we delineate the research design of  the field 
experiments. Next, we discuss the measures adopted in this study. Afterwards, we present the 
research results based on the statistical analyses and validate the hypotheses. Additionally, we 
compare findings between this field study and the previous laboratory study. Finally, we 
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conclude this study by answering the aforementioned research question. 
 
6.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, similar to Chapter 5, we study the overall conceptual model (see Figure 2-1). 
The difference focuses on the independent variable. In Chapter 5, we stressed the discussion 
of  either transparent or opaque conditions. In this field study, we extend the conditions of  
information transparency to four different levels. In turn, we establish another two hypotheses, 
H1b and H2b, based on the relevant theories in this section.  
 
6.2.1 Information Transparency Strategy and Traders’ Participation Activity 
Market transparency is affected by the underlying technological infrastructure of  online and 
offline distribution channels (Cappiello et al. 2003; Sawhney 2001; Granados et al. 2008).  
Granados et al. (2008) asserted that the Internet is the major enabler of  a structural increase in 
the levels of  market transparency. In addition, market transparency also depends on the digital 
attributes of  products (Granados et al. 2005; 2008). Essentially, the higher the digital attributes, 
the higher the potential for market transparency in the Internet channel. With regard to a 
contemporary prediction market, the trading mechanism is usually established based on 
Internet infrastructure, namely, an online prediction market. The products traded in an online 
prediction market, namely, the contracts, are fully digitized. Consequently, the potential for 
market transparency is high in an online prediction market based on Internet infrastructure. 
 
To be specific, price information can be either disclosed or concealed and it can be disclosed 
more or less extensively. Therefore, traders may learn from information in the market that is 
more or less comprehensive or even complete. In turn, different levels of  price transparency 
can be put forth in terms of  the amount of  price information displayed to the traders in a 
market.  
 
Previous studies demonstrated that a market with the presence of  quote information reveals 
information more rapidly and completely than a market without it (Bloomfield 1999; 
Madhavan 1995; Pagano and Röell 1996). Quote information is a type of  pre-trade 
information which allows traders to infer other traders’ expectations on contracts from their 
pricing behavior (Pagano and Röell 1996). As discussed above, traders in prediction markets 
do not collaborate but compete and are motivated to trade by different opinions (Surowiecki 
2004). As a result, traders are likely to more actively participate in a market with quote 
information than without it, as long as the market is not confronted with an extremely limited 
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number of  traders. 
 
However, when only the highest or the lowest outstanding quote information is displayed, 
traders can only observe the buying or selling price of  a contract submitted by the most 
aggressive traders in the market. Informed traders benefit in this case, as they may earn more 
profit by trading with these aggressive traders (Madhavan 1995). Less informed traders, by 
contrast, benefit when more diverse quote information is displayed. In particular, there is 
always uncertainty about private information and the future. Thus, the increased amount of  
quote information helps traders extract more information from different traders to conceive 
their own expectations on the contracts. Consequently, when there are a number of  traders in 
a prediction market, higher price transparency motivates traders to actively participate in the 
market. 
 
Nonetheless, in the situation of  full transparency, when all quote information is revealed in a 
prediction market, traders in general do not trade more actively. To be specific, a trader can 
easily identify if  there is a matching buy or sell order in the market at the moment when he or 
she would like to trade. If  there is no such matching order, he or she will simply wait instead 
of  placing a desired order into the market. This is particularly true of  informed traders. 
Informed traders are likely to conceal their private information in fully transparent markets, as 
everyone else will be able to observe and learn from their actions (Gruca et al. 2005; Rhode 
and Strumpf  2004). These traders benefit from profitable trading by possessing private 
information (Surowiecki 2004). In turn, the full transparency design is not likely to raise the 
participation activity level, and hence, the following hypothesis (H1b) is constructed: 
 
H1b: In an internal prediction market, an increased disclosure of  different traders’ quote 
information leads to a higher level of  traders’ participation activity. However, the 
complete disclosure of  traders’ quote information does not further improve traders’ 
participation activity. 
 
6.2.2 Information Transparency Strategy and Traders’ Dynamic Interactions 
In Chapter 5, we delineated the function of  quote information as a signal in a market from 
which traders can learn. Signals were named as they would carry information persistently from 
those with more to those with less information in a market (Spence 2002). In turn, traders 
expect to learn from other traders based on quote information in a prediction market. As a 
result, the disclosure of  quote information gives the opportunity for traders to adjust their 
expectations on contracts iteratively. 
 
124_Erim ShenYun Yang BW_Stand.job
108 
 
Furthermore, the greater visibility of  the individual orders can enhance the precision of  
traders’ inferences about whether orders are driven by information or liquidity (Pagano and 
Röell 1996). Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) also argued that when traders can discern the 
imbalances of  buy or sell orders across the market, traders can learn any information from 
prices more quickly and therefore set their own prices more efficiently. These arguments 
suggest that traders’ adjustment of  expectations on contracts may increase and the influence 
of  one trader on another may also be enhanced due to greater visibility of  quote information.  
 
Complete quote information, nonetheless, makes it more difficult for traders to discern 
information quality or the likelihood of  potential outcomes. It also requires traders to spend 
more time analyzing information carried to the market. The explorative case study revealed 
that employees do not spend much time taking part in an internal prediction market in 
addition to their regular work. Traders are not likely to commit more time to analyzing quote 
information to adjust their expectation on a contract. Thus, traders’ learning activity level is 
not likely to increase further. 
 
Moreover, when all buy or sell orders are revealed in a market, the reaction of  the traders will 
become similar to the situation in the previous laboratory experiments, when there are only a 
few traders in a market. Informed traders no longer actively update their opinion of  future 
events, as other traders may learn from their improved estimation by observing the adjusted 
orders in the market. The resulting similar opinion between the traders prevents informed 
traders from making profitable trades. As individual adjustments become limited, the 
influence of  one trader on another trader’s learning becomes even more constrained. 
Consequently, the full transparency of  price information hampers traders’ interactions. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis (H2b) is proposed: 
 
H2b: In an internal prediction market, an increased disclosure of  different traders’ quote 
information leads to an increase in traders’ dynamic interactions. However, the complete 
disclosure of  traders’ quote information does not further enhance traders’ dynamic 
interactions. 
 
6.3 RESEARCH METHODS  
We delineate the details of  this field study in the following paragraphs, including the 
experiment design, the market mechanism design, the contracts in each market, the 
composition of  the subjects, the incentive scheme and the experimental procedures. 
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6.3.1 Field Experimental Design 
Similar to the laboratory experiments in Chapter 5, this field study focuses on quote 
information in prediction markets, as this pre-trade information is likely to influence traders’ 
behavior. We identified four different levels of  price information transparency in this study, 
including “opaque”, “limited-transparent”, “semi-transparent”, and “full-transparent” (see 
Table 6.1).  
 
In these field experiments, subjects were neither randomly assigned to one or more conditions 
nor required to take part in each of  the conditions. Assignment to condition was by means of  
self-selection (Shadish et al. 2002). In other words, subjects were allowed to take part in any 
markets, as long as the markets were ongoing. This self-selection design is in line with traders’ 
participation in real internal prediction markets, in which they take part based on personal 
willingness and interest.  
 
Table 6.1 Operational Definitions of  Price Transparency Levels 
Transparency Levels Operational Definitions 
Opaque  
Traders do not see any other trader’s buy or sell orders, neither the 
price nor the number of  shares 
Limited-transparent 
Traders see the highest outstanding buy order and the lowest 
outstanding sell order, including the price and the total number of  
shares  
Semi-transparent 
Traders see the highest three outstanding buy orders and the lowest 
three outstanding sell orders, including the price and the total number 
of  shares. These buy and sell orders are presented to traders in a 
descending and an ascending order, respectively. 
Full-transparent 
Traders see all outstanding buy and sell orders, including the price and 
the total number of  shares. These buy and sell orders are presented to 
traders in a descending and an ascending order, respectively. 
 
There were four markets running in parallel every day. The names of  the markets were 
vertically listed on the home page of  the experiments. Subjects clicked the name of  a market 
to enter that specific market. To avoid the situation that a subject did not participate in every 
market and always clicked the market listed in a particular position, we adopted a Latin square 
design (Field and Hole 2003) to order the experimental market sequences on the home page. 
Table 6.2 shows the markets and the corresponding transparency condition. 
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Table 6.2 Trading Day, Market and Price Transparency Level 
Trading Day Markets Price Transparency Level 
Day 1 
I Limited-transparent  
II Semi-transparent 
III Full-transparent 
IV Opaque 
Day 2 
V Full-transparent 
VI Opaque 
VII Limited-transparent 
VIII Semi-transparent  
Day 3 
IX Semi-transparent  
X Full-transparent  
XI Opaque 
XII Limited-transparent 
 
The field experiments were conducted in collaboration with Wasu TaoBao Co., Ltd (hereafter 
referred to as Wasu TaoBao). The company was founded by TaoBao and China Digital TV 
Media Group in 2010. The major business of  Wasu TaoBao included two areas. One was iTV 
TaoBao, an online market on interactive TV with approximately 150,000 users. The other was 
www.taohua.com (hereafter referred to as taohua.com), an online B2B2C market specialized in 
digital products with approximately 370 million users. Taohua.com was the first as well as the 
largest online market of  digital products in China. This online market focused on two product 
categories, including e-books and film and television. With more than 300 business providers, 
taohua.com had more than 30,000 different types of  products and 10 million listed products. 
Based on taohua.com, Wasu Taobao aimed to promote a digital lifestyle in China with genuine, 
high quality and diversified products. 
 
However, as the first online and newly established market of  digital products, Wasu TaoBao 
has little information on customer behavior and sales of  products on taohua.com. 
Furthermore, the market has been volatile and uncertain. The company, nevertheless, would 
like to predict some key performance indicators (KPIs) of  taohua.com, based on their 
employees’ knowledge and information. Therefore, Wasu TaoBao conducted the field 
experiments of  internal prediction markets together with us, forecasting periodic KPIs of  
taohua.com.  
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6.3.2 Market Mechanism Design 
A web-based continuous double auction mechanism was developed for the field experiments. 
The entire development of  the market mechanism lasted for three months. The development 
included the user interface design, back-end programming, testing, modification and final 
implementation. Compared to the interfaces used in the previous case studies and the 
laboratory experiment, three major differences were introduced.  
 
First, the language on the web-page was changed from English to Chinese, as the pilot studies 
(including six markets) with the English version revealed that the language barrier impeded the 
participation level of  subjects.  
 
Second, the display of  outstanding orders in the semi-transparent and full-transparent 
conditions was modified. Instead of  listing an order book on the left of  the page, in the field 
experiment, the outstanding buy or sell orders were displayed in an overlay text when traders 
moved the mouse over the corresponding contract. This modification was carried out based 
on feedback from the subjects during the pilot studies. To illustrate this feature, we use 
full-transparent condition as an example (see Figure 6.2). 
 
For instance, if  the subject wanted to see the outstanding sell orders of  contract “600-799”, 
he or she could move the mouse to the corresponding “所有” (meaning: “All”) in the column 
“最低卖出竞价” (meaning: “The Lowest Sell Order” ). A blue window would appear, listing 
all outstanding sell orders of  this contract in ascending order according to the selling price 
together with the number of  shares in brackets. 
 
Third, in contrast to the case studies and the laboratory experiments, where subjects were 
given a pre-set user account, subjects in this study were allowed to register a user account with 
his or her company email address and preferred password. The company email address 
allowed us to trace if  any fraud or collaboration between the subjects existed. In addition, the 
subjects did not have to endeavor to remember the user name and password, which was an 
advantage as managing login details had seriously demotivated some participants in the pilot 
studies. 
 
When a market started, every subject received an endowment, including 2,000 TaoBan and 20 
shares per contract. TaoBan was the currency developed for the markets in this field study, 
implying Wasu TaoBao’s company name and major business. Its abbreviation, TB, was stated 
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on the web-based internal prediction markets (see Figure 6.2). 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Screenshot of  a Full-Transparent Field Experiment Market 
 
6.3.3 Contract Design 
The events being predicted and the contracts available were developed together with Wasu 
Taobao. We conducted 12 internal prediction markets inside the company to forecast its actual 
business KPIs in a certain month in 2011, such as the number of  transactions or the number 
of  page views of  taohua.com. To avoid correlation between different markets, the 12 future 
events being predicted were mutually exclusive based on the managers’ expertise in the 
business. 
 
Every market had five contracts, representing five possible ranges of  the outcome of  a 
specific business KPI. Table 6.3 lists the contracts of  each market. To clarify, to protect 
confidential information, we agreed to conceal the business KPIs predicted by the markets. 
Therefore, these markets are referred to as Market I to Market XII and the units of  the 
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contracts are concealed in the following discussions throughout the dissertation.  
 
Due to high uncertainty about the business, the company was interested in an interval 
prediction rather than a point prediction, and in turn, the range of  each interval was relatively 
larger. For example, in Market XI, the interval represented by one contract is from 5,000 to 
9,999 In addition, not every contract had the same interval. For instance, in Market IV, the 
interval of  contracts 1, 2 and 4 were 299; but the interval of  contract 3 was 399 and the 
interval of  contract 5 reached 1,700.   
 
Table 6.3 Markets and Contracts in the Field Experiments 
Markets Contract 1 Contract 2 Contract 3 Contract 4 Contract 5 
I 0-49 50-99 100-299 300-499 500-1,000 
II 0-199 200-399 400-599 600-799 800-1,500 
III 0-5 6-9 0-14 15-19 20-100 
IV 0-299 300-599 600-999 1,000-1,299 1,300-3,000 
V 40K-60K 61K-90K 91K-120K 121K-150K 151K-300K 
VI 0-10K 11K-30K 31K-60K 61K-90K 91K-200K 
VII 0.00-3.00% 3.00%-5.99% 6.00%-8.99% 9.00%-11.99% 12.00%-20.00% 
VIII ¥0.00-¥1.99 ¥2.00-¥4.99 ¥5.00-¥7.99 ¥8.00-¥10.99 ¥11.00-¥20.00 
IX 0-19 20-49 50-79 80-109 110-200 
X 0-49 50-99 100-149 150-199 200-500 
XI ¥0-¥4,999 ¥5,000-¥9,999 ¥10,000-¥14,999 ¥15,000-¥19,999 ¥20,000-¥50,000 
XII ¥0-¥99 ¥10-¥399 4¥00-¥699 ¥700-¥999 ¥1,000-¥2,000 
 
6.3.4 Subjects 
The field experiments were limited to employees of  Wasu TaoBao. During our field 
experiments, the company had approximately 100 employees, including the executive team. 
We invited 30 employees to take part in the field experiments based on the discussion with the 
managers. This invitation list consisted of  employees of  all departments and the management 
team. Table 6.4 shows the departments and the corresponding number of  invited employees. 
According to the General Manager, the composition of  invited employees represented the 
actual distribution of  employees in different departments. 
 
  
130_Erim ShenYun Yang BW_Stand.job
114 
 
Table 6.4 Composition of  Invited Employees 
Department / Team Number of  Invited Employees 
Management 3 
Product management 2 
Product development 9 
Business development 3 
Operation 11 
Marketing 1 
HR 1 
Total 30 
 
6.3.5 Incentives 
As Wasu TaoBao did not allow monetary incentives in these field experiments, small 
non-monetary incentives, such as a mug or T-shirt, were provided as a “prediction reward” 
and a “trading reward”. The subject who owned most shares of  the contract which 
represented the actual result in a market received the prediction reward. In each market, the 
subject who had the most TaoBan in his or her account at the end of  a market received the 
trading reward. Similar to the laboratory experiments, the former reward was developed to 
motivate subjects to learn in the market and the latter was designed to motivate subjects to 
trade actively. Subjects were also informed that they would not be eligible for the market 
rewards if  they did not place any buy or sell order in that market. Additionally, the reward 
winners were announced to the whole company as a “reputation reward”. 
 
6.3.6 Experimental Procedures 
To kick off  the internal prediction markets, a 30-minute plenary introduction was given to the 
invited subjects in Wasu Taobao’s headquarter. During the introduction, the General Manager 
introduced the potential contribution of  internal prediction markets to the company’s 
decision-making processes and the experiment administrator demonstrated the operations of  
trading on the web-page. In the end, the subjects were allowed to register and play in four trial 
markets.  
 
It should be clarified that the aforementioned four trial markets were not the same as the pilot 
study. We conducted the pilot study of  six internal prediction markets with the participation 
of  Wasu TaoBao’s employees two months prior to the kick-off. The pilot study was carried 
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out remotely, without the presence of  the experiment administrator in the office of  Wasu 
TaoBao. The pilot study provided us with feedback on the adjustment of  the experimental 
design, such as the aforementioned mechanism design. The trial markets, however, aimed to 
familiarize employees with the operation of  the web-based prediction market and help them 
understand their tasks as traders.  
 
We conducted 12 markets (excluding the trial markets) on three consecutive days. Every day, 
four markets were listed and running in parallel during one specific hour. Each market 
corresponded with one transparency level. All registered subjects were allowed to participate 
in all markets. The allocation of  one specific hour for prediction markets was designed based 
on the results drawn from the case studies. As employees were incline to focus on work during 
working hours and did not participate in the prediction markets after working hours, the 
General Manager of  Wasu TaoBao decided to allocate one specific hour each day for the 
employees to participate in the internal prediction markets. Thus, the employees were more 
likely to actively participate in the markets. 
 
During the one-hour trading time, the experiment administrator was also available onsite to 
answer questions or solve problems. Subjects could communicate with the administrator 
either by coming to the administrator’s (temporary) office or via the company’s internal instant 
message software, called Aliwangwang.  
 
At the end of  every trading day, a brief  report regarding participation levels and trading 
activities, such as the highest and the lowest transaction prices of  each contract, were sent to 
the subjects via email. According to the pilot studies, subjects were interested in the 
summarized information about a market. In turn, this feedback was considered helpful in 
motivating the subjects to participate in the next day’s markets. 
 
6.4 MEASURES 
The measures in this field experiment involve four variables, i.e. trader’s participation activity, 
trader’s dynamic interactions, information aggregation efficiency, and market predictive 
accuracy. These measures are identical to the measures of  the same variables in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 (see 4.4 and 5.4 Measures).  
 
To recap, the measure of  traders’ participation activity entails the contract level (i.e. number 
of  transactions and number of  shares traded) and the individual trader level (i.e. number of  
buy orders/sell orders and number of  shares in buy orders/sell orders). Similarly, the measure 
of  trader’s dynamic interaction entails the contract level (i.e. 1-influential, 2-influential, 
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3-influential, and 2out3-influential orders) and the individual trader level (i.e. Type I and Type 
II self-revisions). With regard to information aggregation efficiency, we adopt the 
measurement we developed (see 5.4.1) based on the comparison between the transaction price 
and the dynamic equilibrium price of  a contract. The measurement of  market predictive 
accuracy followed absolute accuracy as developed by Plott and Chen (2002), which is assessed 
against the actual outcomes (see 5.4.2).  
 
6.5 RESULTS 
In this section, we discuss the results of  the field experiments and validate the hypotheses 
based on these results. We first present the overview of  the subjects’ participation and the 
market prediction results in the experiments. Thereafter, we elaborate the results drawn from 
the field study according to the sequence of  the hypotheses.  
 
6.5.1 Overview of  Subjects’ Participation 
41 subjects, namely, the employees of  Wasu TaoBao, registered an account in these field 
experiments, and 17 of  them were not from the invitation list. Having heard about the 
prediction markets, these employees proactively joined based on their own interests. This 
active, voluntary participation indicated the employees’ interest in internal prediction markets.  
 
Table 6.5 Overview of  Market Design and Subjects’ Participation 
Markets Price Transparency Level Number of  Active Traders 
I Limited-transparent 14 
II Semi-transparent 23 
III Full-transparent 15 
IV Opaque 12 
V Full-transparent 11 
VI Opaque 10 
VII Limited-transparent 8 
VIII Semi-transparent 7 
IX Semi-transparent 6 
X Full-transparent 8 
XI Opaque 8 
XII Limited-transparent 6 
Average  11 
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Four employees participated in all 12 markets. The average number of  active traders per 
market was 11. The highest number and the lowest number of  active traders in a market were 
23 and 6, respectively. Table 6.5 summarizes the design and the market size of  each market. 
 
On the last trading day, the number of  traders declined due to a promotion activity on the 
taohua.com, which required most employees to follow that activity online. Therefore, the 
traders were distracted from the internal prediction markets on that day.  
 
The 41 participating employees were drawn from all the departments in the company. Figure 
6.3 shows the composition of  the employees. The figure reveals that the largest proportion 
was from operational department, which also has the largest number of  employees.  
Employees of  this department may also have made up the largest proportion of  traders 
because they possessed the most relevant information about the events the markets predicted.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Compositions of  Subjects 
 
During the field experiments, two employees resigned. Their participation data in the markets 
before their designation remained valid in the following analyses. We also noticed that several 
subjects attempted to create double accounts. According to the market rules, every subject was 
allowed to create only one account based on his or her company email address. However, 
some non-company email address registrations were found in the administration system. This 
indicated that some subjects registered additional accounts. They probably intended to trade 
with unauthorized accounts so as to improve the performance of  their genuine account and 
become the winner. Having detected the frauds, those unauthorized accounts were 
immediately disabled. 
7% 
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6.5.2 Effects of Information Transparency on Traders’ Participation Activity 
Similar to the analysis in the laboratory experiments, due to the different number of  active 
traders in each market, we weighted the numerical values by the ratio of  traders for the 
measurement at the contract level. Table 6.6 summarizes the statistics for the average trader’s 
participation activity at the contract level under the four different price transparency 
conditions.    
 
Table 6.6 Summary Statistics for Traders’ Participation Activity at the Contract Level 
Market Price transparency level 
Weighted number of  
transactions 
Weighted number of  
shares traded 
I Limited-transparent 12 168 
II Semi-transparent 25 272 
III Full-transparent 15 169 
IV Opaque 11 136 
V Full-transparent 10 143 
VI Opaque 6 92 
VII Limited-transparent 18 299 
VIII Semi-transparent 14 192 
IX Semi-transparent 12 169 
X Full-transparent 14 215 
XI Opaque 10 173 
XII Limited-transparent 12 184 
Average 
Opaque 9 134 
Limited-transparent 14 217 
Semi-transparent 17 211 
Full-transparent 13 176 
 
A Kruskal Wallis test did not revealed any significant difference between the number of  
transactions per contract in the markets with four different price transparencies (𝑥2(3) = 5.6, 
p > 0.13). According to Table 6.6, the largest difference in the number of  transactions 
between different market transparency levels did not exceed eight (Meanopaque = 9, Meanlimited 
= 14, Meansemi = 17, and Meanfull = 13). 
 
The number of  shares traded per contract in the four types of  markets did not differ either 
(𝑥2(3) = 4.4, p > 0.22). As Table 6.6 shows, the difference of  the number of  shares traded 
between different market transparency levels lay in the range between 6 and 83 (Meanopaque = 
134, Meanlimited = 217, Meansemi = 211, and Meanfull = 176). 
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The insignificant difference between the four transparency levels was probably due to the 
relatively high traders’ activity level. In the explorative case study described in Chapter 4, there 
were only 9 or 18 transactions per contract in a market during 12 trading days, compared to at 
least 9 transactions per contact in the internal prediction in this study. The relatively high level 
of  traders’ activity, hence, led to the similarly high number of  transactions and number of  
shares traded. 
 
Table 6.7 exhibits the statistics for the average trader’s participation activity at the trader level 
in each market. Again, a Kruskal Wallis test was performed to further compare the 
corresponding measures across the 12 markets with different price transparency levels. The 
results showed that there was no significant effect of  price transparency on trader’s 
participation activity based on the measure of  the number of  buy orders (𝑥2(3) = 4.7, p > 
0.19), number of  shares in buy orders (𝑥2(3) = 1.1, p > 0.78), number of  sell orders (𝑥2(3) = 
2.1, p > 0.54), or number of  shares in sell orders (𝑥2(3) = 1.7, p > 0.63). 
 
Table 6.7 Summary Statistics for Traders’ Participation Activity at the Trader Level 
Market Price transparency level 
Number of  buy 
orders 
Number of  
shares in buy 
orders 
Number of  
sell orders 
Number of  
shares in sell 
orders 
I Limited-transparent 2 88 2 33 
II Semi-transparent 4 115 4 61 
III Full-transparent 3 113 2 41 
IV Opaque 3 115 2 34 
V Full-transparent 2 35 3 57 
VI Opaque 1 23 2 41 
VII Limited-transparent 2 66 4 64 
VIII Semi-transparent 1 22 2 31 
IX Semi-transparent 3 59 3 41 
X Full-transparent 2 60 2 33 
XI Opaque 3 68 3 61 
XII Limited-transparent 3 69 3 43 
Average 
Opaque 2 69 2 45 
Limited-transparent 2 74 3 47 
Semi-transparent 3 65 3 44 
Full-transparent 2 69 2 44 
 
As Table 6.7 further illustrates, the average values of  each measurement of  different price 
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transparency levels were in fact very close to each other. For instance, the average number of  
buy orders (Meanopaque = 2, Meanlimited = 2, Meansemi = 3, and Meanfull = 2) and sell orders 
(Meanopaque = 2, Meanlimited = 3, Meansemi = 3, and Meanfull = 2) in the four types of  markets 
were almost the same. With regard to the number of  shares in buy orders and the number of  
shares in sell orders, the largest difference did not exceed nine (Meanopaque = 69, Meanlimited = 
74, Meansemi = 65, and Meanfull = 69) and three (Meanopaque = 45, Meanlimited = 47, Meansemi = 
44, and Meanfull = 44), respectively.  
 
This result was, again, related to the high activity level of  traders. The number of  active 
traders in these 12 markets (see Table 6.5) did not seem to be very large. However, within one 
hour and with four markets in parallel, the average number of  buy or sell orders per trader 
reached two or three. This number exceeded the number of  the same measure per trader per 
day in the explorative study.  
 
According to the aforementioned results, it can be argued that the special trading time 
allocated to the employees motivated them to focus on participation in the internal prediction 
markets, ensuring the certain level of  traders’ participation activity, though the number of  
active traders was necessarily large. 
 
In line with the aforementioned statistical analysis results, it can be argued that when there are 
a number of  actively participating traders in an internal prediction market, their activity levels 
do not vary according to price transparency levels. In turn, the following hypothesis (H1b) is 
not supported. 
 
H1b: In an internal prediction market, an increased disclosure of  different traders’ quote 
information leads to a higher level of  traders’ participation activity. However, the 
complete disclosure of  traders’ quote information does not further improve traders’ 
participation activity. 
 
6.5.3 Effects of  Information Transparency on Traders’ Dynamic Interactions 
A Kruskal Wallis test was performed to examine traders’ dynamic interactions. Analysis at the 
trader level revealed a significant effect of  price transparency level on both Type I 
self-revisions (𝑥2(3) = 14.7, p < 0.01) and Type II self-revisions (𝑥2(3) = 14.7, p < 0.01). 
 
A post-hoc test using Mann-Whitney tests with Bonferroni correction showed significant 
differences between opaque and semi-transparent markets (U(66) = 380, z = -2.21, p < 0.05), 
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between limited-transparent and semi-transparent markets (U(64) = 292, z = -3.10, p < 0.01), 
and between semi-transparent and full-transparent markets (U(70) = 424, z = -2.36, p < 0.05).  
 
These findings applied to both Type I and Type II self-revisions. In other words, the effects 
of  different price transparency levels on traders’ dynamic interactions at the trader level did 
not differ in terms of  the type of  self-revisions. When we compared the occurrence of  these 
two types of  self-revisions in each market, we noticed that the results were identical. This 
result implied that whenever a trader adjusted his or her expectation on a contract, the price 
difference between the previous and the updated order was at least 5% of  the previous order.  
 
Table 6.8 further illustrates that the average number of  self-revisions per trader in 
semi-transparent markets was at least two times as many as in other markets (Meanopaque = 1, 
Meanlimited = 0, Meansemi = 2, and Meanfull = 1).  
 
Table 6.8 Summary Statistics for Traders’ Dynamic Interactions at the Trader Level 
Market Price transparency level 
Number of  Type I 
self-revisions 
Number of  Type II 
self-revisions 
I Limited-transparent 0 0 
II Semi-transparent 3 3 
III Full-transparent 1 1 
IV Opaque 1 1 
V Full-transparent 1 1 
VI Opaque 1 1 
VII Limited-transparent 1 1 
VIII Semi-transparent 1 1 
IX Semi-transparent 1 1 
X Full-transparent 1 11 
XI Opaque 2 2 
XII Limited-transparent 0 0 
Average 
Opaque 1 1 
Limited-transparent 0 0 
Semi-transparent 2 2 
Full-transparent 1 1 
 
However, the occurrence of  self-revisions did not differ between opaque and 
limited-transparent markets (U(58) = 383, z = -0.68, p > 0.49), opaque and full-transparent 
markets (U(64) = 499, z = -0.18, p > 0.86), and limited-transparent and full-transparent 
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markets (U(62) = 414, z = -1.03, p > 0.30). As Table 6.8 demonstrates that the average 
number of  self-revisions per trader in these markets lay between zero and one, the difference 
was in fact tiny. This indicated that traders adjusted their expectations on the contracts most 
frequently in semi-transparent markets.  
 
At the contract level, the analyses addressed the weighted number of  four different types of  
influential orders. According to the result of  a Kruskal Wallis test, there was a significant 
effect of  price transparency on traders’ dynamic interactions based on the 1-influential orders 
(𝑥2 (3) = 25.9, p < 0.01), the 2-influential orders (𝑥2 (3) = 18.5, p < 0.01), and the 
2out3-influential orders (𝑥2(3) = 15.3, p < 0.01). 
 
A post-hoc test using Mann-Whitney tests with Bonferroni correction showed detailed results 
as follows. First, with regard to 1-influential orders, there was a significant difference between 
semi-transparent and the other markets (opaque: U(30) = 30, z = -3.77, p < 0.01; 
limited-transparent: U(30) = 37, z = -3.37, p < 0.01; and full-transparent: U(30) = 31, z = 
-3.78, p < 0.01). No significant difference was revealed between opaque and 
limited-transparent markets (U(30) = 98, z = -0.90, p > 0.53), between opaque and 
full-transparent markets (U(30) = 106, z = -0.52, p > 0.80), and between limited-transparent 
and full-transparent markets (U(30) = 92, z = -1.31, p > 0.41). In turn, the most 1-influential 
orders in semi-transparent markets; and the other three types markets did not differ. 
 
Second, with regards to 2-influential orders, there was a significant difference between 
limited-transparent and semi-transparent markets (U(30) = 60, z = -2.96, p < 0.05) as well as 
between semi-transparent and full-transparent markets (U(30) = 60, z = -2.96, p < 0.05). No 
further significant difference was revealed between the other markets. 
 
Third, no single 3-influential order occurred in all the markets (see Table 6.9). In turn, 
different price transparency levels in a market did not have any effect on this measurement. 
 
Moreover, these follow-up analyses did not reveal any significant difference between all the 
markets in terms of  2Out3-influential orders. These insignificant differences were mainly due 
to the small number of  this type of  orders in all the markets (see Table 6.9). 
 
The aforementioned results showed that the influence of  one trader’s order on another’s in 
general occurred most frequently when the market was semi-transparent. Nevertheless, other 
markets did not differ significantly. The results drawn from the contract level and the trader 
level were convergent. Therefore, hypothesis (H2b) is supported. 
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H2b: In an internal prediction market, an increased disclosure of  different traders’ quote 
information leads to an increase in traders’ dynamic interactions. However, the complete 
disclosure of  traders’ quote information does not further enhance traders’ dynamic 
interactions. 
 
Table 6.9 Summary Statistics for Traders’ Participation Activity at the Contract Level 
Market Price transparency level 
Number of  
1-influential 
orders 
Number of  
2-influential 
orders 
Number of  
3-influential 
orders 
Number of  
2Out3-influential 
orders 
I Limited-transparent 0 0 0 0 
II Semi-transparent 3 1 0 1 
III Full-transparent 0 0 0 0 
IV Opaque 0 0 0 0 
V Full-transparent 0 0 0 0 
VI Opaque 0 0 0 0 
VII Limited-transparent 0 0 0 0 
VIII Semi-transparent 1 1 0 1 
IX Semi-transparent 1 0 0 0 
X Full-transparent 0 0 0 0 
XI Opaque 0 0 0 0 
XII Limited-transparent 0 0 0 0 
Average 
Opaque 0 0 0 0 
Limited-transparent 0 0 0 0 
Semi-transparent 2 1 0 1 
Full-transparent 0 0 0 0 
 
To be specific, when there are a number of  actively participating traders in an internal 
prediction market, showing different traders’ quote information leads to a higher level of  
traders’ interaction than showing no or the highest or lowest outstanding quote information. 
The complete disclosure of  price information, as hypothesized, does not further enhance 
traders’ interactions. 
 
6.5.4 Effects of Traders’ Participation Activity on Information Aggregation Efficiency 
We first calculated information aggregation efficiency, a percentage deviation of  the 
transaction price from the equilibrium price in a prediction market. This percentage deviation 
measures to what extent the transaction price reflects the market consensus. Thus, it indicates 
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how efficiently a market aggregates the information from individual traders.  
 
We considered the last transaction price and the weighted average transaction price of  a 
contract to measure the information aggregation efficiency. Table 6.10 exhibits the percentage 
deviation of  each type of  transaction price from the equilibrium price per market. A Wilcoxon 
test was performed on the 12 markets: three opaque, three limited-transparent, three 
semi-transparent and three full-transparent. The result revealed that the choice between these 
two types of  transaction prices did not yield significant difference of  information aggregation 
efficiency (W(12) = 24, z = -0.8, p > 0.42).  
 
Since the average value of  the percentage deviation was slightly smaller based on the last 
transaction price, (opaque markets: Meanlast = 40.75%, Meanaverage = 48.58%; 
limited-transparent markets: Meanlast = 27.71%, Meanaverage = 48.58%; semi-transparent 
markets: Meanlast = 22.91%, Meanaverage = 21.48%; and full-transparent markets: Meanlast = 
35.11%, Meanaverage = 35.20%), we adopted last transaction price in the following analyses. 
 
To test the effect of  traders’ behavior on information aggregation efficiency, we examined the 
linear relationship based on Spearman’s correlation coefficient. The results showed that 
traders’ participation activity and dynamic interactions had a positive effect on information 
aggregation efficiency. 
 
With regard to the traders’ participation activity, contract level results revealed that the 
number of  transactions had a significant correlation with information aggregation efficiency 
(ρ(12) = -0.81, p < 0.01). The negative correlation indicated that a higher level of  traders’ 
participation activity leads to a smaller percentage deviation of  the transaction price from the 
dynamic equilibrium price of  a contract.  
 
Nevertheless, the number of  shares traded at the contract level (ρ(12) = -0.57, p > 0.54) and 
the indicators at the trader level, including number of  buy orders (ρ(12) = -0.23, p > 0.46), 
number of  shares in buy orders (ρ(12) = -0.20, p > 0.54), number of  sell orders (ρ(12) = 0.06, 
p > 0.85), and number of  shares in sell orders (ρ(12) = -0.32, p > 0.31), did not show a 
significant correlation with information aggregation efficiency.  
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Table 6.10 Information Aggregation Efficiency Measurement per Market 
Market Price transparency level 
Based on the last 
transaction price of  a 
contract (%) 
Level of  
Information 
Aggregation 
Efficiency 
Based on the 
weighted average 
transaction price of  
a contract (%) 
Level of  
Information 
Aggregation 
Efficiency 
I Limited-transparent 28.64 High 29.81 High 
II Semi-transparent 19.26 High 23.00 High 
III Full-transparent 21.03 High 52.76 Low 
IV Opaque 36.29 High 55.80 Low 
V Full-transparent 63.24 Low 33.10 High 
VI Opaque 42.37 Low 46.35 Low 
VII Limited-transparent 30.02 High 17.88 High 
VIII Semi-transparent 19.54 High 17.21 High 
IX Semi-transparent 23.93 High 24.23 High 
X Full-transparent 21.07 High 19.73 High 
XI Opaque 43.58 Low 43.58 Low 
XII Limited-transparent 24.46 High 45.10 Low 
Average 
Opaque 40.75 Low 48.58 Low 
Limited-transparent 27.71 High 30.93 High 
Semi-transparent 22.91 High 21.48 High 
Full-transparent 35.11 High 35.20 High 
 
The aforementioned results implied that a trader’s individual participation activity did not 
indicate the quality of  the information carried by the traders. By contrast, the number of  
transactions at the contract level, representing the agreed opinion between traders, indicated 
the common recognition of  the quality or certainty of  the information carried into the market. 
Therefore, this indicator manifested the positive effect of  traders’ participation activity on the 
capture of  market consensus in an internal prediction market. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis (H3) is supported. 
 
H3: An increased level of  traders’ participation activity in an internal prediction market leads 
to higher information aggregation efficiency.  
 
6.5.5 Effects of  Traders’ Dynamic Interactions on Information Aggregation Efficiency 
With regard to traders’ dynamic interactions, all indicators at the contract level had a 
significant effect on information aggregation efficiency, including the number of  1-influential 
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orders (ρ(12) = -0.66, p < 0.05), the number of  2-influential orders (ρ(12) = -0.65, p < 0.05), 
and the number of  2Out3-influential orders (ρ(12) = -0.65, p < 0.05), except the number of  
3-influential orders, as this degree of  interactive influence did not occur among the traders. 
 
At the trader level, the results did not reveal a significant effect of  trader’s self-revisions (ρ(12) 
= -0.83, p > 0.79) on information aggregation efficiency (the number of  Type I and Type II 
self-revisions were the same in all the markets, as previously discussed). This result implied 
that although traders updated their personal expectations on the contracts, this adjustment 
did not always influence another trader’s adjustment. In turn, while different influential orders 
at the contract level had an impact on information aggregation efficiency, self-revisions at the 
trader level did not.  
 
Overall, the aforementioned results demonstrated the positive effect of  traders’ dynamic 
interactions on the reflection of  the traders’ consensus in the transaction prices. Consequently, 
hypothesis (H4) underneath is supported. 
 
H4: An increase in traders’ dynamic interactions in an internal prediction market leads to 
higher information aggregation efficiency. 
 
6.5.6 Effects of Information Aggregation Efficiency on Market Predictive Accuracy 
We first calculated the point estimation based on the transaction prices of  a market and 
identified the corresponding contract in each market. Table 6.11 exhibits the market 
prediction based on the last transaction price and the weighted average transaction price of  
contracts. The corresponding percentage error per contract compared to the actual result is 
also listed. However, it is important to note that these percentage errors are not equivalent to 
the actual results, though they are calculated based on the actual results using a master key to 
ensure confidentiality.  
 
According to Table 6.11, it can been seen that the prediction based on the last transaction 
price and the weighted average transaction price of  a contract was different in markets II, III, 
V, VII, and XI. As discussed before, the information aggregation efficiency based on the last 
transaction price in this field experiment was relatively higher than the one based on the 
weighted average transaction price. In line with our hypotheses (H5) that higher information 
aggregation efficiency leads to more accurate market prediction, we reported the results based 
on the last transaction price to Wasu Taobao. 
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Table 6.11 Market Prediction 
Market 
Prediction based on  
the last transaction price of  a contract 
Prediction based on  
the weighted average transaction price of  a contract 
Predicted contract Percentage error (%) Predicted contract Percentage error (%) 
I 300-499 54.32 300-499 48.01 
II 400-599 39.57 600-799 34.16 
III 20-100* 55.32 15-19 59.57 
IV 1,000-1,299 64.18 1,000-1,299 67.80 
V 121K-150K 98.23 151K-300K* 98.09 
VI 91K-200K* 64.95 91K-200K* 64.63 
VII 6%-8.99% 44.94 9%-11.99% 41.88 
VIII ¥8.00-¥10.99 40.27 ¥8.00-¥10.99 41.60 
IX 80-109* 69.48 80-109* 70.64 
X 200-500 38.38 200-500 38.38 
XI ¥20,000-¥50,000* 94.18 ¥15,000-¥19,999 94.67 
XII ¥700-¥999* 44.83 ¥700-¥999* 46.14 
Average 
Opaque 74.44  75.70 
Limited-transparent 48.03  62.04 
Semi-transparent 49.77  60.64 
Full-transparent 63.98  58.19 
 
To examine the effect of  information aggregation efficiency on market predictive accuracy, we 
drew a scatter plot based on information aggregation efficiency and market predictive 
accuracy, and plotted a linear trend line. The trend lines drawn based on the last transaction 
price (see Figure 6.4a) and the weighted average price (see Figure 6.4b) of  a contract showed 
that the prediction percentage error changes with the change in information aggregation 
efficiency in the same direction. This result indicated a positive correlation between 
information aggregation efficiency and market predictive accuracy, supporting H5. 
 
H5: Higher information aggregation efficiency of  a prediction market leads to higher market 
predictive accuracy. 
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Figure 6.4a Market Performance based on the Last Transaction Price of  a Contract 
 
 
Figure 6.4b Market Performance based on the  
Weighted Average Transaction Price of  a Contract 
 
Later, when the actual result was available, if  the predicted contract was the same as the actual 
one it was labeled with an asterisk “*” in the table above. As Table 6.11 illustrates, the 
prediction based on the last transaction price forecasted five markets accurately while the 
prediction based on the weighted average transaction price forecasted four markets accurately. 
This result further manifested that the prediction based on the last transaction priced was 
indeed more accurate than the one based on weighted average price.  
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6.6 DISCUSSION 
In this section, we further discuss to the results drawn from the field experiments. We 
particularly focus on the influence of  different price transparency levels on traders’ behavior 
in an internal prediction market, explaining why the corresponding hypothesis (H1b) is not 
supported. Moreover, we discuss market performance in terms of  both information 
aggregation efficiency and market predictive accuracy. 
 
6.6.1 Effect of  Information Transparency on Traders’ Behavior 
The field experiments show that the transparency level of  price information does not affect 
traders’ participation level. This result is partially consistent with Bloomfield and O’Hara’s 
(1999) research, which states that when trade information is disclosed, quote disclosure has 
little effect on market participation, as trade transparency provides information that cannot be 
obtained from quotes alone. However, considering the difference in experimental settings 
used in our study, our research findings are not fully explained by Bloomfield and O’Hara 
(1999). In their experimental setting, trade information was very much transparent, as an 
individual trader’s trade information was available to other traders in a market. In our 
experimental setting, however, trade information was very limited, as only the last transaction 
price of  each contract was presented, if  any.  
 
We argue that the most probable reason for traders’ active participation is their interest in the 
internal prediction market, though the specific interests could range widely, such as the 
business practices being predicted, observing colleagues’ opinions on the potential outcomes 
of  the future event, and the fun of  playing in the market. Evidence can be derived from prior 
studies on incentives. These studies suggested that a properly designed incentive scheme will 
motivate traders to trade and reveal information in prediction markets (Chen et al. 2009; 2010; 
Cowgill et al. 2008). It is implied that an incentive scheme is the fundamental factor that 
influences the employee’s participation level in an internal prediction market. 
 
Furthermore, the results of  our empirical study show that the presence of  the highest or the 
lowest quote information does not enhance the trader’s learning activity compared to the 
absence of  this information in an internal prediction market. A possible reason is that traders 
are very careful about signals in the market and quote information is in fact a signal in a 
market (Spence 1974; 1976). As information in a prediction market is asymmetric, traders are 
self-interested, and signals are an alterable observable attribute, some traders may place bids or 
asks which in fact deviate from their true expectations in order to affect other trader’s 
estimations and to benefit from this behavior. Activities that are carried out to affect others 
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are referred to as signaling and the individuals who act in this way are referred to as signalers 
(Spence 1974; 1976).  
 
In practice, some traders may know that the signaler’s information is not true, nevertheless, 
they would be glad to sell shares of  the contract at the signaler’s high price or to profitably 
buy shares of  the contract at a low price from the signaler. However, in the real business 
environment, particularly in a new and dynamic business, employees in an internal prediction 
market hardly know whether information is true or not. As a result, to avoid being misled by a 
potential signaler, they may not adjust their expectations more frequently in a 
limited-transparent market than in an opaque market. The increased learning activity in a 
semi-transparent market in fact is the evidence. When more quote information of  a contract is 
displayed in a prediction market, traders can better discern the quality of  the information. 
Therefore, there is an increased level of  trader’s dynamic interactions in semi-transparent 
markets.  
 
Furthermore, the complete quote information does not lead to an increased level of  trader’s 
dynamic interactions. In our empirical studies, the revelation of  all quote information in a 
full-transparent market in fact reduced the dynamic interactions among traders compared to a 
semi-transparent market. This is probably because traders usually learn from more 
representative signals (Anderson and Holt 1997). In a semi-transparent market, we show the 
highest three outstanding buy orders and the lowest three outstanding sell orders. The price 
information of  these outstanding bids or asks is the most representative signal, as it carries 
the most meaningful information. 
 
Moreover, this finding can also be explained based on the phenomenon of  information 
saturation in a market: beyond a certain point, more information does not improve market 
performance any further (Koppius 2002). Although we did not attempt to identify the point 
of  information saturation in our study, if  this point exists, providing information beyond that 
point, including the full disclosure of  all the quote information, will not further improve the 
market performance through trader’s behavior. Our result is in line with this argumentation. 
 
6.6.2 Market Performance 
We examine two aspects of  market performance, namely information aggregation efficiency 
and predictive accuracy. This field study demonstrates an internal prediction market’s robust 
ability to synthesize traders’ agreed opinion. Even under dynamic and uncertain circumstances, 
a prediction market can reflect traders’ mean belief  into the transaction prices of  contracts.  
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We further performed an ex-post analysis by dividing the information aggregation efficiency 
of  the 12 markets into “low” and “high” categories. As the values of  information aggregation 
efficiency essentially lay between 17 and 64, we classified the values between 17 and 40 as high 
efficiency and the values between 41 and 64 as low efficiency (see Table 6.10). Accordingly, 
based on the last transaction prices of  contracts, nine markets were considered to have high 
information aggregation efficiency and two markets were considered to have low information 
aggregation efficiency. Based on the weighted average transaction prices of  contracts, seven 
markets were considered to have high information aggregation efficiency and five markets 
were considered to have low information aggregation efficiency.  
 
According to the analysis above, in our field research, approximately, 75% of  the markets 
aggregated the information efficiently (see Table 6.10). This noticeable ability to capture 
traders’ mean belief  will allow practitioners to obtain employee’s agreed opinions. Particularly, 
as a prediction markets’ mechanism encourages the participants to reveal their true 
information (see 2.1.3.2), the use of  prediction markets can help companies tackle the agency 
problem, specifically that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately 
(Eisenhardt 1989).  
 
In terms of  forecasting, the agency problem usually arises due to different goals or interests 
between the principal and the agent. For example, executives need true forecasts from 
employees; however, employees may reveal a lower forecast than they actually expect, hoping 
to receive possible additional rewards for performance that exceeded the estimate. Thus, the 
use of  internal prediction markets can help executives to collect their employees’ true forecast. 
 
We noted a further interesting finding. We drew a line chart (see Figure 6.4) based on the 
average information aggregation efficiency in a market with a price transparency level in 
accordance with the data analyses shown in Table 6.10. 
 
Although our study results did not reveal a direct effect of  information transparency levels on 
information aggregation efficiency in a prediction market based on a Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient test (Last transaction price: ρ(12) = -0.50, p > 0.10; Weighted average transaction 
price: ρ(12) = -0.37, p > 0.24), Figure 6.4 suggested a non-linear relationship between 
transparency level and information aggregation efficiency. In this specific field study with four 
different transparent settings, semi-transparent markets led to the most efficient information 
aggregation.  
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Figure 6.4 Information Transparency and Information Aggregation Efficiency 
 
With regard to market predictive accuracy, our research manifested that internal prediction 
markets can make fairly accurate predictions, even under dynamic and highly uncertain 
circumstances. As discussed in the results, our field experimental environment was 
characterized by new business products within a complex industry and dynamic context. 
Under such highly uncertain conditions, 5 out of  12 markets, equivalent to 42%, predicted 
accurately; 6 out of  12 predictions were very close to the actual results, forecasting the 
contract adjacent to the accurate one. In turn, more than 90% of  the markets in this field 
study made a satisfactory prediction. The well-known HP internal prediction markets 
predicted six out of  eight accurately, equivalent to 75% (Plott and Chen 2002). However, their 
business environment was relatively more stable than Wasu Taobao. Therefore, compared to 
the 75% accuracy of  HP, we argue that the 50% accuracy of  the Wasu Taobao markets is 
significant.  
 
The aforementioned argument is in light of  Healy et al. (2010), who conducted laboratorial 
experiments to investigate prediction market performance under different levels of  
information complexity. They manipulated information complexity by altering the uncertainty 
of  the events to be predicted. To be specific, in a relatively less complex environment, the 
markets only have one true-false event; in a relatively more complex environment, the market 
features three correlated events. Their empirical studies exemplified that the performance of  
prediction markets under higher information complexity, namely higher uncertainty, is less 
satisfactory than under lower information complexity. This difference is particularly evident 
when there are only a limited number of  traders in a market.   
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Last but not least, it should be noted again that in this field study, because of  the terms of  our 
confidentiality agreement with Wasu Taobao, we did not receive the specific number of  the 
actual result. Therefore, we were not able to calculate the percentage error as in Chapter 5. 
Under this constraint, it is in fact possible that some of  the markets which predicted the 
adjacent contract to the actual one may have been very accurate, if  the specific number of  the 
actual result was very close to the predicted point estimation. 
 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
This research investigates the effect of  information transparency on prediction market 
performance. We address different price transparency levels and internal prediction markets in 
a real business environment. The objective of  this chapter is to answer the following two 
specific research questions: How does a different level of  price information transparency in an internal 
prediction market influence traders’ behavior and further influence market information aggregation efficiency? 
and How does a different level of  price information transparency in an internal prediction market influence 
traders’ behavior and further influence market predictive accuracy? 
 
The findings of  our empirical study reveal that price transparency affects market information 
aggregation efficiency through traders’ dynamic interactions. Different transparency levels 
show non-linear effects on traders’ dynamic interactions. When traders’ buy or sell orders are 
disclosed in an internal prediction market, traders learn most actively: traders actively update 
their own expectations on the contracts; the influence of  one trader’s learning on another 
occurs most frequently; and the influence of  one trader may sometimes extend to two 
different traders. However, the disclosure of  all outstanding buy or sell orders does not 
further enhance traders’ adaptive learning behavior.  
 
Different price transparency levels, however, do not impact traders’ participation level in an 
internal prediction market. This suggests that other design factors, such as incentives, should 
be considered to further motivate traders in internal prediction markets. For instance, Chen et 
al. (2010) demonstrated that traders can be motivated when their trading performance is 
associated with the endowment they receive. 
 
Traders’ participation and dynamic interactions positively affect the information aggregation 
efficiency of  internal prediction markets. Higher participation and active learning behavior of  
traders leads to a close reflection of  market consensus in the transaction prices of  contracts. 
Moreover, when enough accurate information about the future exists in a market, the traders’ 
consensus captured by the market indicates the actual outcome of  the future event. In other 
words, a market with higher information aggregation efficiency is likely to predict accurately.   
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The different price transparency levels, however, do not necessarily have an effect on market 
predictive accuracy through traders’ behavior or information aggregation efficiency when the 
environment is complex and uncertain. Even in dynamic environments, prediction markets 
have the ability to make accurate predictions. 
 
This field study has two primary theoretical contributions. First, this research extends the 
literature on information transparency strategy by demonstrating how different information 
transparency levels influence market performance. Granados et al. (2005; 2008; 2010) 
contended that information transparency can be strategically designed in order to fulfill 
participants’ goals or positions in a market, and eventually, lead to an improved market 
outcome. They argue that information transparency should be further studied as it contributes 
to market design. In this field experimental study, we designed four different transparency 
levels, representing four distinct uses of  price information, including concealing the quote 
information, disclosing the most aggressive quote information, disclosing representative quote 
information from different traders, and disclosing complete quote information. The inclusion 
of  these comprehensive information transparency levels encourages the research on 
information transparency to move from extreme cases to the exploration of  optimization. 
Moreover, the focus on quote information particularly adds to the scant research on this type 
of  information in information transparency and market design. 
 
Second, our further development and implementation of  the measurement of  information 
aggregation efficiency especially contributes to the research stream of  information 
aggregation in prediction markets (Bothos et al. 2012; Gruca et al. 2005; Plott 2000). We 
developed the measurement in accordance with the characteristics of  prediction markets; 
aggregating the agreed opinion of  traders in a market (Gjerstad 2004; Wolfers and Sitzewitz 
2006a). Although our predecessors defined information aggregation efficiency, they did not 
develop the measurement accordingly. Instead, most of  the researches measure the 
information aggregation efficiency of  a prediction market against the actual result based on 
the assumption that there is enough accurate information in the market. However, in the 
increasingly dynamic business environment nowadays, this assumption does not always hold. 
Moreover, as illustrated in this field study, managers sometimes are more interested in the 
employees’ opinion than in the accuracy of  prediction. Therefore, our measurement, which 
measures to what extent the market aggregates the traders’ mean belief, fills a gap in the 
research on the information aggregation efficiency of  prediction markets. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS  
This dissertation focuses on contemporary web-based internal prediction markets and aims to 
improve market design from the perspective of  information. It addresses two specific 
objectives. First, we aim to gain insights into traders’ behavior in internal prediction markets. 
Second, our study investigates the effect of  information transparency on prediction market 
performance. A better understanding of  those factors will allow a prediction market to better 
serve managerial decision-making.  
 
Our research entails two major research questions: (1) How do traders behave in an internal 
prediction market? and (2) How does information transparency in an internal prediction 
market influence market performance? 
 
To answer those questions, we adopted a pluralist methodology, consisting of  three empirical 
studies, including explorative case studies, laboratory experiments and field experiments. Table 
7.1 summarizes the research design of  each study, including the research focus, questions, 
method, unit of  analysis and market design. The three studies adopted different research 
methods to supplement each other, and followed the use of  sequential triangulation: the 
results drawn from each study were used to plan the method of  the following study. This 
approach allowed us to conclude substantive and comprehensive overall findings.  
 
The remainder of  this chapter is structured as follows. First, we answer the research questions 
based on the main findings. Subsequently, we delineate the theoretical contributions of  our 
study. Thereafter, we provide practitioners with managerial implications. Finally, we discuss the 
limitations of  our research and suggestions for future research. 
 
7.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
We present the answers to the two major research questions of  this dissertation in sequence in 
this section. We first elaborate traders’ behavior in internal prediction markets. Thereafter, we 
delineate the indirect effect of  information transparency in a prediction market on market 
performance. 
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7.1.1 Traders’ Behavior 
Traders’ behavior in this research focuses on two major aspects, participation and dynamic 
interactions. In general, traders do not actively participate in an internal prediction market. 
First, a small number of  employees participate in a market. A company may invite a large 
number of  employees to take part, however, only a few employees become actively 
participating traders, who frequently trade in the market during the entire trading time period. 
Second, employees spend very limited time trading in a market. Even those actively 
participating traders do not trade every day or trade on all contracts.  
 
The low participation of  employees in internal prediction markets has two main causes. First, 
most employees are motivated to trade based on their curiosity about prediction markets 
(Borison and Hamm 2009); this curiosity can quickly drop as traders’ interest in the market 
changes or declines (Dye 2008). Particularly, after they gain experience in one market, they are 
no longer interested in the following markets. Second, employees’ trading time is constrained, 
as they must fulfill their work duties during working hours. Hanson (2006) argued that 
participation in an internal prediction market requires that employees allocate time and effort 
from their regular work. The time and effort constraints, in fact, imply that employees regard 
participation as a part of  their job. Employees do not consider participation to be the priority 
during the workday, nor do they trade after hours. This is the underlying reason why the 
entertainment value (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004), which drives traders to actively participate 
in public prediction markets, does not work in internal prediction markets.  
 
Dynamic interactions between traders indicate the learning of  traders in a market. First, 
employees in an internal prediction market keep learning and incorporate new information 
into their trading activities (Bondarenko and Bossaerts 2000; Gruca e al. 2005; Rhode and 
Strumpf  2004). They do not trade actively, but they update their opinions whenever they trade. 
The empirical study reveals that more than half  of  the buy or sell orders entail an update of  
traders’ opinions; the difference of  prices between the previous order and the following order 
is always at least 5%, considered to be statistically significant. Additionally, employees learn 
from different information sources, particularly newly acquired private information. 
 
Second, one trader’s order has an impact on another trader’s order, leading to an identical 
change of  a different trader’s opinion. However, this impact is limited to two consecutive 
orders. One trader’s order rarely influences more than two subsequent orders from different 
traders, as employees rely on private information most when they make trading decisions. 
 
Moreover, an unusual price of  an order is likely to lead to an information cascade in an 
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internal prediction market, as employees believe that another trader has special private 
information about the future event. In turn, they quickly respond to this signal (Bondarenko 
and Bossaerts 2000; Gruca et al. 2005; Rhode and Strumpf  2004) and follow the same 
direction of  change. “Marginal traders” are able to discern the quality of  the signal (Forsythe 
et al. 1992; Oliven and Rietz 2004). If  the information carried by the signal is not accurate, 
marginal traders can correct the market. However, market correction requires time.  
 
7.1.2 The Effect of  Information Transparency on Market Performance 
Information transparency affects market performance indirectly via traders’ behavior. The 
effect of  the level of  information transparency on traders’ behavior is also moderated by 
market size. To be specific, when a market has only a few actively participating traders, the 
concealment of  price information of  buy and sell orders leads to a higher level of  traders’ 
activity and interactions than the disclosure of  the information. Two primary reasons are 
identified. First, when price information is concealed, traders must spend time searching for 
counterparties with whom to trade, and therefore, they follow a more aggressive pricing 
strategy (Madhavan 1995), placing a large number of  buy and sell orders and changing the 
order price every time.  
 
Second, employees in an internal prediction market have certain relevant information about 
the future event, though the information they have differs. In turn, their individual order 
prices entail their private information. When the market discloses the price information and 
the market is thin, as soon as an informed trader places a buy or sell order, he or she reveals 
his or her private information to others. As a result, while other employees immediately learn 
and benefit from this private information, the informed trader loses the advantage of  having 
private information (Surowiecki 2004). Therefore, when a market is quite thin, concealment 
rather than disclosure of  price information motivates employees to participate and learn in the 
market. 
 
When a market has relatively more actively participating traders, different price transparency 
levels have a non-linear effect on traders’ learning activities. The disclosure of  different traders’ 
price information leads to an increase in traders updating their opinions and the influence of  
one trader’s learning on another. The variety of  price information allows employees to infer 
others’ expectations on the contracts (Pagano and Röell 1996), provides them with more 
comprehensive information (Granados et al. 2010), and enables them to discern accurate 
information (Kahn et al. 2002) and learn in the market. Complete price information, however, 
does not further enhance the dynamic interactions between traders due to the phenomenon 
of  information saturation in a market (Koppius 2002). Nevertheless, price transparency does 
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not affect traders’ participation level in such a market.   
 
Furthermore, traders’ participation and dynamic interaction have a positive effect on the 
information aggregation efficiency of  a prediction market. In other words, increases in traders’ 
participation and learning activities enhance the ability of  the market to reveal traders’ mean 
belief. Higher information aggregation efficiency indicates more accurate market prediction. 
However, a higher level of  traders’ participation and enhanced traders’ dynamic interactions 
do not necessarily lead to more accurate market forecasts, as the information in the market is 
not always highly certain (Sunstein 2006a).  
 
The aforementioned research findings are summarized by the following revised research 
model (Figure 7.1) and the corresponding hypotheses:   
 
 
Figure 7.1 Revised Research Model 
 
Ha: In a thin internal prediction market, concealment of  quote information leads to higher 
traders’ participation activity; in a thick internal prediction market, the transparency level of  
quote information does not have an effect on traders’ participation activity.    
 
Hb: In a thin internal prediction market, concealment of  price information leads to a greater 
prevalence of  traders’ dynamic interactions; in a thick internal prediction market, greater 
disclosure of  different traders’ quote information leads to a greater prevalence of  traders’ 
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dynamic interactions than either concealment or full disclosure of  traders’ quote information. 
 
Hc: An increased level of  traders’ participation activity in a prediction market leads to higher 
information aggregation efficiency. 
 
Hd: An increase in traders’ dynamic interactions in a prediction market leads to higher 
information aggregation efficiency. 
 
He: Higher information aggregation efficiency of  an internal prediction market leads to more 
accurate prediction market forecasts.  
 
7.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on information transparency and prediction 
markets. With regard to information transparency, first, we theoretically develop and 
empirically test the impacts of  information transparency in the context of  prediction markets. 
This extends previous studies on information transparency that focused on B2B (Zhu 2004) 
or B2C markets (Granados et al. 2010). Prediction markets represent a different type of  
market, namely a double auction. Particularly considering the similarity between prediction 
markets and financial markets (Hanson 2006), the information transparency results of  this 
study are likely to hold for financial markets.  
 
Second, this dissertation contributes to the research stream of  transparency strategy. 
Following the seven key components of  transparency strategy identified by Granados et al. 
(2010), our study particularly focuses on information elements and potential actions (see 2.2.3). 
To be specific, we investigate the effect of  price information transparency on traders’ behavior 
and prediction market performance.  
 
Within the scope of  price transparency, this dissertation extends the current literature on the 
effect of  different types of  price transparency on markets. Price information falls into several 
categories, such as quote, trade, and order flow. Different price information components have 
different effects on a market, and even the same type of  price information may have different 
impacts on different types of  markets (Bloomfield and O’Hara 1999). By investigating quote 
information and its transparency effect in prediction markets, this research has further 
explored price transparency in designing new market types.  
 
With regard to the literature on prediction markets, first, this research adds to theory 
development in prediction markets. Prior research primarily focused on the effects of  
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incentives (such as Bondarenko and Bossaerts 2000; Gruca et al. 2005; Malone 2004b; Rhode 
and Strumpf  2004), market size (such as Berg et al. 2008; Tetlock 2007) and contract design 
(such as Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004; 2006b) on prediction market forecasting accuracy. This 
dissertation addresses prediction markets from the perspective of  information transparency. 
Advanced information technologies have driven the adoption of  web-based prediction 
markets. This research further shows how information technologies can affect the 
performance of  web-based prediction markets. In turn, this dissertation fills the research gap 
on contemporary web-based prediction markets and links the discipline of  IS to the study of  
prediction markets. 
 
Moreover, this research distinguishes information aggregation efficiency and market 
performance for the analysis of  aggregation. Existing research on prediction markets mostly 
focused on market efficiency and measured this variable by assessing the market’s forecasting 
accuracy (such as Gruca et al. 2005; Plott 2000). This measurement is based on the principle 
that if  a market aggregates information efficiently, all the relevant information will be 
reflected in the price of  contracts, and therefore, the market prediction ought to be accurate. 
Nevertheless, it neglects the truth that, in reality, no one has accurate information about the 
future. Moreover, a market successfully aggregates information, even information that does 
not necessarily lead to an accurate prediction. The reverse is also true: an inaccurate market 
forecast does not definitely indicate inefficient information aggregation. 
 
Subsequently, we propose a measurement of  information aggregation efficiency. This not only 
enables the assessment of  information aggregation in a prediction market but also fulfills the 
increased need of  companies to use prediction markets to collect employees’ agreed opinion 
rather than to forecast specific outcomes. Additionally, our study on the relationship between 
information aggregation efficiency and market predictive accuracy further contributes to the 
research stream of  prediction markets by theoretically developing and testing the relationship 
between these two variables.  
 
Furthermore, this research incorporates traders’ individual activities to explain the effect of  
information transparency on market performance. Specifically, this research investigates how 
price transparency influences traders at the individual level and the results at the aggregate 
level of  prediction markets. We take two different individual activities into consideration that 
are likely to affect the aggregation level, namely traders’ participation level and traders’ 
dynamic learning behavior. Indeed, Bapna et al. (2004) contented that understanding 
individuals’ activities is crucial to enhance the design of  online markets. Our study on 
individual traders’ activities, in turn, contributes to the design of  web-based prediction 
markets. 
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Finally, this dissertation adds to the research on new applications of  prediction markets inside 
a company, which are referred to as internal prediction markets (Hahn and Tetlock 2006; 
Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). Although the literature contains references to numerous 
companies, such as Dentsu (Pethokoukis 2004), Eli Lilly (Hahn and Tetlock 2006; 
Pethokoukis 2004), Intel Corporation (Malone 2004), Microsoft (Hahn and Tetlock 2006), and 
Siemens (Ortner 1998), that are actively employing prediction markets in their businesses, little 
scientific research has been done on the implementation and performance of  these internal 
markets. The current research on internal prediction markets is limited to HP (Plott and Chen 
2002) and Google (Cowgill et al. 2008). The lack of  empirical research on internal prediction 
markets may impede the adoption and contribution of  prediction markets in the real business 
world. Therefore, this dissertation extends the literature on internal prediction markets and 
encourages its practice in business. 
 
In addition to literature, this dissertation also contributes to research methodology by using 
multiple research methods. Multi-method research is desired but not common in IS. Mingers 
(2001) showed that only a tiny proportion of  IS empirical research adopted multiple methods; 
two-thirds of  these research combinations involved similar approaches, such as surveys, 
interviews, and/or case studies. He contended that these types of  research combinations are 
not equivalent to the desired pluralist methodology of  a wide diversity of  different approaches. 
It is in fact just a narrow spectrum centered around traditional approaches with very few 
cross-paradigm linkages. This dissertation adopts various different research methods, 
including case studies, laboratory and field experiments, and surveys. Therefore, this 
dissertation adds to IS research with a pluralist methodology and demonstrates the feasibility 
of  multi-method research in IS. 
 
7.3 MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
In addition to the theoretical contributions, the contributions to practitioners are of  
paramount importance to our research. In this section, we discuss the managerial implications 
of  our study. 
 
7.3.1 Use of  Internal Prediction Markets 
Prediction markets are generally considered as a forecasting tool, and therefore, their 
forecasting accuracy is always assessed. Similar to previous research, our research, particularly 
the case studies and field experiments, show again that internal prediction markets are able to 
forecast an accurate outcome of  future events. Moreover, the one-hour ad-hoc play time 
adopted by Wasu Taobao demonstrates that an internal prediction market has the possibility 
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to forecast within very limited market duration.  
 
Besides forecasting, prediction markets are used for many other management purposes, such 
as idea selection and information aggregation (Chen and Plott 2002; Chen et al. 2009; Chen et 
al. 2010; Hanson 1992; Hanson 1995; Ottaviani 2009; Passmore et al. 2005; Spears et al. 2009). 
In the case of  Wasu Taobao, its managers aimed to learn employees’ agreed opinions on sales. 
The corresponding field experiment illustrates the application of  internal prediction markets 
as an information aggregation mechanism. Particularly, with the proposed measurement of  
information aggregation efficiency in this dissertation, managers are able to evaluate to what 
extent the market outcome reflects the agreed opinions of  employees. This may also become 
an indicator for managers to decide whether or not the market forecast should be adopted. 
 
Furthermore, the current empirical studies on internal prediction markets are limited to the 
western business context. It is yet unclear if  any difference, such as culture, between the West 
and the East, may influence the feasibility of  using prediction markets inside Eastern 
companies. Wasu Taobao’s internal prediction markets, conducted in a new, dynamic and 
highly uncertain business environment, not only demonstrate the considerable potential for 
prediction markets in managerial decision-making but also manifest the feasibility of  
connectivity and collaboration between the East and the West through efficient IS.  
 
Finally, according to the follow-up study of  our case study, employees bring updated private 
information into a market by incorporating this information into their trading decisions. This 
behavior not only positively affects market performance but also meets managers’ 
expectations, as they use prediction markets to aggregate updated inside information from the 
front line. 
 
7.3.2 Conduct of  Internal Prediction Markets 
Given the opportunity to design, establish and operate numerous internal prediction markets 
during the research, we have gained insights into conducting an internal prediction market. 
These insights inductively yield guidance for practitioners to build up a prediction market in 
their own companies. We identify four major phases of  conducting an internal prediction 
market: design, development, implementation and evaluation (see Figure 7.2a).  
 
In the first phase of  design, all the necessary elements of  an internal prediction market, such 
as contracts, traders, incentives, market duration and information presentation, should be 
considered and determined. For instance, with regard to traders, the practitioner should 
consider access to the market, whether employees will be allowed to self-select to be a trader 
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or if  participation will be by invitation only. In the latter case, the practitioner must determine 
the number of  invited employees. The proportion of  very active traders is commonly low. In 
our empirical studies, the rate was approximately 12%. Therefore, the company may invite a 
relatively larger group of  employees in order to ensure a sufficient group of  active traders in 
the market. Moreover, the department affiliation of  the invited employees ought to be 
carefully considered. Information brought by the employees from different departments may 
vary. The relevance and diversity of  information about a future event are crucial to market 
performance. Consequently, when practitioners design an internal prediction market, they 
must take factors into consideration that influence market performance.  
 
In the second phase of  development, the applicable support infrastructure must be developed, 
including the web-based trading interface, the associated database, user account management 
and technologies and methods of  communicating with traders. System or software testing and 
the pilot study are crucial, as technical problems may demotivate employees to participate. 
Traders’ inactivity, in turn, hampers information aggregation and eventually market 
performance. In addition, due to competition and self-interest, there could be fraud or 
manipulation performed by some traders in an internal prediction market. For example, in our 
field experiments, we found that a single employee had double registered with two different 
email addresses. We successfully detected this behavior as we required each employee to 
register with his or her own company email address, which is unique to each employee. Once a 
non-company email address was found in the system, we could immediately eliminate that 
account. It is hard to prevent certain frauds, and overly restrictive game rules may reduce 
traders’ activities. However, companies must develop certain methods to detect fraud and 
measures to correct manipulations. 
 
In the following phase of  implementation, an internal prediction market is launched. Before 
the kick-off  of  the prediction market, an introduction and a trial play for traders are 
recommended. As not every trader has knowledge or experience about trading in a prediction 
market, the trial play with assistance can help them learn quickly. Furthermore, a debriefing of  
market performance and an announcement of  the winning traders is strongly recommended. 
The “game” results usually motivate traders to continue playing in subsequent prediction 
markets. According to our field experiments, we observed that traders were eager to know the 
winning results. This is probably due to the competition institution of  the market. Winners 
showed pride and excitement after debriefing and became stable active traders. Additionally, 
debriefing can be companywide, even if  only a few employees participated in a market. This 
companywide debriefing may remind or inspire some employees to become new traders. We 
considered this an important reason why many uninvited employees later actively registered 
and joined the internal prediction markets of  Wasu Taobao. 
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The last phase of  evaluation is particularly important if  a company would like to adopt 
internal prediction markets as its long-term decision-making tool, as the evaluation can help 
the company continuously improve the operation of  internal prediction markets and 
eventually better serve the company’s management. This evaluation should not only 
concentrate on market performance, such as forecasting accuracy, but also traders’ feedback. 
The company may carry out an online survey to understand the difficulty of  implementation 
and develop the solution accordingly. For example, in our case study, a follow-up online 
questionnaire study among the traders revealed that constrained time was the major reason for 
employees not taking part in the internal prediction markets actively or even at all. In the trial 
field experiment of  Wasu Taobao, the same issue was revealed. Accordingly, in the following 
experimental internal prediction markets, Wasu Taobao proposed one-hour ad-hoc play time 
of  prediction markets every day. Given this top-down encouragement, the participation and 
the trading activities of  employees were remarkably increased.   
 
Last but not least, it should be noted that for a single internal prediction market, the four 
phases occur chronologically. However, for a company running prediction markets in the long 
run, these phases in fact form a cycle (see Figure 7.2b). The previous market experience is 
always the foundation for improving the following ones. 
 
7.4 LIMITATIONS 
In this dissertation, we investigate traders’ learning behavior in accordance with their trading 
activities in a market. There in fact can be another supplementary measurement by comparing 
a trader’s individual estimation of  a future event before and after a prediction market. This 
comparison can indicate whether traders learn in a market. In the case study, we could not 
observe traders’ initial personal estimation of  sales in advance of  the prediction markets. We 
attempted to make up this limitation in our later field experiment. We asked invited employees 
to fill in their personal predictions of  the future events via an online questionnaire. 
Unfortunately, few employees provided their individual predictions. Consequently, we again 
could not execute this measurement of  traders’ learning.    
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To gain an understanding of  traders’ activities, particularly, traders’ dynamic interactions under 
different information transparency levels, we investigated traders’ use of  different information 
sources by a follow-up questionnaire survey after each laboratorial experimental market. 
However, this study did not allow us to instantly trace how a trader uses different information, 
particularly, price information for a trading decision. In addition, the survey results may reflect 
traders’ subjective thoughts regarding how they incorporated different information sources in 
their trading decision rather than the actual behavior during the market. Consequently, the 
explanatory power of  traders’ use of  information sources based on survey results is reduced. 
 
With regard to managerial practice, we did not measure decision makers’ perceptions about 
market performance. Although we explored their motivations for an internal prediction 
market, we did not evaluate the market performance based on their satisfaction. Similar to 
their different motivations, those decision makers, such as general managers, may hold 
different criteria of  a market outcome. We measured market performance based on 
forecasting accuracy in this research. Nevertheless, in practice, it is in fact more important to 
assess if  managers think that market performance is satisfactory according to their own 
criteria. A decision maker’s evaluation of  market performance fundamentally determines 
whether or not internal prediction markets will be conscientiously adopted inside a company.   
 
7.5 FUTURE RESEARCH 
With regard to the key variable of  this research, namely information transparency, we focused 
on quote information. However, numerous types of  price or non-price information can be 
shown on a web-based prediction market platform, such as the last five transactions of  each 
contract and the dynamic ranking of  traders. The presence or absence of  a certain type of  
information is in fact another dimension of  information transparency. To extend the research 
on information transparency in prediction markets, we suggest continuing with the 
aforementioned dimension.    
 
As discussed in the limitations, we intended to capture traders’ use of  information sources in a 
prediction market. We are particularly interested in instantly observing the extent and 
consequences of  the price information that captures a trader’s attention. This may help us 
understand how information transparency affects traders’ use of  information sources that 
further influence the traders’ learning. From a methodology perspective, an eye-tracking 
experiment is desired. Facilitated by eye-track equipment and software, all details of  a subject’s 
eye movement can be recorded, such as the watching sequence of  objects and the duration of  
eye stay on a certain object. Duchowski (2007) introduced the possibility of  tracking a 
subject’s eye movements to allow researchers to follow along the path of  the subject’s 
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attention. Thus, we may gain insight into what the subject found interesting, what drew his or 
her attention. We may even obtain a clue as to how that person perceived whatever scene he 
or she was viewing. Accordingly, in future research on trader’s behavior in a web-based 
prediction market, an eye-tracking experiment can be adopted. 
 
Human beings continuously learn during any form of  interactions between them. During the 
field experiment in Wasu Taobao, we noticed that some employees in fact discussed the 
markets and future events via the company instant messenger and all the employees were 
allowed to see the chat. Thus, this online chatting platform became another learning channel 
for traders. Additionally, as employees are the primary traders in internal prediction markets, 
we can imagine that employees may talk about internal prediction markets offline during their 
workday. All these information exchanges outside the market are beyond the research scope in 
this dissertation. Nonetheless, it is interesting to consider these information sources in future 
study on trader’s learning behavior in prediction markets. We may further investigate to what 
extent traders may reveal private information and learn from each other in these online or 
offline social interactions; how traders in turn incorporate learned information into their 
trading activities in a market; and if  traders take advantage of  these additional interactions to 
manipulate the market. 
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX I QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY FOR THE EXPLORATIVE 
CASE STUDY 
 
Beste Relatiemanagers *** Bank! 
 
Zoals jullie weten zijn jullie onderdeel van een uniek en belangrijk wetenschappelijk onderzoek, 
beter bekend bij jullie als de auctions. Wij willen graag wat meer achtergrond informatie 
verzamelen om de gegevens beter te kunnen interpreteren en daarvoor is deze korte enquete 
ter evaluatie van de eerste auction (verder genoemd de Maart auction) en de tweede auction 
(verder genoemd de Juni auction).  
 
Het invullen van de vragenlijst duurt maximaal 10 minuten. Alle informatie die verzameld 
wordt middels deze vragenlijst wordt met de grootst mogelijke zorgvuldigheid en 
vertrouwelijkheid behandeld. De informatie wordt anoniem geanalyseerd en alle rapportage is 
op groepsniveau en zal uitsluitend gebruikt worden ter ondersteuning van de 
onderzoeksgegevens die al reeds uit de auctions naar voren zijn gekomen.  
   
Alvast hartelijk bedankt! 
 
 
PARTICIPATIE 
 
1. Hoe actief  heeft u deelgenomen aan de Maar t auction?  
   Extreem Inactief  (0 keer ingelogdr) 
   Inactief  (1 - 5 keer ingelogd) 
   Gemiddeld (6 – 10 keer ingelogd) 
   Actief  (11-20 keer ingelogd) 
   Extreem Actief  (meer dan 20 keer ingelogd) 
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3. Hoe actief  heeft u deelgenomen aan de Juni auction?  
   Extreem Inactief  (0 keer ingelogdr) 
   Inactief  (1 - 5 keer ingelogd) 
   Gemiddeld (6 – 10 keer ingelogd) 
   Actief  (11-20 keer ingelogd) 
   Extreem Actief  (meer dan 20 keer ingelogd) 
   
4. Wat deed u meestal wanneer u inlogde in Juni?  
Meerdere antwoorden mogel i jk  
   Niets  
   Observeren van de bewegingen in de markt.  
   Actief  handelen in aandelen  
   Bekijken van de status van mijn uitstaande orders  (bijvoorbeeld toegewezen of  niet) 
   Anders __________________________ 
 
5 Wanneer er  nogmaals een auction gehouden zou word en, zou u dan mee wi llen 
doen? Meerdere antwoorden mogel ijk  
   Ja 
  
 Nee 
 
6.  Waarom zou u weer wi llen meedoen?  
__________________________ 
 
7.  Waarom zou u niet weer wil len meedoen?  
__________________________ 
2. Wat deed u meestal wanneer u inlogde in Maar t?  
Meerdere antwoorden mogeli jk  
   Niets  
   Observeren van de bewegingen in de markt.  
   Actief  handelen in aandelen  
   Bekijken van de status van mijn uitstaande orders (bijvoorbeeld toegewezen of  niet) 
   Anders __________________________ 
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GEBRUIKTE INFORMATIEBRONNEN 
 
De volgende vragen hebben betrekking op de MAART auction  
8. Hoe vaak deed u een bod gebaseerd op uw eigen "gevoel" over wat een accurate 
voorspel l ing was?  
   Altijd 
   Vaak 
   Soms 
   Bijna nooit 
  
 Nooit 
 
9. Hoe vaak nam u bij het doen van een bod het handelen van anderen in overweging? 
(bijvoorbeeld het hoogste bod, laagste verkooppri js of  laatste transacties)  
   Altijd 
   Vaak 
   Soms 
   Bijna nooit 
  
 Nooit 
 
10. Hoe vaak nam u bij het doen van een bod de pr ijs van een aandeel in overweging?  
   Altijd 
   Vaak 
   Soms 
   Bijna nooit 
  
 Nooit 
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11. Hoe vaak nam u bi j het doen van een bod de ***productie van *** van de 
afgelopen jaren in overweging?  
   Altijd 
   Vaak 
   Soms 
   Bijna nooit 
   Nooit 
   
12. Hoe vaak nam u bij het doen van een bod de ***productie van *** van de 
afgelopen maanden in overweging?  
   Altijd 
   Vaak 
   Soms 
   Bijna nooit 
  
 Nooit 
 
13. Welke informatie van buiten de auction nam u in overweging bi j het doen van 
bod?  
__________________________ 
 
14. Maart auction Hoeveel tijd heeft u besteed aan het meedoen met de Maart auction, met 
uitzondering van de briefing die u heeft ontvangen op de relatiemanagersdag? 
   Geen tijd 
   Minder dan een uur 
   Tussen een uur en een halve dag 
   Een dag of  meer 
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De volgende vragen hebben betrekking op de JUNI auction  
 
15. Hoe vaak deed u een bod gebaseerd op uw eigen "gevoel" over wat een accurate 
voorspel l ing was?  
   Altijd 
   Vaak 
   Soms 
   Bijna nooit 
  
 Nooit 
 
16. Hoe vaak nam u bi j het doen van een bod het  handelen van anderen in overweging? 
(bijvoorbeeld het hoogste bod, laagste verkooppri js of  laatst e transacties)  
   Altijd 
   Vaak 
   Soms 
   Bijna nooit 
  
 Nooit 
 
17. Hoe vaak nam u bi j het doen van een bod de prijs van een aandeel in overweging?  
   Altijd 
   Vaak 
   Soms 
   Bijna nooit 
  
 Nooit 
 
18. Hoe vaak nam u bij het doen van een bod de ***productie van *** van de 
afgelopen jaren in overweging?  
   Altijd 
   Vaak 
   Soms 
   Bijna nooit 
   Nooit 
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20. Welke informat ie van buiten de auct ion nam u in overweging bi j het doen 
van bod? 
__________________________ 
 
21. Maart auction Hoeveel tijd heeft u besteed aan het meedoen met de Juni auction, met 
uitzondering van de briefing die u heeft ontvangen op de relatiemanagersdag? 
   Geen tijd 
   Minder dan een uur 
   Tussen een uur en een halve dag 
   Een dag of  meer 
 
 
VERKOOPVOORSPELLING 
 
22 Hoeveel gepasseerde ***productie zou je gemiddeld als relatiemanager in 2007 uit het 
intermediaire kanaal kunnen halen, uitgaande van de gemiddelde hoofdsom in jouw district? 
Geef  uw indicat ie in mi ljoen EURO  
 __________________________ 
23. Hoeveel geaccepteerde omzet zou je gemiddeld als relatiemanager in de periode *** 2007 
(***campagne) uit het intermediaire kanaal kunnen halen, uitgaande van de gemiddelde hoofdsom 
in jouw district? (Geef uw indicatie in miljoenen euro's) 
Geef  uw indicatie in miljoen EURO  
 __________________________ 
   
 
19. Hoe vaak nam u bij het doen van een bod de ***productie van *** van de 
afgelopen maanden in overweging?  
   Altijd 
   Vaak 
   Soms 
   Bijna nooit 
  
 Nooit 
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PERSOONLIJKE ACHTERGROND 
 
24. Wat is uw naam? (uw gegevens z ijn louter voor de Erasmus Universite it en worden 
niet doorgegeven aan management of  anderen binnen ***, volledige anonimiteit is  
gewaarborgd)  
 
__________________________ 
 
25. Wat is uw geslacht?  
   Man 
  
 Vrouw 
 
26. In welke regio bent u werkzaam?  
   Amsterdam 
   Midden NL 
   Rotterdam 
   Zuid Holland 
   Arnhem / Nijmegen 
   IJsselland 
   Noord Holland 
   Oost Brabant 
   Limburg 
   Noord Nederland 
   Oost Nederland 
   W&M Brabant 
  
 Zuid West NL 
 
27. Hoe lang werkt u nu voor *** ***?  
   Minder dan 1 jaar 
   1 – 3 jaar 
   3 – 5 jaar 
   5 – 10 jaar 
   meer dan 10 jaar 
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PERSOONLIJKHEID 
Sterk mee oneens   Sterk mee eens 
28.1. In onzekere ti jden verwacht ik vaak het ergste.       
28.2. Ik ontspan mij gemakkeli jk .       
28.3. Als bij mij iets verkeerd kán gaan, dan gáat het ook 
verkeerd .  
     
28.4. Ik ben alt i jd optimist isch over mijn toekomst .       
28.5. Ik geniet veel van mijn vrienden.       
28.6. Ik vind het belangr ijk om bezig te z ijn.        
28.7. Ik verwacht dat bijna nooit de dingen gaan zoals ik wil .       
28.8. Ik ben niet gemakkel i jk van mijn stuk te brengen.       
28.9. Ik reken er bijna niet op dat mij goede dingen 
overkomen.  
     
28.10. Over het algemeen verwacht ik dat mij meer goede dan 
slechte dingen overkomen.  
     
 
 
OPMERKINGEN 
  
29. Ziet u het mogel ijke nut van auct ions voor ***. Indien u nog overige vragen , 
opmerkingen of  klachten heeft over de auctions of  deze vragenli jst , dan kunt 
u deze ook hieronder invullen.  
    __________________________   
28. Hoe lang werkt u nu in de *** markt?  
   Minder dan 1 jaar 
   1 – 3 jaar 
   3 – 5 jaar 
   5 – 10 jaar 
   meer dan 10 jaar 
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APPENDIX II GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS OF THE EXPERIMENT 
This experiment comprises of  three rounds. Each round consists of  a market and a 
questionnaire. The entire experiment is expected to accomplish within 60 minutes. The market 
allows you to trade contracts that represent the 2008 annual sales of  a certain product 
category on TaoBao, a B2C and C2C online market in China.  
 
Each player begins with 1,000 points play money and 10 shares of  each contract in a market. 
There are five contracts in one single market. Only one of  them represents the true annual 
sales of  the product category in 2008. During the course of  trading, you can buy or sell shares 
on any given contract. If  you think that a contract corresponds with the true annual sales 
outcome, or you believe that the price of  a contract is going to go up, buy shares of  that 
contract from other players. If  you think a contract does NOT correspond with the true sales 
result, or believe the price is going to go down, sell your shares of  that contract to other 
players. Every market is open for 10 minutes. When a market is closed, you will no longer be 
able to trade.  
 
On your table, you will find three piles of  documents, labelled as Round 1, Round 2, and 
Round 3. They correspond with the rounds of  experiments in sequence. Each pile of  
documents includes an instruction of  the web-based trading system for that certain round, the 
monthly sales from January till June 2008 of  the product in that certain round, a piece of  
private information - giving you the clue of  the true annual sales, and a questionnaire. Please 
fill in the questionnaire when a market is closed.  
  
Rewards: 
1. Attendance reward: every student who completes the entire experiment will be 
rewarded cash €10.00. 
2. Prediction based reward: You can earn €0.50 euro per share exceeding the endowment 
(10 shares) of  the contract which corresponds with the actual annual sales outcome 
of  each market. The maximum number of  shares you may earn = (total number of  
traders in your group – 1) * 10. 
3. Trading based reward: when a market is closed, the person who has the most play 
money left in his or her funds will be rewarded €2.00. However, this person must 
have conducted trading in this market. Otherwise, this reward will be given to the 
person has the second most play money, and so on. In case that there is more than 
one person are eligible for this reward, the reward will be equally distributed among 
them. 
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Please note: 
1. Do NOT communicate with any subject. 
2. Please put on the headphone during the entire experiment. 
3. If  you have any problem with the web-based trading system, please come to the 
control room immediately and ask. 
4. You can obtain the rewards only if  you accomplish the entire experiment. The 
rewards will be distributed in the end of  the entire experiment 
5. When you finish the entire experiment, please leave all the documents on your table.   
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APPENDIX III AN EXAMPLE OF AN INFORMATION SET GIVEN TO 
A SUBJECT IN THE LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS  
 
Prediction Market Platform Descriptions 
 
A: Event being predicted in this market. 
B: Status of  the market. 
C: Refresh so as to see all the updated information on the website. You may press the 
button “REFRESH” on the website frequently to see the most updated information. 
Please do not press button “F5” on the keyboard to refresh the website, as it will lead you back to the 
login screen. 
D: Number of  shares of  each stock you possess. 
E: Last transaction price of  each stock. A transaction occurs when there is a buy order 
lower or equal to a sell order in terms of  price. 
F:  Total value of  each stock you possess = D * E. 
G: The amount of  play money available in your fund. 
H: Line chart of  all the transaction prices of  each stock over the trading time. 
I: Order status, including complete, running, or infeasible. When you find an order 
becomes infeasible, you cannot delete or change it, but submit a new order. 
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J: Lowest sell/Highest buy running order of  each stock in the market. It will display as 
“quantity @ price” (e.g. 5@2). This information will update automatically, though with a 
bit delay. Therefore, we suggest you pressing “refresh” button for the most updated 
information. 
 
Please do not write on this page, as we will re-use it in the next experiment!  
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Private Information 
 
 
 
 
The event being predicted in this market is:  
 
 
 
Sales of  product category “Female Clothing” on TaoBao in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The inside information reveals that 
 
 
 
The actual sales of  product category “Female Clothing” on TaoBao in 2008 
does NOT lie in “7,911-7,914 million RMB”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please do not write on this page, as we will re-use it in the next experiment!  
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Historical Sales Information 
 
 
Sales of  product category “Female Clothing” on TaoBao  
from January to June in 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please do not write on this page, as we will re-use it in the next experiment! 
-
100,000,000
200,000,000
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Sales  533,603,383  280,266,604  538,605,370  524,056,053  528,342,806  536,052,942 
Average  490,154,526  490,154,526  490,154,526  490,154,526  490,154,526  490,154,526 
January February March April May June
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APPENDIX IV AN EXAMPLE OF A QUESTIONNAIRE AFTER EACH 
MARKET IN THE LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS  
 
1. The historical sales information from January to June 2008 was important to my trading 
decisions. 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral     
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
2. The private information regarding the annual sales in 2008 was important to my trading 
decisions. 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral     
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
3. The line chart of  transaction prices of  each stock over the trading time period on the 
website was important to my trading decisions. 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral     
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
4. The last transaction price of  each stock on the website was important to my trading 
decisions. 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral     
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
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5. The “Lowest Sell” and “Highest Buy” of  each stock on the website were important to my 
trading decisions. 
 Strongly agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral     
 Disagree 
 Strongly disagree 
 
6. Please rank the following information sources from 1 (most important) to 6 (least 
important) 
 Historical sales information Jan-June 2008 
 Private information 
 Line chart of  transaction prices on the website     
 Last transaction price of  each stock on the website 
 Lowest sell / Highest buy of  each stock on the website 
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GLOSSARY 
 
A 
 
Absolute accuracy: the accuracy of 
prediction markets that is evaluated against the 
actual outcome.  
 
Adaptive learning: a theory states that 
economic agents initially may not know the 
exact information they need to predict the 
relevant outcomes. Nevertheless, the agents are 
willing and able to learn over time. As a result, 
the agents are able to keep updating their 
expectations based on the newly-received 
information. 
 
Ask: a sell order made by a trader in a market. 
 
B 
 
Between-method triangulation: the use of 
multiple methods to examine the same 
dimension of a research problem. 
 
Bid: a buy order made a by trader in a market. 
 
C 
 
Case study: an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the 
boundaries between a phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident. 
 
Collective wisdom: see the wisdom of 
crowds. 
 
Collective intelligence: see the wisdom of 
crowds. 
 
Continuous double auction (CDA): a 
market mechanism in which buyers submit 
bids and sellers submit asking prices and the 
mechanism executes a trade whenever the two 
sides of the market reach a mutually agreeable 
price. A CDA poses no risk for the market 
institution, as it only matches willing traders. 
However, a CDA may suffer from illiquidity in 
the form of huge bid-ask spreads or light 
trading. 
 
Continuous double auction with market 
maker (CDAwMM): a market mechanism 
similar to CDA. This mechanism has a market 
maker, who is willing to accept a large number 
of buy and sell orders at particular prices. A 
CDAwMM has built-in liquidity, as the market 
maker itself  is usually affiliated with the market 
institution. Nevertheless, the market maker is 
exposed to significant risk of large losses. As a 
result, the liquidity is at a cost. 
 
Contract: a product traded in a prediction 
market. 
 
D 
 
Dynamic pari-mutuel market (DPM): a 
market mechanism that is a hybrid between a 
CDA and a PM. This DPM in turn solves the 
CDA’s problem of  illiquidity and allow for 
continuous information incorporation, which 
is not possible in a standard PM. 
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E 
 
Efficient market hypothesis: in an efficient 
market, prices always “fully reflect” all available 
information. 
 
Electronic market hypothesis (EMH): a 
hypothesis posits that advanced IT reduces 
coordination costs between suppliers and 
buyers and motivates the dominance of 
electronic market-based forms of economic 
activity. The EMH predicts that biased 
electronic markets will emerge as suppliers take 
advantage of IT to lock in buyers. However, 
unbiased electronic markets will gradually 
dominate. In unbiased electronic markets, all 
products and suppliers can be evaluated by 
buyers to make well-informed decisions and 
information is complete, accurate, and real 
time. 
 
Engaged scholarship: an implication of a 
fundamental shift in how scholars define their 
relationships with the communities. This 
engagement refers to the relationship that 
involves negotiation and collaboration between 
researchers and practitioners in a learning 
community; such a community jointly 
produces knowledge that can both advance the 
scientific enterprise and enlighten a community 
of practitioners. This approach of engaged 
scholarship can address the widening gap 
between research and practice in management. 
 
Experiment: a study in which an intervention 
is deliberately introduced to observe its effects. 
 
F 
Field experiment: an experiment employs a 
nonstandard subject pool with field context in 
the commodity, task, or information set that 
the subjects can use in the environment where 
the subjects naturally undertake these tasks and 
do not know that they are in an experiment. 
 
I 
 
Incentives: a monetary or non-monetary item 
that is given to motivate traders to trade and 
reveal information in a prediction market. 
 
Index: a type of contract, in which the amount 
that the contract pays varies in a continuous 
way based on a number that rises for falls. This 
contract price represents the mean value that 
the market assigns to the outcome. 
 
Information aggregation: a process that 
aggregates private information held by traders 
and disseminates this information in the 
market. 
 
Information aggregation efficiency: the 
ability of the market to synthesize the traders’ 
mean belief.  
 
Information technology (IT): technological 
artifacts that enable electronic markets, such as 
Internet, network technologies, and 
communication technologies. 
 
Information transparency: the degree of 
visibility and accessibility of information. 
 
Information transparency hypothesis: a 
hypothesis posits that open sharing of 
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information in electronic markets is beneficial 
to all traders. 
 
Informed trader: a trader, who has a piece of 
information about the future event being 
predicted in a prediction market. 
 
Internal prediction market: a prediction 
market that is used inside a company, only 
open for selected traders, who are usually 
employees. 
 
Insider: see informed trader. 
 
J 
 
Judgmental forecasting method: a 
forecasting method that makes predictions by 
sourcing information from individuals. 
Examples: customer survey and expert 
opinions. 
 
L 
 
Laboratory experiment: an experiment that 
allows researchers to deliberately divorces a 
phenomenon from its context, and thus, 
focuses on only a few variables in a highly 
controlled environment. 
  
M 
 
Marginal trader: a trader who is relatively free 
of judgment bias, and thus, consistently buys 
and sells at prices very close to the equilibrium 
price, which reflects all the available 
information about the future events. These 
traders are usually more rational and can drive 
the efficiency of market prices in spite of large 
numbers of traders who display constantly 
suboptimal behavior.  
 
Market transparency: the level of availability 
and accessibility of information about products 
and market prices. 
 
Market scoring rules (MSR): a market 
mechanism that is developed based on scoring 
rules. A MSR can be conceptualized as a 
market provides a two-sided automated market 
maker that is always willing to accept a trade on 
any event at some price. A MSR allows for 
simultaneous predictions over many 
combinations of  outcomes instead of 
requiring separate markets for each 
combination of possible outcomes.  
 
Methodological pluralism: a position that 
favors a diversity of methods, theories, even 
philosophies, in scientific inquiry. It lies 
between the extremes of methodological 
monism and the anarchy of an “any-thing goes” 
attitude. The emergence of methodological 
pluralism in IS is mainly due to the gradual 
unfolding of the human, organizational, and 
social dimensions of this discipline.   
 
O 
 
Outsider: see uninformed trader.. 
 
P 
 
Pari-mutuel market (PM): a market 
mechanism in which all of the money that is 
bet goes into a common pot and is then 
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divided among the winners. A PM does not 
have the problem with liquidity or involve risks 
for loss, because traders can place a bet on any 
outcome at any time and no need for a market 
maker. Prices in this mechanism, however, do 
not reflect the continuously updated 
information, as traders do not place bets until 
either all information is revealed or the market 
is about to close. 
 
Prediction market: designed and conducted 
for the primary purpose of aggregating 
information so that market prices forecast 
future events. In such markets, a group of 
traders trade in contracts whose payoff 
depends on unknown future events. 
 
Prediction market mechanism: a market 
mechanism determines how buyers and sellers 
are matched in a prediction market. 
 
Predictive accuracy: the most adopted 
measurement of prediction market 
performance. The smaller the discrepancy 
between a prediction and the actual outcome is, 
the more accurate is the prediction. Market 
predictive accuracy can be categorized in to 
absolute accuracy and relative accuracy. 
 
Price transparency: the revelation of 
information about prices, such as current 
market prices, quotes, and historical transaction 
prices. 
 
Public prediction market: a prediction 
market that gives free entry to any one. 
 
R 
Rational expectation theory: in the aggregate, 
the expected price is an unbiased predictor of 
the actual price. According to this theory, all 
available information to traders in a market is 
revealed by prices in the process of trading. 
 
Relative accuracy: the accuracy of prediction 
markets that is evaluated against the prediction 
of competing forecasting methods. 
 
S 
 
Sequential triangulation: the use of multiple 
methods which requires a researcher to use the 
results of one method as the basis for a new 
study of the same concept with a different 
method. In turn, the methods are dependent. 
 
Simultaneous triangulation: the use of 
multiple methods in the same study to measure 
the same phenomenon. By checking the 
consistency of the multiple evidences, the 
results of the study is considered more 
convincing. 
 
Spread: a type of contract, in which, traders 
differentiate themselves by bidding on the 
cutoff that determines whether an event 
occurs. For example, either one team will win 
by at least a certain number of points or not in 
a football game. Combining with the setting 
that winners double their money while losers 
receive zero, the corresponding price indicates 
the market’s expectation of the median 
outcome. 
 
Statistical forecasting method: a forecasting 
method that makes predictions by discovering 
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a pattern of historical data. Examples: time 
series models and structural models. 
 
T 
 
Thick market: a market with a large number 
of participants. 
 
Thin market: a market with only a few 
participants. 
 
Trader: a participant in a prediction market, 
who buys and sells contracts. 
 
Trader’s dynamic interaction: a trader’s 
revision of  buy or sell orders on contracts. It is 
not only the consequence of learning, but also 
the cause of another trader’s revision. 
 
Transparency strategy: a set of policies and 
decisions that a firm makes to disclose, conceal, 
bias, or distort market information. 
 
Triangulation: the combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon. Triangulation is a form of the 
pluralist methodology.  
 
U 
 
Uninformed trader: a trader, who does not 
have a piece of information about the future 
event being predicted in a prediction market. 
 
W 
 
Winner-take-all: a type of contract, in which 
the contract costs some amount of money and 
pays off only if  a specific event occurs. The 
price on a winner-take-all market represents the 
market’s expectation of the probability that an 
event will occur based on the assumption of 
neutral risk. 
 
Wisdom of  crowds: the aggregation of the 
dispersed information in groups. 
 
Within-method triangulation: the use of 
multiple techniques within a given method to 
collect and interpret data, such as a survey 
questionnaire with different scales measuring 
the same “empirical uniP3.” 
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SUMMARY 
 
The increased complexity of  the business environment, such as globalization of  the market, 
faster introduction of  new products, more interdependencies among firms and financial crises, 
has reduced the forecasting accuracy of  conventional prediction methods based on historical 
data or experts. Over the past decade, some in the business world have come to believe that 
the best forecasts emerge from neither past behavior patterns nor far-removed experts who 
analyze markets, but rather crowds; the front-line employees who are working directly with 
new products and services and interacting daily with buyers, sellers and customers in the field, 
as they have the most relevant and updated information and knowledge required for 
forecasting.  
 
A prediction market is an elegant and well-designed method for capturing the wisdom of  
crowds and predicting the outcome of  a future event. Prediction markets can be powerful 
information-processing mechanisms that aggregate the views of  multiple market traders to 
generate a prediction of  the future. Its promising forecasting results have inspired much 
enthusiasm among both researchers and practitioners in recent years. The use of  prediction 
markets for aggregating information about the future is based on the efficient market 
hypothesis and the rational expectations hypothesis. These theories suggest that prices in a 
market reflect all available information about the future, and therefore, prices imply the 
prediction of  the future. 
 
This dissertation entails two major research objectives. First, we aim to understand traders’ 
behavior in a prediction market within a firm, as traders are often front-line employees and 
their behavior in a prediction market is dynamic and has a great effect on market performance. 
Second, this dissertation adopts the information-based view to investigate the effect of  
information transparency on prediction market performance. Accordingly, this dissertation 
answers the following two research questions: (1) How do traders behave in an internal prediction 
market?; and (2) How does information transparency in an internal prediction market influence market 
performance? 
 
This dissertation adopts a pluralist methodology to investigate the research questions. The 
case study (Chapter 4) investigates the activity of  and dynamic interactions between traders in 
an internal prediction market. The subsequent laboratory experiment (Chapter 5) examines 
the effect of  price information transparency on market performance via traders’ behavior. 
The field experiment (Chapter 6) further investigates different levels of  price information 
transparency in an internal prediction market in a real business environment. 
 
The results show that in a prediction market, the disclosure of  different traders’ buy and sell 
orders enhances dynamic interactions between traders, though the disclosure does not have an 
impact on traders’ participation activity. However, the disclosure of  all buy and sell orders will 
impede, rather than further improve, the traders’ dynamic interactions in a market. 
Furthermore, increases in traders’ participation activity and traders’ dynamic interactions in a 
prediction market enhance the market’s ability to aggregate dispersed information (i.e., 
information aggregation efficiency), and eventually, lead to more accurate prediction (i.e., 
market predictive accuracy). 
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This dissertation contributes to the academic literature on information transparency and 
prediction markets. With regard to information transparency, it extends current research by 
investigating its effect in a new type of  market. Second, this work contributes to the research 
stream of  transparency strategy by focusing on a particular information element (i.e., quote 
information) and its impacts (i.e., its influence on traders’ behavior and market performance). 
This dissertation takes an information-based view to study prediction markets and highlights 
the importance of  information transparency in their design. This research distinguishes 
between information aggregation efficiency and market predictive accuracy for the analysis of  
prediction market performance by defining and developing a measurement of  information 
aggregation efficiency. It examines traders’ activities in a real business environment to enhance 
our understanding of  traders’ behavior in an internal prediction market and its influence on 
market performance, improving the design of  internal prediction markets. Furthermore, our 
empirical study in a new, dynamic and highly uncertain business environment demonstrates 
the considerable potential of  prediction markets in managerial decision-making.  
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
 
De toegenomen complexiteit van bedrijfsomgevingen, zoals de globalisering van de markt, 
snellere introductie van nieuwe producten, meer onderlinge afhankelijkheid tussen bedrijven 
en de financiële crisis, heeft de nauwkeurigheid van conventionele voorspellingsmethoden op 
basis van historische gegevens of  deskundigen verminderd.  
 
De afgelopen tien jaar, zijn sommigen in de zakelijke wereld ervan overtuigd geraakt  dat de 
beste voorspellingen niet gegenereerd worden via gedragspatronen uit het verleden noch 
middels experts die markten van ver af  analyseren, maar via de massa; de eerstelijns 
medewerkers die werken met nieuwe producten en diensten en de dagelijkse interacteren met 
kopers, verkopers en klanten in het werkveld, omdat ze over de meest relevante en actuele 
informatie en kennis beschikken die nodig is voor het voorspellen. 
 
Een voorspellingsmarkt is een elegant en goed ontworpen methode voor het vastleggen van 
de wijsheid van de massa en het voorspellen van de uitkomst van een toekomstige gebeurtenis. 
Voorspellingsmarkten kunnen krachtige informatieverwerkende mechanismen zijn die de 
meningen van meerdere markthandelaren aggregeren om een voorspelling van de toekomst te 
genereren. De veelbelovende voorspellingsresultaten hebben in de afgelopen jaren tot veel 
enthousiasme geleid bij zowel onderzoekers als practici. Het gebruik van voorspellingsmarkten 
voor het aggregeren van informatie over de toekomst is gebaseerd op de efficiënte markt 
hypothese en de rationele verwachtingen hypothese. Deze theorieën stellen dat de prijzen in 
een markt alle beschikbare informatie over de toekomst weerspiegelen en dat daarom de 
prijzen, het voorspellen van de toekomst, impliceren. 
 
Dit proefschrift omvat twee belangrijke onderzoeksdoelstellingen. Ten eerste is het doel om 
het gedrag van handelaren in een voorspellingsmarkt binnen een bedrijf  te begrijpen, 
aangezien de handelaren vaak eerstelijns werknemers zijn en hun gedrag in een 
voorspellingsmarkt dynamisch is en een groot effect heeft op de prestaties van de markt. Ten 
tweede, neemt dit proefschrift een op informatie-gebaseerd perspectief  om het effect van 
transparantie van informatie op de prestatie van de voorspellingsmarkt te onderzoeken. 
Derhalve beantwoordt dit proefschrift de volgende twee onderzoeksvragen: (1) Hoe gedragen 
handelaren zich in een interne voorspellingsmarkt? en (2) Hoe beïnvloedt transparantie van informatie de 
marktprestatie in een interne voorspellingsmarkt? 
 
Dit proefschrift volgt een pluralistische methodologie om de onderzoeksvragen te bestuderen. 
De case studie (Hoofdstuk 4) onderzoekt de activiteit van en de dynamische interacties tussen 
handelaren in een interne voorspellingsmarkt. Het daaropvolgende laboratoriumexperiment 
(Hoofdstuk 5) onderzoekt het effect van prijsinformatie transparantie op marktprestatie via 
het gedrag van handelaren. Het veldexperiment (Hoofdstuk 6) onderzoekt nader de 
verschillende niveaus van prijsinformatie transparantie in een interne voorspellingsmarkt in 
een daadwerkelijke bedrijfsomgeving. 
 
De resultaten tonen aan dat in een voorspellingsmarkt, de openbaarmaking van de koop- en 
verkooporders van verschillende handelaren de dynamische interacties tussen handelaren 
verbetert, alhoewel de openbaarmaking geen invloed heeft op de participatie activiteit van 
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handelaren. Echter, de openbaarmaking van de koop- en verkooporders, belemmert eerder 
dan dat het de dynamische interacties van handelaren in een markt verder verbetert. 
Bovendien verbeteren toenames in de participatie activiteit en de dynamische interacties van 
handelaren het vermogen van de markt om verspreide informatie te aggregeren (i.e. 
informatie aggregatie efficiëntie) en leiden uiteindelijk tot een meer nauwkeurige voorspelling 
(i.e. de marktvoorspellende nauwkeurigheid). 
 
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan de academische literatuur over informatie transparantie en 
voorspellingsmarkten. Ten eerste, met betrekking tot de transparantie van informatie, verlegt 
het de grenzen van huidige studies over transparantie van informatie door deze effecten te 
onderzoeken in een nieuw type markt. Ten tweede, draagt dit werk bij aan de 
onderzoekstroming van transparantie strategie door zich te richten op een specifiek 
informatie-element (i.e. quote informatie) en de impact daarvan (i.e. de invloed daarvan op het 
gedrag van handelaren en de marktprestaties). Met betrekking tot de voorspellingsmarkten, 
neemt dit proefschrift ten eerste een op informatie gebaseerd perspectief  om te 
voorspellingsmarkten te bestuderen en benadrukt het werk het belang van transparantie van 
de informatie voor het ontwerp van voorspellingsmarkten. Ten tweede, maakt dit onderzoek 
onderscheid tussen informatie aggregatie efficiëntie en markt voorspellende nauwkeurigheid 
voor de analyse van prestatie van de voorspellingsmarkt door het definiëren en ontwikkelen 
van een maatstaf  voor informatie aggregatie efficiëntie. Ten derde, bestudeert dit onderzoek 
de activiteiten van handelaren in een daadwerkelijke bedrijfsomgeving om het begrip te 
vergroten van het gedrag van handelaren in een interne voorspellingsmarkt en de invloed 
hiervan op de prestatie van de markt, daarmee het ontwerp van de interne 
voorspellingsmarkten verbeterend. Bovendien, blijkt uit onze empirische studie in een nieuwe, 
dynamische en uiterst onzekere bedrijfsomgeving het aanzienlijk potentieel van 
voorspellingsmarkten voor de besluitvorming van managers. 
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The increased complexity of the business environment, such as globalization of the
market, faster introduction of new products, more interdependencies among firms and
financial crises, has reduced the forecasting accuracy of conventional prediction methods
based on historical data or experts. How can we predict the future? Where can we find
information about the future? 
Over the past decade, some in the business world have come to believe that the best
forecasts emerge from neither past behavior patterns nor far-removed experts who ana -
lyze markets, but rather crowds; the front-line employees who are working directly with
new products and services and interacting daily with buyers, sellers and customers in the
field, as they have the most relevant and updated information and knowledge required for
forecasting. A prediction market, an elegant and well-designed method for capturing the
wisdom of crowds and predicting the outcome of a future event, has been, therefore, intro -
duced. Its promising forecasting results have inspired much enthusiasm among both
researchers and practitioners in recent years.  
This dissertation adopts the information-based view to investigate the effect of
information transparency on traders’ behavior and prediction market performance. The
research consists of three empirical studies. The case study investigates the activity of and
dynamic interactions between traders in an internal prediction market. The subsequent
laboratory experiment examines the effect of price information transparency on market
performance via traders’ behavior. The final field experiment further investigates different
levels of price information transparency in an internal prediction market in a real business
environment. The dissertation distinguishes clearly between information aggregation
efficiency and market predictive accuracy for the analysis of prediction market performance
by defining and developing a measurement of information aggregation efficiency. This
research, as a whole, contributes to the academic literature on information transparency
and prediction markets, and also demonstrates the considerable potential of prediction
markets in managerial decision-making. 
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